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Abstract 
 
 
General practice emerged as a distinct medical discipline in the nineteenth century. As 
independent contractors, General Practitioners (GPs) have however largely been 
‘untouched’ by centrally derived policy.  As a result, the profession has possessed wide 
discretion in relation to the way they dealt with their patients. However, due to increasing 
concerns over the cost and quality of care within the NHS, general practice increasingly 
became a focal point for the attentions of central policy makers who sought to control 
aspects of frontline practitioner behaviour. In order to do attempt to align the frontline 
behaviour of GPs with such policy aims, policy makers turned to their main tool, the 
contract.  In this thesis I am concerned with the most recent contractual changes (and its 
later variants) introduced in 2004.  In particular, the study is concerned with the impact of 
the large element of Pay-for-performance (P4P) known as the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) contained within the new contract.  QOF rewards practices on the basis 
of meeting a number of targets in relation to clinical, organizational, and patient 
experience indicators.  As a result of the scale and prescriptive nature of the targets, QOF 
had the potential to change the nature of GP work at the micro-level should GPs choose to 
follow this voluntary policy.  Previous evidence in relation to GP responses to other 
prescriptive policies such as National Service Frameworks (NSFs) and clinical guidelines 
suggests that GPs responded as workers, specifically as street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) by 
selectively by choosing aspects of policies based upon the on the criteria of whether or not 
they made the practicalities of processing their daily workload easier.  However, the 
evidence suggests that there were also instances of GP principal (those that (part-) own 
their practices) behaviour that did not conform to expected SLB behaviour but instead 
resembled behaviour that would be expected of those managers who are ‘results oriented.’ 
Based upon this evidence and the analytical possibilities the SLB framework provided, the 
theoretical view of GPs as frontline public sector workers or street-level bureaucrats 
(SLBs) was employed to understand the continuing perceived impact and responses of 
GPs to the new contract and in particular QOF. Unlike previous analyses of GPs as SLBs 
however, this study distinguished between GP principals and salaried GPs employed by 
the GP principal counterparts. Ultimately, the aim of the thesis was to address the question 
of whether or not the conceptualization and responses of GPs as SLBs was still relevant 
and useful post-contractual change. Data was collected (between Feb 2008 and Sept 2009) 
via semi-structured interviews.  In total 62 first round interviews and 24 second round 
interviews were conducted and analysed thematically.  The findings indicate that the 
financial incentives within the QOF appear to strongly influence the responses of GP 
principals and reflect their priorities as owners of, rather than workers in their 
organisations.  In addition, it appears that the Evidence Based Practice (EBP) movement 
means that salaried GPs priorities are also aligned to those of their organisations as they 
believe most of the QOF to be evidence-based.  As a result, the application of Lipsky’s 
SLB framework to explaining GP behaviour in relation to QOF is less useful than 
previous applications.  
 14
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Declaration 
 
No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an 
application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other 
institute of learning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15
 
 
Copyright 
 
i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this 
thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he 
has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, 
including for administrative purposes. 
 
ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic 
copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in 
accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to 
time. This page must form part of any such copies made. 
 
iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and other 
intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of 
copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables 
(“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned 
by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property 
and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the 
prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property 
and/or Reproductions. 
 
iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and 
commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property 
and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the 
University IP Policy (see 
http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=487), in any 
relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The 
University Library’s regulations (see 
http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations) and in The 
University’s policy on Presentation of Theses 
 
 16
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors, Professor Steve Harrison, 
Professor Ruth McDonald and Dr Caroline Sanders.  Each of you provided me with 
unique and invaluable advice which has enabled me to complete this huge and sometimes 
overwhelming task.  In addition to your intellectual input you were all incredibly 
emotionally supportive during a period of time which was, outside of the PhD, also the 
most challenging of my life so far.  You are all inspirational figures, not only 
academically but also in that you are all such great people who squeeze the most out of 
each day. 
 
In addition, I would also like to thank all my colleagues and fellow PhD students who 
were always on hand to ponder a tricky topic or simply when I needed to blow off some 
steam.  I hope that I was also of some use to you all in this capacity!  I would particularly 
like to thank Dr Peter Bower and Nicola Small who have been of great support personally 
as well as Dr Tom Blakeman, Dr Jo Protheroe and Professor Aneez Esmail who all aided 
me in my seemingly never ending quest to recruit GPs.  Special thanks go to Dr Kath 
Checkland who provided an invaluable source of ‘insider’ GP knowledge. All in all I can’t 
think of a better place that I could have conducted this work. 
 
No qualitative research project can ever occur without willing participants. I wish to take 
this opportunity to thank each and every one of the GPs who took part in my research as 
well all of the participants of the wider research project this PhD derived from. 
 
Now, I come to those closest to me.  I couldn’t have asked for a more wonderfully loving 
and supportive family.  My mum and dad have been unfailing supportive not only of my 
education but also simply of who I am and any of the endeavours I have undertaken 
throughout my life.  I hope that I have made you proud and that you can feel that this 
achievement is something of a formal recognition of the efforts and sacrifices you have 
made over the years.  To my brothers, I hope that you strive to achieve and be successful 
and enjoy whatever it is you choose to do in life but most importantly remain the 
genuinely good blokes you are.  I also wish to thank my partner Matthew and his family 
who I have grown extremely close to over the 13 years I have known them.  Since my 
family emigrated, Pauline and Jim have always made me feel as though I have another 
home where I am always welcome.  I have no idea where all the in-law jokes come from!   
Finally, I need to thank my partner Matthew.  You are simply everything to me.  You have 
witnessed the best and worst of me during this work and regardless of this your support 
was unwavering.  Having completed a PhD yourself, you knew more than I did what an 
undertaking this was.  Without you this work would have been much more difficult and 
more importantly life would be much less wonderful. 
 
 17
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my grandma
 18
The author 
I have had a varied career to date.  I studied Zoology as an undergraduate and then took a 
graduate job within a pharmaceutical market research company.  During this post I gained 
further skills and specific techniques which allowed me to apply for a research associate post at 
the National Primary Care Research and Development Centre (NPCRDC).  I am grateful to the 
interviewing panel for taking a chance on someone with no postgraduate qualifications.  Having 
successfully completed this job I was sponsored by the Medical Research Council and the 
NPCRDC to undertake the MRes in Primary Care.  Following my success in this I was offered 
another research associate post with added bonus of completing a PhD concurrently.
 19
Chapter 1 
Thesis structure and content 
1.1. The scope of the thesis 
This thesis focuses on general practice in England at a time of unprecedented change caused by 
the introduction of a new contract in 2004.  I examine the impact of this contractual change and 
in particular the introduction of the pay-for-performance scheme contained within it, known as 
the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), on the work and working lives of General 
Practitioners (GPs).  The purpose of this brief chapter is to outline to the reader the overall 
structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 The structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 plays an important role as it familiarises the reader with the broad area of research i.e. 
general practice. It provides the historical background against which the contractual changes 
briefly highlighted above, can be interpreted. I am necessarily selective but also fairly 
comprehensive, as I start the chapter at the very beginning of the GP story i.e. the emergence of 
‘the GP’ before moving forward through time highlighting key events which have shaped the 
profession to date. I end the chapter with a detailed discussion of the substantive topic of interest; 
namely the new contract, and in particular QOF. 
 
In chapter 3 I briefly discuss some of the traditional theoretical approaches that have often 
been employed when studying the impact of policies upon medical professionals before 
outlining the rationale for my chosen approach.  I provide a detailed discussion of the 
chosen theoretical framework, namely Michael Lipsky’s Street-Level Bureaucracy and 
highlight the reasons for my choice by discussing it prior applications as well as its 
relevance and limitations when applied to my topic of interest.  I conclude by outlining the 
main research question, namely, whether the conceptualisation of GPs as Street-Level 
Bureaucrats (SLBS) is still appropriate and useful as an aid to understanding GP 
behaviour and responses to centrally defined policy since the introduction of the new 
contractual arrangements, and in particular QOF. 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the overall methodology I used.  I provide details and examine the merits and 
adequacy of the specific research methods.  I also discuss the sampling strategy and approach to 
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data analysis as well as providing the details of the 62 research participants.  I conclude the 
chapter by briefly discussing my role in the data generation. 
 
In chapters 5 and 6 I present the results of my study. In chapter 3 I outline the a priori reasons 
behind the decision to separate out these chapters by GP status, hence chapter 5’s focus on the 
findings from GP principals and chapter 6’s focus on salaried GPs. 
 
The concluding chapter draws together my findings presented in chapters 5 and 6 and interprets 
them in relation to both the existing empirical literature and my chosen theoretical framework 
before providing my conclusions.  I also discuss the strengths and limitations of my study 
followed by some overall concluding comments. 
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Chapter 2 
 
A historical account of the development of general practice 
 
2.1  Introduction  
In this thesis I examine general practice in England at a time of unprecedented change 
caused by the introduction of a new contract in 2004.  My focus is to ascertain the impact 
of this contractual change and in particular the introduction of the pay-for-performance 
scheme contained within it, known as the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) on the 
work and working lives of General Practitioners (GPs).  In order to ascertain the impact of 
any change, one needs to be familiar with the context that those changes have taken place 
in and this is the purpose of this chapter. For ease of presentation, the chapter is divided in 
to 7 major sections. In each major section I discuss chronological periods marked by key 
internal and external events and I finish with a discussion of the details of the new 
contract.   
 
2.2 The origins of the Profession  
2.2.1 The appearance of the GP 
In the early 19th century there were technically three recognized medical professions in 
England; physicians, surgeons and apothecaries. The Royal College of Physicians, 
established in 1518, was the traditional domain of the educated elite. The Royal College 
of Surgeons, founded in 1800, represented the growing prestige of surgeons well before 
the technological revolution in surgery made such a distinction functionally inevitable. 
Apothecaries formed a third strain.1  The ‘general practitioner’ appears to have emerged 
early on in this period, having evolved from the apothecaries or surgeon-apothecaries of 
medieval times.2  GPs occupied the lowest rung of the medical hierarchy as hospital 
medicine was in the ascendancy and physicians and surgeons alone had access to hospital 
beds.3  The dominance of hospital medicine, with its focus on the concept of the disease, 
reflected the fact that this period was characterized by a rapid growth in medical scientific 
discovery.  This has been described as a shift away from the cosmology of ‘bedside 
medicine’ that views illness within a framework of ‘conscious human totality’, to the new 
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scientific cosmology of ‘hospital medicine’ or ‘biomedical model’a of care.4 It has been 
suggested that the dominance of the biomedical model was both a consequence and a 
determinant of the domination of hospital medicine over its community general practice 
counterpart.5  The continued and rapid growth in medical science throughout the late 19th 
and early 20th century also gave rise to a period of proliferation in medical specialisation. 
This trend did nothing to help the position of GPs who had no claim to an area of 
specialisation.  
 
One area however that did prove fruitful for GPs around this time was the middle classes. 
These patients were suspicious of the new scientific approach to care and preferred the 
more ‘warm, friendly, comfortably old-fashioned and unscientific’6(p359) approach that the 
GP provided.  In addition, such bedside care was provided within the patient’s own home 
and therefore appeared to give a degree of comfort and control to patients over the nature 
of the care received.  Such a ‘personal’ approach to care or ‘whole person medicine’6 was 
to become the hallmark of the profession, which I return to later.  
 
GPs clustered around areas associated with their middle-class patrons and were less 
present in poor areas.7  Poorer patients had access to a cheap ‘sixpenny’ medical service 
that included a quick consultation with the GP and bottle of medication,7 allowing GPs to 
process large volumes of patients, in contrast to the personal/bedside care afforded to 
middle class patients.  This entrepreneurial approach to general practice is one which has 
been the target of government policy in order to affect desired changes and is an important 
feature to highlight with respect to the introduction of the recent contract. 
 
2.2.2 The National Insurance Act of 1911 
The first years of the twentieth century saw an increase in political interest in the state of 
the nation’s health. This was stimulated in part by a shift in political attitudes towards the 
Liberal ideals of the incumbent government,8 as well as the recognition of the ill state of 
health amongst the poor.9  The response from the government was to pass the National 
                                                 
a The biomedical model has its roots in Cartesian dualism i.e. the division between mind and body. Disease 
is seen primarily as a failure within the body and results from physical trauma occurring due to injury, 
infection, inheritance and the like. 
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Insurance Act of 1911.  This provided minimal financial relief during sickness; as well as 
free medical care in the form of ‘panel’ doctors to the working population.  It was in 
essence the progenitor for the creation of a national health service. Although the act only 
provided limited coverage, it did enable a relatively large portion of the working 
populationb below a specified income level access to free GP services.6 Furthermore, the 
act presented GPs with the first real sign of state recognition and maintained their division 
from the other medical specialties.11 
 
The advent of the panel system was also significant for GPs in other ways: it established 
the concept of GP registration and provided GPs with a degree of financial security. The 
capitation system offered insurance payments on the basis of the number of patients on the 
GPs’ list. The system was so popular that by 1920, three-quarters of GPs were on the 
‘panel’ and all had a list of registered patients.12 (p111-12)  In addition to panel patients, GPs 
benefited financially from using this baseline to increase their private practice.13 As a 
result, it has been suggested that panel patients received comparatively worse care than 
their middle-class counterparts due to the incentive to minimize costs (e.g. time spent with 
panel patients) at the expense of quality of care they received.14  Concerns surrounding 
quality of care is a key feature of recent and current public service policy in general and 
will be returned to later. 
 
Finally, the 1911 Act was also significant as it established the way that negotiations 
between the state and the medical profession were to be conducted for most of the ensuing 
century.15   The government had attempted to keep the medical profession (as represented 
by the British Medical Association (BMA)) as outsiders to the policy making process. 
However, the government was unsuccessful and as a result, the final Act bore little 
resemblance to the initial (pre-BMA involvement) draft.15   Significantly, the medical 
profession’s intervention ensured that general practitioners were independent contractors 
who were rewarded by capitation payment.  
 
                                                 
b The working population was covered (albeit at different rates for men and women) by the national 
insurance scheme but workers families e.g. wives and children were not.  The uninsured were left to the 
mercy of non-governmental charitable organizations.10 
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2.2.3 The Genesis of the National Health Service (NHS) 
The inter-war period established many of the values and concepts on which the NHS 
would be based.16 It was characterized by various significant events and reports and is 
summarised as including: the creation of the Ministry of Health in 1919; the Dawson 
report in 1920;c,19 The Royal Commission’s 1926 recommendation for the extension of 
the National Health Insurance (NHI) Scheme to cover the majority of the population and 
finally the BMAs proposals for a ‘general medical service for the nation’ which suggested 
that the National Insurance should be extended to hospital services as well as the families 
of insured workers.20 
 
In summary, there appeared to be recognition of the need for a state wide health care 
system. Affirmative action on this did not occur however until the Second World War 
during which the Beveridge Report was published in 1942.  The report recommended a 
social security system supported by a National Health Service (NHS).  As public 
expectations rose, the government accepted the report’s proposals.11  A White Paper, The 
National Health Service, published in 1944 detailed the plans for such a scheme and 
proposed a comprehensive and free health service (for all).  Essentially these free services 
were to be accessed in any of the areas of the new system i.e. hospital, community or 
general practice, this became known as the ‘tripartite’ system. 
 
The 1944 White Paper proposed that GPs would be salaried and work in health centres 
under the control of a Central Medical Board.20 GPs however wanted to retain their 
independence eschewing the salaried proposals in favour of continued capitation.21  In this 
way GPs would able to retain a degree of control over their ‘pay’ (which for GP principals 
equates to the profits or share of those profits left over after the practice expenses) rather 
than receive a fixed salary. GPs (via the BMA) successfully negotiated on this key issue15 
and with the formation of the NHS in 1948 they maintained their status as independent 
                                                 
c This recommended ‘primary health centres’ (staffed by GPs) as well as ‘secondary health centres’ that 
would deal with more difficult cases requiring specialist care. The terms ‘primary care’ and ‘general 
practice’ are often used interchangeably within the literature.  There is however a school of though that see 
primary care as being broader than general practice (see17,18) however we are concerned here with primary 
medical care which is delivered in general practice. 
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contractors,d a status which the majority of GPs (80%) have to this day.22 With this status 
as independent contractors, GPs engage in a contract ‘for service and not of service; they 
are not employees.’23 (p133)   
 
The formation of the NHS was therefore significant for GPs in two major ways. First, GPs 
now had registered lists of patients that covered the ‘whole’ of the population thereby 
strengthening the role of GPs as family doctors6 by providing care to the ‘whole’ family 
(it was likely that the families of workers would register with the same GP as the already 
registered male worker). Secondly, it institutionalized the role of the GP as gatekeepers to 
secondary/specialist care as some hospitals patient entry criteria was the referral of the 
patient by their NHI doctor.24   
 
2.2.4 The 1950s – low morale and the poor state of General Practice 
Although the formation of the NHS had been positive for GPs in many ways, the 1950s 
was also a period of low morale amongst the profession, with a dip in status relative to 
other specialties.  The correspondence section of the British Medical Journal in the early 
1950s provides a snapshot view of this via the published letters from disillusioned 
GPs.e.g.25   GP complaints reflected their lack of specialist status and facilities to practice 
the scientific type of medicine that formed the basis of hospital medicine which 
commanded the dominant proportion of NHS spending.  A major factor in the low morale 
of GPs however was the difference in remuneration that specialists and GPs received.  In 
1946 and 1948, the Spens Committees recommended that a specialist ought to receive 
twice the monies that of a GP, reinforcing existing differentials.26  The level of pay that 
GPs received not only adversely affected the morale of practising GPs, but also potentially 
affected recruitment into general practice by deterring medical students from choosing it 
over hospital medicine.e  
 
                                                 
d Independent contractor status refers to ‘Principals’ i.e. those GPs who held the contract with the state and 
owned or part-owned their own practices. For many decades this was the sole way of working, however 
future changes (discussed later) led to the introduction of the ‘Associate’ or ‘Salaried’ GP. 
 
e Recruitment and retention concerns have also featured more recently and played a part in prompting later 
contractual changes as will be outlined. 
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In addition to GPs’ own concerns over pay, a series of reports published throughout the 
1950s (The Collings report;27 The Hadfield report28 and The Taylor report29 respectively) 
highlighted GPs’ resources and working conditions as inadequate. The first of these in 
1950 noted the poor condition of GP surgery premises, equipment, practice organisation 
and staffing and sympathised with their working situation.30  The second described GPs 
working alone in  their own homes, each with a patient base of between 1500-2500, and 
with the only form of assistance being their wives.28  GPs appeared to be permanently on 
duty (day and evening surgeries plus home visits) and could see approximately 25 patients 
in one and a half hours.28   The heavy workload subsequently also impacted on patients 
who were reported as receiving care not in line with the way that GPs were trained at 
medical school i.e. GPs were “forced by necessity to short-cut the detailed method” (ibid 
p 685).   
 
Finally, the Taylor report in 1954 highlighted the negative impact of fatigue and decline in 
efficiency of GP performance due to the heavy workload.29  The report recommended that 
improvements in quality of care as well as the reduction in pressure on individual GPs, 
could be achieved by GPs practicing in groups supported by ancillary staff.29 In summary, 
the formation of the NHS had done nothing to improve the service and the NHI scheme 
has simply increased the workload and placed a strain on GPs. 
 
2.3 The re-birth of general practice 
The 1950s reports are credited by some as being a key catalyst in the subsequent 
rejuvenation of general practice.31 Leading GPs of the time, Drs FM Rose and John Hunt 
argued for the formation of a professional college. A steering committee was brought 
together and the formation of the college occurred in November 1952.32 
 
In addition to the formation of a recognizable professional body, GPs also received a 
boost in their finances from the Danckwerts pay award.26 Such a boost enabled the 
realization of some of the recommendations of the various reports outlined in section 
1.2.4; however progress was slow, and the issue of pay continued on and again came to 
prominence in the late 1950s. The Royal Commission of Doctors’ and Dentists’ 
Remunerations (1960) recommended a new pay award for GPs, with regular reviews but it 
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was not until the threat of mass resignation in 1965 that the issue was really resolved with 
the agreement of the Family Doctor’s Charter in 1965, the recommendations of which 
were accepted in 1966.23  The four principles of the Charter were: 1) the right to practise 
good medicine in up to date, well staffed premises; 2) the right to practise medicine with 
the minimal intrusion by the state; 3) the right to appropriate payment for services 
rendered; and 4) the right to financial security.33 The Charter resulted therefore in an 
increase in GPs’ overall remuneration and a reduction in list sizes. There was also 
additional remuneration for 70% of the wage costs other employee nurses and ancillary 
staff (i.e. the advent of the primary health care team (PHCT)), money for improving 
premises as well as financial incentives to encourage group practice.  The advantages of 
group practice for GPs included immediate financial rewards from sharing premises and 
more general long-term opportunities for increasing income.34  From this point onwards 
the proportion of GPs working alone fell steadily and was accompanied by an increase in 
the average number of staff employed per practice.35 
 
Although the Charter raised the status of general practice and moved it towards a more 
familiar organizational form, the it has been suggested that it was also significant as the 
General Medical Services (GMS) contract tied GPs more closely than ever to the NHS 
due to their resulting financial dependency.11 Despite this, GPs were still relatively free to 
practice as they wished as the initial contract was not very prescriptive; in fact, it simply 
required the GP to ‘render to his [sic] patients all necessary personal medical services of 
the type usually provided by general practitioners.’36 In other words the profession was 
simply trusted to provide services adequately according to need.  This vague statement led 
to this type of contract being commonly known as the ‘John Wayne’ contract  i.e. ‘a GP’s 
got to do what a GP’s got to do.’37 
 
Before moving on to examine the later policy and some of the broader changes affecting 
the development of general practice to present day, the account pauses here to discuss a 
key aspect of the re-birth of general practice, namely how the profession made claims to 
the unique and distinguishing features that forms the basis of its disciplinary identity i.e. 
‘biographical medicine’. This is important for the current work as the new contractual 
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arrangements have been criticized by some commentators as risking the profession’s 
identity and preferred and/or prior models of working. 
 
2.3.1 Defining the central tenets of the profession 
The biomedical model of care was instituted as the dominant mode of care with the 
formation of the NHS.  In the 1950s however, general practice began to establish its own 
separate identity, one that was not based on the biomedical model of care. Key to this was 
the creation of the College (later the Royal College) of General Practitioners (RCGP) in 
1952.38  Although established initially as an academic institute charged with identifying 
and developing a unique GP approach to care it eventually became the voice of general 
practice as it developed into a discipline in its own right.39  The unique and alternative 
approach to hospital medicine that was identified and adopted by the College and its 
members has been referred to as a ‘biographical approach’, and originates from the 
seminal work of Balint40 who highlighted the value of doctor-patient interactions.  The 
biographical approach focuses on: 
 
…the individuality of the patient, the unity of the psyche and the soma and the 
need to get beyond the presenting symptoms to explore the history and 
circumstances of the patient’s life.41(p230) 
 
This approach therefore emphasizes the whole person, taking into account not only the 
biomedical, but also the psychological and social aspects of the patient’s presenting 
problem.  It has been argued that the shift from biomedical medicine allowed GPs from 
the 1960s onwards to develop a distinct sense of identity and their own ideology that had 
previously been lacking.42  This allowed them a basis from which to counter the 
dominance of the biomedical hospital-based approach to medicine.43 
 
By the early 1970s the RCGP had adopted the biographical approach as their own model 
of care and the language of the biographical model became the hegemonic discourse of 
their institutions e.g. the college publication “The Future General Practitioner”44 defined 
general practice as being ‘patient-centred’ and concerned with the patient’s total 
experience of illness. The features of this approach and their institution in to the 
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professional rhetoric was aided by the fact that from this point biographical medicine went 
on to form the basis of much of the undergraduate teaching and postgraduate training.45 
 
The move towards a biographical model of care as a basis for professionalism was aided 
by the fact that this was taking place in a wider context of change within medicine as a 
whole i.e. one where there was explicit criticism of the biomedical model because of its 
‘somatic reductionism.’46  Psychoanalysts in particular found the biomedical model to be 
lacking as there were difficulties in relating the observable afflictions of the mind to a 
specific physical origin. The psychiatrist George Engel in 1977 proposed an alternative 
approach which he termed the ‘biopsychosocial model.’  In his new model Engel 
proposed that the appearance of illness results from a diverse interaction of causal factors, 
from the molecular level through to the social circumstances in which the illness arose.47 
The RCGP also adopted this term and this type of language continues to dominate official 
professional publications and rhetoric. For example, the current the RCGP curriculum 
core statement states that ‘holism and patient-centredness are core values of general 
practice.’48  The RCGP uses the term holism here as defined by Kemper in that it 
involves: 
caring for the whole person in the context of the person’s values, their family 
beliefs, their family system, and their culture in the larger community, and 
considering a range of therapies based on the evidence of their benefits and cost. 49 
(p214) 
 
In the literature the terms ‘holism,’ ‘biographical medicine,’ ‘biopsychosocial medicine’ 
and ‘patient-centred’ medicine are often used inter-changeably. In this thesis the term 
holism is preferred as it is the current terminology espoused at an institutional level and 
may therefore be the terminology that practitioners are most familiar with.  Recent work 
also indicates this i.e. holism is still central to the self-representation of rank and file 
GPs50 and is also still used by GPs to distinguish themselves from other types of 
practitioners.51,52  
 
2.3.2 Holistic care: Rhetoric or Reality? 
The subtitle above is borrowed from an article53 and alludes to the fact that thus far the 
historical account has suggested that the profession successfully adopted and defined itself 
via a discourse of holism. However, whether or not this was the type of medicine that rank 
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and file GPs actually deliver remains an empirical question. GPs were historically subject 
to high workloads with inadequate resources leading to negative consequences for the 
type care provided.  Although various policies were intended to alleviate some of these 
burdens, these issues continued to plague the profession. For example, an article in 1984 
by a Professor of General Practice, questions the ability of GPs to practice in line with 
their espoused professional ideals: 
 
One remembers the description of the French Military Brothel as sacrificing 
quality to speed of throughput. This, more than Balint, is our sort of world 54(p86) 
 
In other words the day to day pressures of processing patients meant that the practicalities 
of dealing with patients in their ‘six-minute consultations’ (ibid p85) was the overriding 
factor on the approach to care.  Ten years later, another study investigated the issue of 
rhetoric or reality of care provision in general practice.53 The authors of this study 
surveyed all RCGP members to explore the extent to which the rhetoric of holism 
corresponded to the reality of GP views about their professional responsibilities. The 
results revealed that whilst GPs considered that patients with physical conditions (acute or 
chronic) to fall within the remit of their work they were more ambivalent about 
psychological problems, and social problems were not considered to be appropriate 
presenting problems at all.  Further qualitative research by the same authors confirmed 
these findings: the model of care that GPs actually appeared to work to at this time was 
more reflective of a biomedical approach to care.55    
 
Providing personal care to the individual patient has been a constant aspect of the role of a 
GP since their appearance in the nineteenth century and in particular since the advent of 
patient registration.  It is also an aspect of care that policy and organizational changes 
have affected over time. The recent contractual changes which form the focus of this 
thesis have been no exception and therefore a more detailed discussion of this aspect of 
GP work is now presented. 
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2.4 Personal and continuous care in general practice 
2.4.1   Personal care 
Personal care has been defined as care that focuses on the individual as opposed to groups 
or populations of patients.56 It is also care that is tailored to the individuals needs and is 
aided by a continuing relationship between a GP and a patient.  It is linked to a GP's 
increasing personal knowledge about the patient over time,57 and is seen as a facilitator of 
personal care.58  Personal care, has long been a feature of the definitions of the role of a 
GP.  In the 1970s the best two known definitions of a GP a placed ‘personal’ at the head 
of the list of words that define a GP’s role.58  However over time some commentators 
have suggested that this aspect of a GP’s role is lessening.56,59  This is reflected by a 21st 
century definition of general practice published in the British Medical Journal did not 
feature ‘personal care’ as such but simply discusses the individual patient and how the GP 
should organize the available resources within the system to the best advantage of 
patients.60  The RCGP’s own website however still appears to place the word personal at 
the start of its description of the GP role: 
 
GPs are personal doctors, primarily responsible for the provision of comprehensive 
and continuing medical care to patients irrespective of age, sex and illness. In 
negotiating management plans with patients they take account of physical, 
psychological, social, and cultural factors, using the knowledge and trust 
engendered by a familiarity with past care. They also recognise a professional 
responsibility to their community.61 
 
However, the question remains as to whether or not the description above is again rhetoric 
or reality remains as many would argue that policy changes since the 1990s in particular 
have placed more emphasis on general practice and the role it can play in the wider NHS. 
As a result policies have placed more of an emphasis on providing care to local 
populations over personal individual care. This in turn had implications for another 
traditional aspect of the GPs’ role i.e. acting as advocates for their patients.62 The policy 
context will be returned to after the completion of discussing a facilitator of personal care, 
namely continuity of care. 
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2.4.2 Continuity of care  
Continuity of care is considered to be a key factor in providing personal care to patients.e.g. 
58  Continuity of care has also been a key feature of general practice and was instituted as 
part of the GP role when patient registration became standard practice. It is traditionally 
related to patients visiting the same doctors over time i.e. ‘personal or ‘longitudinal’ 
continuity. However, in addition to this definition, continuity can also refer to the way that 
care is organized i.e. care that is coordinated across providers or ‘management 
continuity.’63,64 A third definition of continuity has also been forwarded which relates to 
‘informational continuity’ i.e. ‘the use of information on past events and personal 
circumstances to make current care appropriate.’65 (p354)  
 
Personal continuity of care, has consistently been an aspect of care that patients desire and 
value.66-68  However, there appears to be limited evidence as to the relationship between 
personal continuity and actual clinical outcomes69 and in some cases it has been shown to 
be disadvantageous to patients.70 Personal continuity has also been shown to be important 
to the providers i.e. GPs themselves in terms of both job satisfaction and the practicalities 
of the job, such as saving time in consultations.71 
 
The distinctions between the various types of continuity are important for the current 
study as various policies as well as trends in general practice have combined to bring 
different aspects or types of continuity to the fore and dampen others in the work of 
general practice.  For example, one of the reasons that personal continuity has been 
decreasing is due to the fact that GPs are working fewer hours and in groups employing 
ancillary staff, most significantly practice nurses.  It is to this key development in general 
practice that the discussion now turns to and combines the introduction and proliferation 
of the practice nurse, with the a discussion of the major policy drivers that encouraged 
their widespread employment and development before proceeding on in the historical 
account of key developments in both policy and within medicine itself. 
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2.5 General practice nursing 
2.5.1     Practice nurses  
The development of the practice nurse (PN) and the PHCT was largely stimulated by the 
Family Doctor’s Charter in 1965, which resulted in an increase in GPs overall 
remuneration as well providing additional remuneration for 70% of the wage costs other 
employee nurses and ancillary staff.11  Numbers of PNs were slow to increase, but by 
1977, 84% of practices had at least one PN.72  This, in combination with the fact that 
virtually all practices now employed a secretary or receptionist, meant that GPs became 
outnumbered in general practice for the first time.  This trend was continued by the 
introduction of practice managers in response to the steady increase in the organizational 
complexity and associated administrative workload.72 
 
The second major factor that affected the development of practice nursing in the 1980s 
was an increased focus on health promotion. The interest in health promotion at this time 
was aroused by concerns regarding quality. Concerns arose due to variability in various 
measures of clinical activity, such as prescribing costs, childhood immunisation rates and 
hospital referral rates.42 The 1986 Green Paper on primary care also reflected concerns 
about cost and quality.73 The main recommendation was the introduction of a ‘good 
practice allowance,’ which would provide financial incentives for good quality of care. 
This quality initiative was however rejected by the profession, who argued that any 
payment for quality of care should be achievable by all general practitioners and such an 
allowance would only serve to widen the inequalities in care between good and bad 
practitioners.33  Although the government conceded to the profession over this, it shortly 
after succeeded for the first time in imposing a new contract on the profession in 1990.  
This contract was the third key factor in the development of practice nursing and is 
considered by some to be the single most important factor in the proliferation of PNs,74 
with the actual number of PNs quadrupling between 1985 and 1995.75 
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The stated aims of the 1990 contract,f were to provide increased consumer choice and 
satisfaction, increase the range of services within practices and to link for the first time an 
element of performance with pay.76  The 1990 contract also provided a focus on health 
promotion activities by incentivizing certain health promotion activities (for details of 
these activities see77;78;79).  An investigation of the impact of the 1990 contract on general 
practice found that GPs did not view many of the newly incentivized tasks as relevant.78 
GPs considered the health promotion activities to be of ‘dubious’ value as well as aiming 
to change the focus of General Practice inappropriately i.e. the perceived move away from 
the individual patient, towards a more public health or population view of care. However, 
many practices pursued the available health promotion payments and rather than doing the 
health promotion work themselves, GPs delegated it to their PNs.78 PNs positively 
embraced the new work78 but also resulted in an estimated increase in workload by 75%, 
despite the delegation of some PN tasks down to Health Care Assistants (HCAs).80   
 
The 1990 contract also saw changes to the remuneration system for ancillary staff in 
general practice and replaced 70% remuneration of support staff salaries with a total staff 
budget, making it easier to take on a diverse range of staff.72 The diversification of staff 
included HCAs, as well as Nurse Practitioners.  
 
2.5.2 Nurse Practitioners 
Nurse practitioners (NPs) arose in the mid-1960s in the United States (US).  They started 
off working alongside doctors but subsequently extended their role by undertaking clinical 
assessments of patients, managing a range of common disorders and in some areas of low 
physician provision, acting as surrogate or substitute doctors.81 They are generally 
distinguished from their PN colleagues by their additional knowledge and skills which 
enable the autonomous front line and first contact management of patients.11  However, it 
should be noted that ambiguity exists over the use of the term ‘nurse practitioner,’ with 
much debate about the remit of their role and the qualifications that they need to hold. 82 
 
                                                 
f The 1990 contract will be returned to later on in the historical journey, however the reader is introduced to 
some of the core aspects now in order to explain the influence it had in shaping the PHCT we are familiar 
with today. 
 
 35
The introduction of NPs into United Kingdom (UK) general practice was recommended in 
1986 by Baroness Cumberlege in her report, Neighbourhood Nursing.83 The author 
envisaged the role as focussing on diagnosing and treating minor illness, work which 
would have previously been the sole remit of GPs.84   In the US, NPs have been seen as 
cheap doctor substitutes. Forthcoming recruitment and retention issues amongst the GP 
workforce and increasing demand on general practice meant that NPs in a resource limited 
system like the NHS are an attractive option.  The issue of substitution in this manner and 
extension of nurse roles has been a key aspect of the recent emphasis in the NHS on ‘skill-
mix.’g Skill mix in UK general practice is largely focused on the transfer of ‘tasks’ from 
highly qualified, expensive professionals to less highly qualified, less expensive 
professionals.86   
 
In general practice therefore as we have seen, NPs and PNs have been delegated tasks by 
their GP employers. PNs however, are also witnessing this movement of tasks down the 
hierarchy as Health Care Assistants are increasingly employed in general practice.h 
   
2.5.3 Health Care Assistants 
The final commonly employed member of the general practice clinical staff is the HCA.  
In the UK, HCA is the title formally applied to those staff working at National Vocational 
Qualification (NVQ) level 2 or 3 in healthcare.89 They are found in hospitals, but also 
increasingly in general practice, with a survey in 2006 suggesting that there were 
approximately 6700 HCAs employed in general practice.90   As with NPs however, the 
HCA label is applied without strict criteria and therefore estimates of their numbers are to 
be taken with caution.  As highlighted above, HCAs are delegated tasks that were 
previously within the remit of PN work and the types of clinical tasks they perform 
include the taking of various morphological measurements, phlebotomy, blood pressure 
checks etc.86  Evidence as to the impact of the role and issues such as competence and 
                                                 
g Skill-mix can been defined in individual, organisation and/or sectorial terms and involves: 1) mix of 
disciplinary groups involved in the delivery of a service; 2) mix of skills within a given disciplinary group; 
and 3) and/or the mix of skills possessed by an individual.85 
h For further information on this topic the reader is referred to two reviews:87 & 88 
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patient satisfaction is scant due to the relative recent introduction of their role in to general 
practice.89  
 
2.6 The Modern General Practice  
2.6.1 Managing general practice 
During the first three decades of the NHS, the medical profession enjoyed considerable 
autonomy, which has been termed  the ‘golden age of doctoring.’91   GPs could refer to 
any hospital within the UK (with financial consequences falling on the hospital) as well as 
to prescribe freely from the NHS pharmacopoeia.92 However, due to the ever-rising costs 
of providing ‘free’ public health care, the system was seen as unsustainable and interest 
grew in curtailing the spiralling costs.  In 1971 the Conservative Secretary of State, Sir 
Keith Joseph suggested that reorganization and improved management of the NHS was 
necessary.93  
 
The Conservative government from 1979 onwards made a clear move towards more 
closely managing the NHS as well as other public services11 and key driver for this was 
the 1983 Griffiths report.94  This report is widely seen as instigating a paradigm shift in 
the future running of the NHS and introduced the hitherto foreign principles of 
management associated with the private sector into the public health sector.  The report 
contained proposals for ‘general managers’ to be installed at every level of the NHS from 
the central government department of health to the individual hospital.i The ensuing 
managerial developments (despite the identification of general practice as a budget drain) 
did not however extend to general practice. However, throughout the 1980s general 
practice came under increasing scrutiny as: expenditure rose faster in general practice as 
compared to hospitals; attempts to limit hospital spending drew attention to the source of 
secondary care workload i.e. GP referrals and their role as gatekeepers; there were 
anxieties about the state of inner city general practice; a growing interest in prevention 
and the role that GPs could play and finally the government was committed to 
encouraging consumer choice, whether in health or education.15  One response to the 
situation of rising expenditure seen in general practice was the introduction of the ‘limited 
                                                 
i It should be noted that the BMA did attempt to resist the perceived incursion and restrictions that general 
managers (as proposed by Griffiths) represented, but they were as the reader becomes aware unsuccessful.95 
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list’ to GP prescribing in 1985.11 This move effectively ‘black-listed’ a number of drugs 
from being prescribed from the NHS coffers.  This relatively simple and externally 
imposed mechanism designed to manage an aspect of GP behaviour was the first action of 
many to come from central government, as GPs increasingly, and in particular from 1990, 
came under the NHS managerial gaze.96 
  
2.6.2 Griffiths Reforms 
The recommendations contained within the Griffiths report stemmed from the author’s 
experience within the private sector and this application of private sector managerial 
principles to the public sector has come to be widely known as New Public Management 
(NPM).  The advent of NPM in the UK is not unique and has been traced to the 
introduction of broadly similar administrative doctrines in public administration within 
OECD countries to around the end of the 1970s.97  
 
The appropriateness of the application of private sector managerial techniques to the 
public sector has been the subject of debate, as various analysts have argued that the 
public sector is unique and distinct from the private sector.e.g. 98  Despite these reservations 
the principles of NPM have been adopted and widely applied to the NHS and general 
practice. NPM has been described as emphasizing features such as:  
 
 ..cost control, financial transparency, the atomisation of organisational sub-
units, the decentralisation of management autonomy, the creation of market and 
quasi-market mechanisms…contracts and enhancement of accountability to 
customers for the quality of service via the creation of performance indicators’99 
(p43)  
 
Due to the occurrence of the reforms of the early part of the 1990s there is ample evidence 
of the occurrence of NPM themes of disaggregation, competition and use of contracts in 
the wider NHS and general practice and it is to the first major development, the 1990 
contract that we now turn to. 
 
2.6.3 The 1990 contract  
The 1990 contract arose out of a series of government Green and White Papers in the 
1980s, including the aforementioned 1986 Green Paper which specifically drew attention 
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to issues such as the cost, lack of service responsiveness to patients and quality of care in 
general practice.73  The stated aims of the 1990 contract, were to provide increased 
consumer choice and satisfaction, increase the range of services within practices and to 
link for the first time an element of performance with pay.76  This more prescriptive 
contract, made visible for the first time some specific requirements of the GP’s job. As a 
result, the 1990 contract has been seen to represent the first attempt by government to 
exert managerial accountability over services provided by GPs.96 Since the medical 
profession had previously been successful in bending negotiations towards their own 
aims, the 1990 contract was a clear turning point.   
 
The BMA's General Medical Services Committee (GMSC) and the majority of BMA 
members voted to reject the new contract.15 Although the government made some minor 
concessions they eventually succeeded in imposing their contract and on the profession.  
This development has been characterized as the end of the ‘gentleman’s agreement’ 
between GPs and the government.100 Whereas GPs’ status as independent contractors had 
previously placed them outside the focus and remit of wider NHS changes, the 
government used their most effective method of instigating change i.e. contracts, in order 
to move general practice towards the centrally defined and desired aims.  This was in part 
achieved by the advent of pay-for-performance (P4P) in general practice. In other words 
in 1990, the government treated general practitioners as rational economic individuals who 
would respond to financial incentives provided in order to address some of the areas of 
concern.  For example the issue of disease prevention, was to be addressed by the 
government offering incentives focussing on the practice operating health promotion 
clinics, conducting certain numbers of vaccinations and reaching certain cervical 
screening targets.15   Managerial control of GPs also increased with the advent of Family 
Health Service Authorities (FHSAs).  These new bodies took over from FPCs and were 
led by non-clinicians.  They were empowered to control health care provision and to hold 
GPs to account for their spending. 
 
In addition to the introduction of the NPM features of contracting, pay for performance 
and the decentralisation of management authority (via the FHSAs) the 1990 contract also 
created more intra-professional competition, as the increased element of capitation 
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payments within GPs' remuneration package increased interest in attracting new patients. 
Those practices that responded quickly to the incentives and provided the additional 
services could be seen as attempting to lure patients from other practices.96 The creation of 
this type of intra-professional competition was however limited when compared to the 
effects of the other major reforms in 1991 which created the so-called ‘internal market’. 
 
2.6.4 1991 reforms: The purchaser-provider split, NHS Trusts and GP fundholding 
The 1989 White Paper, Working for Patients101 contained the outline for the application of 
various NPM principles to the NHS and general practice. The proposals included within it 
were: an internal market through the separation of purchasers and providers; General 
practice fundholding (GPFH);  self-governing trust status for providers; medical audit and 
capital charging.11 This marked a watershed moment for general practice as for the first 
time GPs were brought into the central structure of the NHS.  It was also the first move 
towards the government’s vision of a ‘primary-care led’ NHS.102 
 
Prior to this, the NHS was organised via public agencies called (district) Health 
Authorities (HAs).  HAs functioned as both commissioners/purchasers of local health 
services as well as providers of those services.   However, the 1991 re-organisation 
resulted in a so-called ‘purchaser/provider split.’  HAs were split into purchaser and 
provider units and resulted in HAs losing the control of their local NHS hospitals and 
community services, which were subsequently transformed into quasi-independent NHS 
Trusts.95 This led to further competition as Trusts could compete with other providers 
such as non-local trusts and privately run hospitals for the contracts to treat the 
purchaser’s patients.103 In addition, this re-organisation introduced another type of 
purchaser, the GP Fundholder. 104  
 
GPFH was a voluntary scheme which allowed GPs with practices who held a patient list 
size of over 9000 patients, to hold budgets to purchase a range of elective secondary care 
services for their patients.105 They could purchase care from existing NHS providers, from 
private providers or they could provide certain services themselves. 
  
 40
The scheme was voluntary and GPs’ varied in their enthusiasm and entrepreneurial focus. 
GPFH was therefore unevenly spread.96  It was popular with GPs overall however as any 
savings made could be kept by the practice. In 1996 the scheme was extendedj and 
enthusiastic GPs were able to set up total primary care purchasing (TPP) schemes. TPP 
has been defined as: 
 
where either one general practitioner, or a consortium of practices are delegated 
money by the relevant health authority to purchase potentially all of the 
community, secondary and tertiary health care not included in standard 
fundholding for patients on their list.106 (p5)  
 
However, as the GPFH scheme grew so too did the concerns about its effects, as there was 
no clear independent or systematic evidence as to how savings were made or the impact of 
patient care.  The overall evidence suggests that the benefits of fundholding were 
‘patchy,107 with a recent review of the GPFH scheme suggesting that GPFH had limited 
benefits.108  However as no data on outcomes or on the way in which savings were used 
were available it was not possible for the authors to comment on the extent to which 
savings were achieved at the expense of patient care. The literature also suggests that 
Fundholders were able to achieve shorter waiting times than non-fundholding GPs 
pointing to the development of a ‘two-tier’ system.  In addition, GPs’ budgets were 
funded on historical patterns, and were generally greater per patient than non-
fundholders.11,15 However, a post-hoc analysis showed that GPFH patients were overall, 
less satisfied than those in non-fundholding practices.109 
 
GPFH was a key factor in the development of general practice management.  Historically 
managerial responsibilities included and were limited to the employment, supervision, and 
human resources associated with their staff. Whilst, they had also in effect been managers 
of NHS resources via their gatekeeping function, GPs were not directly accountable for 
their decisions regarding NHS resources. GPFH gave GPs a new managerial function by 
extending their managerial tasks to include purchasing. Fundholders were provided with a 
‘management allowance’ and many used this to employ managers from outside the 
                                                 
j There were TPP pilots from 1994 but the scheme was officially available from 1996. 
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NHS.72  This brought new skills into general practice.  In addition, each fundholding 
practice had a ‘lead GP,’ who took on part-time managerial responsibilities.110 
 
2.7 1997 – The Act and the White Paper 
The 1990 GP contract (with its narrow range of performance indicators and quality 
assurance mechanisms) had proved limited in its ability to address quality issues, 
especially those arising due to poor organisational integration.96 In addition, the single 
national contracting arrangement was insufficient to address the new needs and trends that 
had occurred within the profession.  For instance, rank and file GPs complained of the 
rigidity of the working modes that existed in general practice when compared to the wider 
labour market, as well as the fact that many new recruits expressing a wish to avoid the 
commitment of a partnership.33  In addition, the remit of general practice increased to 
accommodate areas of work such as health promotion and screening, as a result of the 
1990 contract, which meant increased demand on general practice.  Furthermore, the 
1990/1 reforms also led to an increase in the administrative workload.111  By 1990, the 
average GP did a 65 hour working week (not counting medico-political activity and 
continuing professional education) with just under 24 of these hours was being on call.112  
As a result of the  reforms and high workload, GP job satisfaction between 1987 and 1990 
declined.113 Work-related stress around this time was also high in 1990 compared to 1987,  
due to the day to day demands of the job.114 An increase in stress and a decrease in job 
satisfaction was also identified when GP responses were compared in 1987 and 1993.115  
A postal survey found that one of the key work-related factors for young GP principals, of 
both sexes, leaving the profession was that they wanted choice in the level of 
responsibility they wanted at work.116  In addition, one of the most significant personal-
factors was due to their childcare commitments, a factor reflective of the fact that females 
were increasing a major component of the GP workforce. Such issues had started to affect 
GP recruitment117 and therefore had to be addressed by the government.  Three 
Conservative government White Papers were published and culminated ultimately in the 
NHS (Primary Care) Act 1997.  This was followed by the 1997  Labour government 
White Paper The New NHS – Modern, Dependable118 which continued many of the 
Conservative government themes. Some of the key changes as a result of these policies 
are now discussed.   
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2.7.1 Personal Medical Services (PMS) Pilots 
The 1997 Act contained various measures intended to free up some of the perceived 
barrier to providing quality care as well as addressing some of the recruitment issues 
within the GP workforce.  In particular, it introduced a new voluntary scheme Primary 
Care Act Pilots (PCAPs). The scheme meant that that GPs could now be employed on a 
more flexible salaried basis by local providers i.e. HAs, Trusts or GP practices. A first 
wave of PCAPs began in April 1998 and were soon renamed Personal Medical Services 
(PMS) pilots.119 Unlike GMS contracts, they are negotiated between the local 
commissioning organisation and the individual GP practice (not the individual GP), and 
are not subject to direct national negotiations between the Department of Health and the 
General Practitioners Committee of the BMA. The terms of these PMS contracts are 
designed specifically to meet those local needs and contributing to poor quality care e.g. 
deprived areas with low GP provision.120  In addition to PMS, there was also a PMS plus 
(PMS +) option, which provided in addition a range of community services.121  These 
arrangements meant that GPs were accountable for both the financial consequences of 
their actions and for the quality of care they provide.  PMS contracts proved popular as by 
2008, 47% of GPs were in practices with a PMS contract.122 At the time of writing, the 
latest available figures show that salaried GPs are an increasingly large proportion of the 
workforce, from 3% in 2001 to 20% in 2008. In 2003, there were 1712 salaried GPs in 
England, this rose to 6022 by 2007 and by a further 10% in the past year.122  GP principals 
however still comprise the majority of the GP workforce and were numbered at 28, 607 as 
of the 30th of September 2009.122  This figure represented 80% of the GP workforce.  
Significantly, the new PMS arrangements meant that the professions long fought rights 
and privileged position associated with their status as independent contractors was being 
undermined, but the impetus for the introduction of these salaried posts had arisen 
primarily from within the profession due to the desires for flexible working and a reduced 
workload. 
  
2.7.2 1997 - The New NHS – Modern, Dependable  
The proposals contained within the 1997 White Paper118 represented some major changes 
for general practice, most of which remain in place today. The first key proposal was the 
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abolition of GPFH (in all forms), which occurred in 1999.  In its place the government 
established Primary Care Groups (PCGs) which contained all the practices (approx. 50) 
within one geographic area (equivalent to approx. 100,000 people) meaning that all 
practices had to work collaboratively. Although they were initially presented as voluntary 
and operated as subcommittees of health authorities, the government stated in 2001, that 
they would make all PCGs freestanding Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) by 2004, with a 
responsibility to provide and in particular commission (including hospital) health care for 
their areas from a single cash limited budget.123 This development represented a partial 
return to the integrated system, but one which all GPs were now subject to.11 However, 
PCGs were relatively popular with GPs as the management structure, gave substantial 
control to an executive committee on which GPs comprised the majority.95 As a result of 
these changes GPs, were moved away from a position of being able to protect their 
relationships with patients by blaming the faceless HA for the consequences of rationing 
as they themselves were now in that rationing position.96  This also had the implication of 
moving those GPs holding managerial posts into considering their decisions away from 
the (traditional) individual patient and towards a population view.  
 
A second central feature of the White Paper was an emphasis on managerial 
accountability and performance management. PCTs were to be subject to ongoing 
assessments of performance via performance indicators (PIs). PCTs were to be 
accountable to health authorities, and to work towards agreed targets and annual 
accountability agreements for improving health. 
 
A third key feature was the development of local systems of clinical governance, officially 
described as: 
a framework through which NHS organisations are accountable for continuously 
improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of care by 
creating an environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish.124 (p33) 
 
Clinical governance was intended to comprehensively address poor performance, 
wherever it was found within the clinical team, although the mechanisms by which this 
would be accomplished remained obscure. 
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The final key feature of the proposals was the establishment of a new set of NHS 
Institutions, namely, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, now the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) and the Commission for Health 
Improvement (CHI), subsequently the Healthcare Commission and now the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC).  The formation of NICE was intended as a way of promoting clinical 
and cost-effectiveness as well as producing and disseminating clinical guidelines 
illustrating best practice.  NICE is supposed to achieve its aims by undertaking ‘evidence-
based’ appraisals on new or existing clinical interventions, the result of which determines 
whether or not that intervention becomes a feature of NHS provision. Compliance with 
NICE recommendations was to be monitored by CHI. CHI has been described as the 
‘enforcer’ to go alongside the ‘standard setter’ role occupied by NICE.125 The White 
Paper's proposals therefore in theory posed a considerable threat to GPs’ prescribing or 
referring autonomy, as they would be restricted by the recommendations made by NICE.  
 
2.7.3 Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) 
The story thus far has suggested that General Practice has progressively become more 
actively managed by external parties i.e. the government. One key development however 
which aided in this process is the rise of evidence based medicine (EBM). EBM has been 
defined by one of its leading proponents, as: 
  
the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making 
decisions about the care of individual patients.126(ibid p71) 
 
The sentiments of this statement have been extended across other professions, such as 
nursing but also across others such as teachers and social workers. As a result the catch all 
phrase of Evidence Based Practice (EBP) is now commonly used. Given that work in 
general practice can be conducted by a number of health professionals, and due to the 
common use of the term EBP in the current literature, EBP is preferred here.  
 
Through EBP it is assumed therefore that one can obtain valid and reliable knowledge via 
the accumulation of sound research which can then be used to formulate ‘clinical 
guidelines’. These have been defined as ‘systematically developed statements which assist 
clinicians and patients in making decisions about appropriate treatment for specific 
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conditions’.127   The validity and reliability of such scientifically produced knowledge 
however is not equal, there is a ‘hierarchy of evidence’ with meta-analyses and 
Randomised Controlled Trials or RCTs sitting at the top (see table 1). 
 
Table 1 The ‘hierarchy of evidence’ (source 128)  
Level of evidence Description Grade of recommendation 
1 Meta-analyses or individual 
randomised trials in which the 
lower limit of the confidence 
interval for the treatment effect 
exceeds the minimal clinically 
important benefit 
A 
2 Meta-analyses or individual 
randomised trials in which the 
lower limit of the confidence 
interval for the treatment effect 
overlaps the minimal clinically 
important benefit 
B 
3 Non-randomised concurrent cohort 
studies 
C 
4 Nonrandomised historic cohort 
studies 
C 
5 Case-series C 
 
It has been argued that EBP has become official policy in the NHS129 and that there are in 
fact four models of the way that medical knowledge can be implemented130 (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 illustrates two spectrums, one around knowledge and the other around its 
implementation. The personal knowledge pole implies that the individual, in this case 
clinicians, internalise and then apply the knowledge, so that the application of the EBP is a 
result of the internal motivation of the individual. The other pole implies that external 
forces via managerial and/or organisational effort are required in order to implement EBP. 
This knowledge may take the form of standards as contained within protocols or clinical 
guidelines as described earlier. This is not to say however that there are not areas of 
discretion left for the individual, as the so called ‘gold-standard’ of EBPs i.e. (RCTs) are 
conducted for a specific patient population under experimental procedures and not at the 
individual patient level. 
 
In the reflective practice model, professionals are assumed to be self-critical and reactive 
to the observations of the effects of the clinical care of individual patients (using for 
example systematic methods of audit).  The professional consensus model takes this 
concept further by the bringing together of professional elites at consensus conferences to 
discuss both formal, published knowledge with informal personal knowledge. The results 
of which are intended to guide the rank and file practitioners.  
 
Figure 1: The Four models of EBP (source: 133) 
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The third model, the so-called Critical appraisal model, reflects its preferred approach to 
the interrogation of published research. This is the model favoured by David Sackett, a 
key proponent of the EBP approach.  Valid knowledge is derived from RCTs and 
individual practitioners are supposed to devote time to integrating this source of 
knowledge with that derived from their personal interactions with a particular patient.  
However, not all practitioners are equipped with the necessary skills or time in order to be 
an effective appraiser of the available evidence and therefore additional training may be 
required, however there can be an issue when attempting to teach these skills. 
 
The final model is called Scientific Bureaucratic Medicine (SBM). This model prioritises 
knowledge derived from the hierarchy of evidence, particularly RCTs and meta-analyses. 
It downgrades the relevance of personal experience and assumes that as busy practitioners, 
individuals will not have the necessary time or skills to follow the critical appraisal 
approach.  Subsequently, the findings from the literature are distilled into manageable 
‘bytes’ of knowledge in the form of protocols or guidelines that are assumed (and 
enforced in some cases) to influence practice: 
 
The logic, though not always the overt form, of guidelines is essentially 
algorithmic—that is, it guides the user to courses of (diagnostic or therapeutic) 
action, dependent upon stated prior conditions: ‘if ... then’ logic. The logic is also 
normative—that is, it tells the clinician what ought to be done. In general, 
guidelines do not claim either to be applicable to all patients or to determine 
clinical action completely, so degrees of discretion are left. Albeit in the highly 
professionalized context of healthcare organisations, such guidelines are a species 
of bureaucratic rule, hence our chosen label.130 (ibid p6) 
 
Some argue that the SBM model had become institutionalised within the structure of the 
NHS from the 1990s in three key areas.95 The first area is that clinical guidelines have 
become ubiquitous and arose during a period of increasing managerial, professional and 
organisational pressures for their implementation.  The advent of NICE, as discussed 
above, also contributed to the proliferation of such guidelines.  
 
Second, there was the introduction of National Service Frameworks (NSFs) first 
mentioned in the 1997 White Paper. These detailed documents provide defined care 
pathways through all levels of care (primary through to tertiary), in which a particular type 
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of patient (e.g. coronary heart disease, mental health etc) are expected to pass through.131 
Although they are to some extent evidence based they are also heavily concerned with the 
organisation of those services in question.  All those working in the NHS are expected to 
implement NSFs as part of the clinical governance arrangements and the CQC are 
required check on these arrangements.   An investigation into the implementation of NSFs 
(across 5 general practice case-study sites) however revealed that in practice 
implementation was uneven. This has been  attributed to the fact that although GPs 
reported positive attitudes to the concept of NSFs, they were in practice not using them 
due to the perception that the NSF documents were too large and complex to aid in the 
practical requirements of processing their day to day  patient workload.132  
 
The third and final institution of SBM, and the focus of this work is the ‘new’ (2004) GP 
contract and the associated QOF.  QOF is essentially a pay-for-performance scheme based 
on the achievement of various, largely clinical, indicators which are in some way 
evidence-based.133  One can say therefore that style of medicine that QOF encourages 
(with its clinical content being underpinned by large scale population RCTs) is usually 
recognisable as being from a public health perspective. However, as described earlier, GPs 
have traditionally defined themselves and their role in terms of a holistic approach to care, 
with the individual patient being the focus of their work.  There is therefore potential for 
role tensions to occur, although of course as has been discussed, this may be more of a 
fiction than fact.   
 
2.8 The New General Practice 
In March 2003, the majority of GPs (79.4%) voted in favour of the adoption of new GMS  
contracting arrangements which contained a prescriptive but optional (146 incentivised 
targets) pay-for-performance scheme in the form of QOF.134  Given that the 1990 contract, 
which contained by comparison a small element of P4P targets, was rejected by the 
profession, it seems pertinent to outline briefly the reasons underlying this sea-change in 
opinion in only a decade or so later and which led to significant change occurring in 
general practice. 
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Familiar issues within the workforce had re-surfaced and needed to be addressed. A 
survey conducted by the BMA revealed that over half of the GPs at the time in UK  would 
consider resigning (or early retirement) if new contractual arrangements could not be 
reached and that addressed the issues such as recruitment and retention and pushed the 
profession to the ‘edge of collapse.’135 (p1381)  The negative attitudes of GPs however 
reflected the situation at the time in general practice. This had largely arisen due to the 
poor definition of expectations of GP services under the 1990 contract, as well as GPs’ 
obligation to provide 24 hour ‘out-of-hours’ care to their patients. As a result, practices 
were unable to control their workload.133 In addition, the then current GMS contract did 
not reward practices providing additional services.133 This in turn inhibited the 
development of new services and GPs who wished to pursue their areas of special interest, 
thereby restricting career progression. General practice was becoming a less attractive 
career option for medical students and added to workforce issues as retention was also an 
issue.134 In order to alleviate the situation underlying the revealed negativity, GPs 
collectively asked for the limits of their responsibilities to be clearly defined.133 They 
wanted choice in whether or not they provided certain services and they wanted to be 
properly resourced in order to provide high quality care to their local populations. The 
principles surrounding the new contracts were designed and intended therefore to address 
such issues.  However, before moving on to discuss the government’s new contracting 
arrangements and the solutions they offered, it is important to briefly highlight an 
important preceding step, the publication of The NHS Plan.136  
 
In ‘The Plan’ the government stated that its aim was to continue to support the founding 
principles of the NHS, but to also design services that were more patient focused. It also 
identified areas that required significant improvement such as for example variations in 
standards of care or the so-called ‘postcode lottery’ and practitioner pay.  In order to 
achieve the stated aims the government stated that they recognised that significant 
modernisation and investment was required in order to address poor infrastructure and 
staffing issues. The backdrop to The Plan, was the commitment to a substantial increase in 
resources for the NHS, promised for the next 5 years. Investment in general practice 
therefore came about as a result of the government’s overall NHS strategy and led to an 
increase of funding in general practice from, £4.9 billion in 2002-2003 to 6.9 billion in 
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2005-6.137 Without such an investment, the new contracting arrangements, and funding 
they required would not have been possible. 
 
2.8.1 New contracts and key changes 
As a result of the investment, the government and the BMA were able to design new 
contracts which were to address some of the issues as highlighted earlier. Firstly, the 
government expanded its contracting options by  creating a ‘new’ version of the General 
Medical Services contract (nGMS), it retained the PMS contract but added two new 
options: the PCT Medical Services (PCTMS) contract; and  an Alternative Provider 
Medical Services (APMS)  contract.138  The PCTMS contract enabled PCTs to employ 
GPs on a salaried basis according to need. The introduction of the APMS contract, was 
introduced by the government to encourage NHS commissioners to explore alternative 
organizational models of primary care, particularly from the private sector.139 The 
introduction of APMS however was particularly controversial as it effectively ended the 
traditional GP principal monopoly over primary care provision to NHS patients.140  
 
Secondly, there were changes to the legal basis of the nGMS contract as it is held at the 
practice level rather than with the individual GP, as was the case with previous contracts. 
GPs therefore no longer have a direct contractual relationship with the state because the 
contract is between the practice and the state (or in the case of PCTMS or APMS with the 
Trust or for example the private company respectively).  GPs therefore no longer have 
individual patient lists as the responsibility of caring for an individual patient lies with the 
practice.  
 
Thirdly, GPs funding arrangements changed and meant that they would be paid according 
to the work they actually do.  This was aided by the separation of general medical services 
into essential, advance and enhanced as well any potential income gained from the QOF, 
should the practice opt in to the voluntary P4P scheme. All practices have to provide 
essential services that cover most of the day to day work of general practice but can now 
opt out of additional (e.g. cervical screening, immunisations etc) or enhanced services. 
Enhanced services come in three forms: National, Direct and Local (NESs, DESs, LESs 
respectively).  Most practices do provide additional services but enhanced provision is 
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more patchy and dependent upon local needs and resources.134  Practices receive their 
main funding for the provision of essential services via a ‘global sum.’ 
 
The global sum payments in addition to funding essential services, also cover staff costs 
and locum reimbursements (for appraisal, career development and protected time) – which 
are paid from the PCT’s unified resource allocation.  It is calculated via the Carr-Hill 
formula, a weighted-capitation formula which is applied to the practice’s registered list 
size in order to generate a number of notional patients that the practice is liable to provide 
services.141 For an average UK practice, with an average practice weighted population, 
this results in an award of around £300,000 in 2004/05.134 The new funding formula was 
seen as more sensitive to the needs of patients and practice workload and was in particular 
a boost for practices in deprived areas as the funding was focused on patients rather than 
the number of GPs in post.142  However, there were some practices that would potentially 
lose out financially as a result of the move from the old funding arrangements. Provision 
was made for such cases, as practices were eligible for a ‘Minimum Practice Income 
Guarantee’ (MPIG). This figure was calculated by comparing the 1 April 2004 initial 
global sum with uplifted historic income from relevant fees and allowances between 1 
July 2002 and 30 June 2003.134     
 
Fourthly, in addition, to the choice of service levels that practices could provide, GPs were 
also able to opt out of their 24hour patient care responsibilities, for a relatively small fee 
of £6000 per GP. The new range of service level options therefore meant that GPs from 
this point should be better able to control their workload, and should they choose to, trade 
income for leisure.142 
 
Fifthly, the new contract offered incentives to practices in order to update the available 
Information Communication & Technology (ICT) in practices. This was crucial to the 
implementation of perhaps the most significant aspect, the QOF, as practices had to 
collect and record the necessary patient data as required by the targets. The discussion 
now focuses on the details of the QOF which is of central importance to the current study. 
 
 
 52
2.8.2 The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) 
2.8.2.1 Why did GPs vote in favour? 
The QOF as outlined earlier is a P4P scheme that rewards practices according to their 
achievement against detailed targets or indicators. It is perhaps the most controversial 
element of the new contracting arrangements and has been described by one commentator 
as representing ‘the boldest such proposal on this scale attempted anywhere in the 
world’143 (p457) and critically by another as moving GPs to ‘an unprecedented system of 
central control and external surveillance.’144 (p888)  Others critics have seen its centrally-
derived clinical targets as a threat to clinical judgement and autonomy.145  The reader may 
therefore wonder why the profession overwhelmingly voted in favour of such a 
controversial system. One commentator identified four key factors that affected GPs’ 
votes in 2003.77 First, since the mid-1980s and the profession’s rejection of the Good 
Practice Allowance, the EBP movement had begun in earnest and rapidly gained 
credence. During the 1990s therefore there was a growing recognition and acceptance that 
good quality care could indeed be defined and measured, at least for some conditions. 
Subsequently the profession accepted that there were widespread demonstrable 
deficiencies in care and that something had to be done to address the situation. Secondly, 
as a result of the variations in quality of care there was increasing public disquiet and 
pressure regarding the variation in quality of services. Thirdly, as a result of the EBP 
movement and public opinion, the government was increasingly under pressure to react 
and they did this by planning an injection of funds into general practice, which would in 
part be due to the QOF. The QOF with its detailed and largely evidence based framework 
of indicators seemed to provide a solution to addressing the variation in quality (by paying 
for standardised care) but also potentially could address the issue of pay which had been 
detrimental to recruitment to, and retention within the profession. Fourthly, negotiations 
were extensive (over an 18 month period) and the content of the QOF received 
considerable professional input by academic advisors and therefore was largely in line 
with professional opinion.  Finally, as noted elsewhere, the contract was sold to GPs as 
providing increased flexibility and freedom.146 In summary therefore, a number of factors 
acted in combination and were responsible for the profession’s decision to work under the 
new system, and most practices have. The detail regarding the types of activities GPs are 
incentivised to conduct as part of this new system is now outlined. 
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2.8.3 QOF: the detail 
The discussion starts with an outline of the initial version of QOF in 2004, however the 
QOF was from 2006/7 subject to annual review and subsequent key changes to its content 
during the study period will also be discussed later.  
 
The initial 2004 version of the QOF comprised 146 indicators covering a range of clinical 
and non-clinical domains pertaining to practice organization, provision of additional 
services and patient experience criteria.  Additional points are also available in the form of 
holistic carek and quality practice payments as well as an Access bonus. Each indicator is 
worth a specified number of ‘points’, with 1050 available in total and each point in 2004/5 
worth approximately £75. Of the 146 quality indicators, 76 were clinical, spanning ten 
clinical areas (see table 2), chosen because of their prevalence or their importance in terms 
of the burden of disease.77 
 
Table 2 Clinical Indicators and Assigned Points in the 2004 Quality and Outcomes Framework 
(source:77) 
Condition Number of Indicators Maximal no. of points 
Coronary heart disease 15 121 
Stroke, transient ischemic attack 10 31 
Hypertension 5 105 
Hypothyroidism 2 8 
Diabetes 18 99 
Mental Disorder 5 41 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary 
Disorder 
8 45 
Asthma 7 72 
Epilepsy 4 16 
Cancer 2 12 
Total 76 550 
 
                                                 
k In contrast to the definition of holism as defined and described earlier as relating to the individual patient, 
holistic here refers to the breadth of achievement across all disease areas.  
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Each clinical indicator measures the quality of a specific aspect of clinical care for 
example in the case of hypertension, the regularity of the blood pressure (BP) monitoring. 
In other cases, points may be awarded simply for collecting data i.e. setting up a disease 
register for epilepsy.  GPs can earn points therefore for ‘process measures’ e.g. patients 
have had their BP or cholesterol recorded as well as for ‘intermediate outcomes’ i.e. such 
risk factors have been managed within defined and reasonable limits. More points are 
available for the intermediate outcome measure and reflect the increased level of effort or 
workload required for their achievement.77  
 
The organisational indicators (worth 184 points) were spread across five categories: 1) 
records and information about patients, 2) communication with patients, 3) education and 
training, 4) management of medicines, and management of physicians’ practices. In the 
additional services domain (worth 36 points), practices are rewarded for the achievement 
of 10 indicators for variety of tasks. An example being that the practice has a policy for 
auditing its cervical screening service, and for performing relevant audits of inadequate 
cervical smears.  In the patient experience section of the QOF (worth 100 points), 
practices are rewarded on the basis of achieving 4 indicators spread across two areas 
relating 1) to the conducting of and reactions to patient satisfaction surveys and 2) 
consultations e.g. there is an incentive for practices who routinely book 10 minute 
appointments. The responsibility for the delivery of these non-clinical QOF areas is 
largely the responsibility of practice managers and hence are not focused upon or 
discussed in great detail in the current study.147 
 
Incentive schemes can vary in structure, with some paying for progress towards a target 
and others adopting an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach, under which payment is only made 
when the target has been met.148 QOF involves payment for practices making progress 
towards the target. For example, in the case of one of the hypertension indicators, 
practices are paid according to the percentage of patients that have had their blood 
pressure recorded in the previous 15 months. The lower threshold of achievement is 25% 
of these eligible patients (worth 1 point) and the upper threshold of 90% of eligible 
patients which at the time translated into 7 points. The threshold at which maximum 
points can be gained varies across the clinical areas.  One of the reasons that the QOF 
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negotiators adopted this approach ‘progress towards targets approach’ was to avoid the 
possible inappropriate treatment of patients. Two mechanisms were used in the QOF 
which were supposed to act to prevent such occurrences.149 First, by setting maximum 
thresholds below 100%, practices can earn the maximum available points and financial 
rewards, without achieving the targets for all eligible patients.  The second allows 
practices to ‘exception report’ patients i.e. exclude them from the performance 
calculations by removing them from the numerator and denominator of any individual 
(inapplicable) indicator.  Consequently practices are not ‘unfairly’ financially penalised 
for work they are unable to perform for valid reasons.  A summary of legitimate reasons to 
exception report patients is provided in table 3.  
 
Table 3 Legitimate reasons for exception reporting patients. (Source:149) 
 
The patient has received at least three invitations for review in the preceding 12 months 
but has not attended. 
 
The indicator is judged to be inappropriate for the patient because of particular 
circumstances, such as terminal illness, extreme frailty or the presence of a supervening 
condition that makes the specified treatment clinically inappropriate. 
 
The patient has recently received a diagnosis or has recently registered with the practice. 
 
The patient is taking the maximum tolerated dose of a medication, but the levels of the  
biological parameters of relevance remain suboptimal 
 
The patient has had an allergic or other adverse reaction to a specified medication or has 
another contraindication to the medication 
 
The patient does not agree to the investigation or treatment. 
 
A specified investigative service is unavailable to the GP 
 
Practitioners are allowed to use their clinical judgement in order to apply the exception 
criteria and there are no limits on the number of patients that a practice may exclude.   
 
The ability to exception report is intended to avoid 1) patients receiving inappropriate 
treatment and 2) GPs feeling pressured to pursue areas of work that are inappropriate.  
However, it also raises the possibility of an unintended consequence i.e. ‘gaming.’ This 
occurs when practitioners knowingly manipulate measured results e.g. GPs could exploit 
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exception reporting to maximise their points by excluding patients for whom the targets 
has simply been missed rather than because of a genuine clinical reason.  Gaming is a 
known phenomenon within the incentives literature and has probably always been in 
existence as people in economic terms at least are always assumed to maximise their 
utility.  Provisions against gaming regarding exception reporting have been made. Firstly, 
QOF data is extracted automatically from practices and collated by the Quality 
Management and Analysis System (QMAS) database. The PCT have access to this data 
and are able to scrutinise it.  It is for this reason that some commentators suggest gaming 
is somewhat difficult for individual practices to do successfully as PCTs have access to 
QOF data for all practices in their locale.150 Identifying a practice who has gamed 
therefore would be relatively easy as the prevalence of each disease is fairly consistent 
across geographic and a practice showing an unusually low prevalence of patients for a 
particular disease would stand out.  In addition, practices are subject to an annual QOF 
inspection by PCT representatives and the penalties for errant practices are severe, 
although the comprehensiveness of the visit may vary.77 To date, it appears that 
widespread gaming has not occurred as rates of exception reporting across English GP 
practices between 2005-6 were low, averaging just under 6%.149  There is however some 
recent evidence that shows a small proportion of practices under-recording disease 
prevalence, thereby falsely increasing their reported achievement rates.151  In contrast to 
this type of self-serving behaviour from some practices, it has also been shown that there 
is altruistic behaviour, with calculations revealing that practices could reduce the number 
of patients treated by 11.8% without losing any QOF revenue i.e. practices are exceeding 
their maximum thresholds, and the motivation to do so is apparently not financial.151 This 
type of ‘moral’ behaviour appears to indicate that something more than personal financial 
gain is driving professional behaviour152 i.e. some form of internal motivation is at work.  
The introduction of QOF (and its external motivators i.e. money) led to concerns for the 
internal motivation of practitioners.  Research early in the lifetime of the QOF (May 2005 
to November 2006) suggests that QOF has not damaged the internal motivation of GPs as 
the  clinical content was largely in line with professional opinion.153   
 
Practices have scored highly on QOF with an average of 959 points being achieved in the 
first year.154 This exceeded the government’s expectations that practices would average 
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750 points and therefore earn £430m in bonuses. Due to the higher actual achievement 
levels the bonuses paid out were closer to £630m and in 2004/5 QOF scores determined 
approximately 20% of practice income.154  In fact average achievement has consistently 
been over 90%, with a mean score of 95.4 % in 2008-9.155 The following sections 
highlight the main factors that have influenced this high achievement and starts with the 
widespread introduction of ICT systems across practices and the impact this has had on 
GP work and patient care.  
 
2.8.3.1 Information Communication & Technology (ICT) 
Crucial to the success of the new contracts and QOF was the widespread introduction and 
implementation of ICT systems capable of capturing, analysing and reporting data as 
required by QOF.  The nGMS contract however, made provisions for this by providing 
funding for the ‘purchase, maintenance, future upgrades, running costs of integrated 
systems as well as telecommunications links to branch surgeries and other NHS 
infrastructure and services.’134 (p16)  PCTs were obliged to meet practices’ entitlements and 
expenditure from their unified budgets. In England, this was supplemented by the 
National Programme for IT in the NHS, which provided an overall investment of over £2 
billion in NHS systems and infrastructure. As a result of such investment virtually 100% 
of UK general practices now use computers to aid in the clinical care of their patients and 
to meet the QOF.139   
 
In order to maximise QOF achievement, practices have opted for and employed the use of 
specifically designed software such as Population Manager and have developed a series of 
standardised data entry templates. One study focussing on the impact of these templates 
provides a description of the main ICT systems in general practice as a result of the data 
collection needs of QOF.150 First, the software allows practices to scrutinise their own 
performance by generating a running total of achievement by indicators and clearly 
identifying and indicating those areas that are yet are no up to the desired target levels. 
The programme also generates a series of pop-up boxes that appear on the practitioners’ 
screen when looking at a patient’s record. These highlight where QOF data is missing for 
that patient and do not disappear from the practitioners’ view until they dismiss it by 
actively selecting the box to do so.150  The other key tool in practices attempting to ensure 
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that data entry is accurate and focused on the QOF is the development of standardised 
(electronic) data entry templates for each clinical area. These templates consist of a series 
of short questions and answers and again act to focus the practitioner on the narrow and 
biomedical needs of the QOF.150  As a result this has led to some observational research 
identifying a trend towards increasing biomedicalisation, despite GPs discursive claims to 
continue to practice ‘holistically.’43 The authors state that GPs were not aware of or did 
not acknowledge this change/biomedicalisation with GPs ‘locating any change at the 
margins of practice’ and maintaining “a discursive claim to holistic practice’ (ibid p800). 
These findings are in contrast to those of pre-QOF research, where it was reported that 
GPs were positioning themselves as biomedical specialists as they dealt with complex 
care in contrast to the simple work delegated to nurses.156  However, a further study 
conducted later on in the lifetime of the nGMS however reported that GPs did express 
concerns about a focus on QOF activities and therefore a loss of holistic care.157  In 
addition the authors of this study reported that a ‘substantial minority’ of GPs appeared to 
be more dissatisfied with the changes that had occurred as a result of the QOF as they ‘felt 
their new role to be at odds with their professional training as generalist doctors’ with 
their new role increasingly focused on management/supervision and standardised care 
being reduced to a ‘box-ticking’ exercise.157 (p136) The sentiments of these GPs and the 
approach to medicine that electronic templates appear to encourage has been analogised as 
a ‘Fordist’ approach to medical care;153 however, practitioners do have the ability to 
dismiss the boxes without completing them in the required manner but the pop-ups will 
appear each time the record is viewed until all requirements are satisfied.150  The ability of 
practitioners to control whether or not they attend to the QOF templates has according to 
some GPs, allowed them to respond flexibly to the demands of the consultation at hand 
and therefore GPs have reported that their professional discretion or clinical autonomy 
had not been adversely affected as a result of such technologies.146,153  In addition, 
according to the RCGP,134 the information required by QOF is no different to that which 
practices were already recording as part of electronic patient records, such as disease 
registers.  It has been reported however that the new formalised approach to data 
collection was perceived by some GPs as influencing their consultation agendas with the 
result being a gap or even conflict between the individual patient’s needs and the GPs’ 
need to attend to the QOF.158  
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Finally, the ICT systems also enable sophisticated call/re-call functions i.e. the system 
automatically generates recall letters and reminders for patients to attend the practice in 
line with the intervals of measurements as required in the QOF.150 As a result the authors 
of this study state that patients are identified and managed as a group.  Furthermore, this  
somewhat diminishes the traditional system of allowing patients a choice of when 
attend.150 The reader is reminded that in the case of persistent non-attendance by patients, 
the practice is not penalised financially due to the exception reporting facility. 
 
In summary, the research concerning the impact of the ICT systems is mixed, with some 
indicating that such systems act to promote and embed a biomedical approach to care i.e. 
one that is in conflict with the espoused model of care that underlies the GPs role and 
identity and others stating that the professional discretion of GPs at least is largely 
unaffected.   
 
2.8.3.2 Practice Nurses 
Although the widespread adoption of ICT has aided practices in collecting the necessary 
QOF data, the issue of the necessary time and manpower required to perform the QOF 
related tasks remained.  Again, we see from evidence in the literature that, as in the case 
of the 1990 contract, GPs have primarily turned to their PNs in order to perform contract 
related tasks. This is illustrated by the fact that total number of consultations carried out in 
GP practices has increased, whereas the number of consultations that each GP carries out 
has reduced. This apparent paradox is easily resolved by the fact that there has been an 
increase in PN workload and consultations,159 with them now performing tasks which 
were previously within the remit of GP work. This shift has in turn instigated recent 
empirical research on the issue of professional hierarchies and boundaries. The results of 
this research have revealed that although QOF has resulted in a shift of certain areas of 
general practice work  ‘down the hierarchy’ (i.e. from GPs to PNs, and in turn from PNs 
to HCAs) existing hierarchies have remained ‘largely intact.’52 As noted above, the 
delegation of work in this manner has been aided by the use of the prescriptive electronic 
data collection templates which outline clearly the QOF related tasks. and in turn allows 
the practice to function more efficiently by less qualified staff who are less likely to 
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deviate from the templates doing such QOF work and frees up GP time for more complex 
work  such as those patients with multiple chronic diseases.150  It is worth noting however, 
that prior to the introduction of QOF in 2004, this trend of delegation in so called medical 
tasks to PNs had already been identified.160  
 
PNs have however had little control over the development and extension of their role in to 
new areas of work and studies have shown mixed reactions to their changing remit with 
some expressing concern about changes to their clinical practice.153 Where PNs have 
reported positive developments, such an increased (and in some cases novel) aspect of 
work in terms of interpersonal care with chronic disease patients, this has resulted in a 
perception in the inequity of financial rewards.161,162  In other words PNs have taken on a 
large part of the incentive rewarded work within QOF but are not seeing the financial 
benefits of doing so.   
 
2.8.3.3 Internal re-organisation and surveillance 
Practices are not obliged to use computer systems, but clearly the effort involved in 
maintaining accurate paper records would be extensive and ultimately potentially prove 
punitive in the successful capturing of clinical quality data. The standardised data entry 
templates as discussed above were designed to accurately and uniformly collect the data 
as required by QOF.   However, the presence of templates and the attention grabbing 
‘pop-up boxes’, on the practitioners computer screen does not ensure compliance with 
their data entry requirements.  In fact there is a literature that illustrates the ways that users 
can subvert the system such as by manipulating the information that is entered.163 Early 
empirical research has however illuminated another major factor as to why GPs have on 
the whole conformed to the template requirements.153  The authors discovered that there 
had been two key changes to the practice organisation.  First, the implementation and use 
of ICT systems and software such as Population Manager, allows for the rapid calculation 
of overall practice QOF performance and allows for the identification of patients (and by 
implication the GP(s)) whose progress is to date insufficient. Therefore GP work, 
although in practice is still conducted in private consultations, is now open to 
measurement and scrutiny.153 Secondly, in order to attempt to ensure that QOF 
achievement is high, practices also appear to have become internally re-organised around 
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the needs of the QOF, with the development of designated QOF leads or ‘chasers’ who, 
via the availability of such performance information, are able to directly engage in the 
monitoring of other practitioners’ (the ‘chased’) performance.153,164 Research to date has 
indicated that practices appear to adopt one of two approaches to monitoring:  1) Practices 
may have multiple QOF leads, with each individual practitioner (which may include 
salaried GPs and/or PNs) having an area of responsibility or 2) they have an overall ‘QOF 
lead’ who oversees all the practitioners’ performance. The type of organisational approach 
taken i.e. one QOF lead vs. multiple leads, as well as the manner or level of scrutiny that 
QOF leads adopt in directing other practitioners’ performance, has also been shown to 
have an impact on the level of perceived surveillance and by implication discretion of 
those under surveillance.153  Regardless of the approach taken however, the end result 
appears to be the same i.e. that decision making is becoming concentrated in fewer hands.  
QOF leads control (to varying extents) the day-to-day work of other practitioners, 
regardless of the espoused narratives or approaches to care that the practice holds.165    
 
In addition to practitioners being monitored by others, some practitioners also engage in 
QOF self-surveillance and appear to do so for two reasons: 1) having access to their own 
performance data provides them with a source of motivation and 2) they self-monitor as 
they do not wish to stand out as a poor-performer within their practice as the achievement 
of QOF is as described a team approach.146  This does not mean however that there has 
been no resistance to the QOF approach to work from individual practitioners but that 
such deviance is generally minimal. Where cases of resistance (by individual GPs) have 
been identified, resistance has been due to ‘QOF resistors’ being  critical of the QOF 
approach and/or those who disliked the requirement of the use computer of templates for 
QOF work.146,166   Finally, there is another factor and this relates to the surveillance of the 
overall QOF score that a practice achieves by other external organisations such as other 
local practices or the PCT as well as patients. There appears to be little evidence regarding 
the importance of these factors within the literature, however as described earlier 
practitioners have been shown to be competitive for example as with the competition for 
patients with the 1990 contract and with GPFH. 
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2.8.3.4 Already doing QOF in all but name? 
The final key factor in practices achieving well and above government expectations was 
the fact that the government had failed to factor in to their negotiations that there was no 
baseline (i.e. pre-QOF) measure of how well practices were already performing in the 
targeted areas.  Research in to this phenomenon has shown that prior to QOF, quality of 
care had already been improving in areas such as asthma, coronary heart disease (CHD) 
and type 2 diabetes, as a result of other quality initiatives, including schemes such as the 
NSFs and clinical audit. According to trackers studies, the introduction of QOF in 2004 
only led to a ‘modest acceleration’ in improvement for only 2 of these conditions, asthma 
and diabetes as measured in 2005.167  Such results have led to questions around whether 
the incentive payments were therefore being made to produce better quality care or were 
simply awarded to practices on the basis of their increased recording of their activities.137  
In other words, is QOF a quality improvement tool or simply a way to reward the 
achievement of good quality as defined by QOF?  Although it is unclear which of these 
options has occurred, practices have invested in additional administrative and clinical staff 
in order to deal with the increased paperwork and running of systems such as the call/re-
call arrangements and patient reminder letters that it generates.147,150 
 
In summary, these four major factors 1) the widespread implementation of ICT systems; 
2) delegation of QOF work to nurses; 3) practices internally re-organised around QOF and 
engage in internal QOF related surveillance, and 4) care was already improving prior to 
QOF, all contributed to and facilitated GPs achieving well against QOF targets. These 
factors, in combination with the majority of practices (99.6%) opting into QOF;168 and 
most achieving well over the governments predictions, led to a large (and unaccounted 
for) extra expense to the tune of £200m.154  As a result, GPs (primarily GP principals) 
have enjoyed substantial increases in their incomes,l  worked fewer hours and has led to 
higher job satisfaction amongst GPs.170  This led to somewhat of a media frenzy and 
backlash, with some headlines claiming that GPs were being overpaid.171 However, it 
should be noted that the award of a pay rise to GPs, was part of the government’s 
                                                 
l In the first three years, pre-tax take home pay for GPs in England (including income from NHS and private 
sources) increased by 58% (from 72,011 in 2002-03 to 113,614 in 2005-06). The average pay for a GMS 
partner increased to 110,054 and a PMS partner to 121,375. This excludes the amount of money surrendered 
in opting out of providing out-of-hours care.169 Increased income and reduced working hours identified as 
key factors in post-QOF increases in GP job satisfaction.170 
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intentions (and discussed in the NHS Plan) when introducing the new contracting 
arrangements. The government however, clearly did not intend for the extent of the rise 
and ultimately paying GPs more for working fewer hours.169   
 
2.8.4 QOF post 2004/5: the honeymoon period ends? 
As a result of the 2004 negotiations, the government had been dealt a budgetary blow by 
GPs ‘over-achieving’ on QOF and at the first possible point, in 2006/7, showed their 
reaction and strategy to dealing with their 2004 losses. Essentially the government 
intended to recoup some monies and control over its providers in general practice by 
various mechanisms (see table 4 for a summary of these and other key changes during the 
study period).  The major changes to QOF mean that for most of the study period, 
practices were required to expend greater efforts, for no additional compensation.  
Furthermore some of the changes (e.g. 2006/7 indicators on depression and chronic 
kidney disease (CKD)) were not perceived by GPs as evidence based (rather politically 
driven introductions) and were not positively received.157  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 64
Table 4 Summary of key contract and QOF developments in England 
Contract       Key developments 
2006/7  
¾ ‘Major’ reorganisation of QOF 
 
o Decrease in total number of QOF points (1050 to 1000) 
 
o Addition of 8 new clinical areas 
 
o Threshold adjustments (lower thresholds raised from 25% to 
40%) 
 
¾ Introduction of ‘choose and book’ DES – incentive to offer choices to 
patients for consultation referrals and to use ICT to book 
appointments. 
 
¾ No financial uplift in any aspect of the contract (for further details of 
2006/7 changes see172) 
 
2007/8 ¾ No change  
2008/9 ¾ Recycling of 58 QOF points to incentivise access (48 hour and 
advanced booking) based on patient satisfaction survey results. 
o led to the first dip in the increasing trend for high QOF 
achievement since its introduction.173  
 
¾ Extended Access DES 
o Participation means that the average 6000 patient practice the 
DES means opening for an additional three hours a week.174 
 
¾ 1.5% financial uplift175  
 
2009/10  
¾ ‘Minor’ reorganisation of QOF 
 
o Tightening of some targets e.g. practices now asked to 
achieve a HbA1c level of 7% (down from previous level of 
7%)176 and focus on clinical domain increased. 
 
¾ Average pay rise of 1.5%177 
 
¾ Funding formula underlying QOF payments adjusted to reflect true 
disease prevalence and QOF related workload178 
 
¾ NICE now involved in the development and assessment of clinically 
and cost-effective indicators. 
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2.9 Summary 
In this chapter I have outlined the key developments in the historical journey of the 
profession of general practice.  I started by describing the emergence of the ‘the GP’ and 
how these early GPs struggled to establish themselves in comparison to their hospital 
counterparts.  GPs however carved out a niche for themselves by providing personal 
‘bedside care.’  The seeds of this type of care eventually led to the formation of a distinct 
GP professional identity around a discourse of holistic medicine.  Poor working conditions 
and high patient demand however meant that throughout the 20th century it was identified 
that actual care provision not representative of their espoused professional ideals.  Several 
factors including the: recognition of the poor quality of care provision; the role GPs could 
play in the nation’s health; as well as the inadequacy of their resources led to repeated 
investment into general practice.  However, later cost concerns prompted a move towards 
increased management of the NHS and over time GPs were increasingly brought under the 
government’s managerial gaze.  As GPs are primarily independent contractors, the 
government has had to utilise the contract as its main tool of management.  As a result 
contracts became less vague and more prescriptive over time.  I ended the chapter with a 
detailed discussion of the substantive topic of interest in this thesis i.e. the latest contract 
and in particular the prescriptive pay-for-performance scheme, QOF.  The nGMS contract 
breaks the traditional GP responsibility for 24 hour care provision and is no longer held 
with individual GPs, but their practices.   Furthermore, early research indicates that QOF 
has resulted in changes in the organisation and running of general practice.  Significantly, 
these have implications for patient care as well as the work of GPs.  It is for this reason 
that I chose to study the continued impact of the nGMS and QOF on GPs.  In the next 
chapter I outline the chosen theoretical framework through which the impacts are viewed 
through. 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I illustrated the various significant changes that have occurred in 
general practice since its emergence as a distinct medical discipline in the nineteenth 
century.  The account showed that for large periods of time GPs were ‘untouched’ by 
central policy and that this was largely as a result of GPs’ status as independent 
contractors. GPs historically therefore have worked in an atomistic manner, within their 
own practices and have had wide discretion in how they dealt with their patients due to the 
vague nature of the ‘John Wayne’ contracts.  However, due to increasing concerns over 
the cost and quality of care within the NHS, general practice has increasingly become a 
focal point for the attentions of central policy makers who increasingly sought to control 
aspects of frontline practitioner behaviour. In order to attempt to align the frontline 
behaviour of GPs with such policy aims, policy makers turned to their main tool, the 
contract.  In this thesis I am concerned with the most recent contractual changes (and its 
later variants) introduced in 2004.  In particular, the study is concerned with the impact of 
the large element of P4P (or QOF) contained within the new contract on the day to day 
work and workings lives of GPs.  Within the literature however, there are various 
approaches that have been adopted when attempting to analyse the impact of government 
policy on medical work.  In this chapter I discuss the approach adopted in the current 
study.            
     
3.2 The theoretical framework       
The traditional conceptual approach to analysing medical work has involved the 
exploration of the status of physicians as archetypal professionals belonging to a 
professional group.  There is a considerable literature surrounding the concept of ‘the 
profession’ and this is briefly summarised here.  Scholars in the first half of the 20th 
century attempted to define a profession (as opposed to an occupation) by simply adopting 
a ‘trait’ approach (e.g. professional work requires specialised expert knowledge gained by 
members undergoing extensive education and training).179-181  Studies of this type were 
often marked by an approach which assumed a beneficent role of professionals and 
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ignored the issue of how occupations ascended to the title of profession and neglected to 
address the need to appeal to ‘being a professional.’  By the 1970s however analysts 
adopted a more critical approach and sought to highlight how professions had come to 
achieve and maintain their professional status.   Two notable analyses by Eliot 
Freidson182and Terence Johnson,183separately employed the notion of ‘social closure’184 to 
understand how professions such as medicine has come to occupy their position of power 
or dominance in relation to other professions (or semi-professions185) such as nursing.  
Professions are therefore marked by hierarchies of status and power within and between 
professional groups. The following quote from Freidson summarises the key elements of 
the dominance perspective: 
  
…it is useful to think of a profession as an occupation which has assumed a 
dominant position in a division of labour, so that it gains control over the 
substance of its own work… The occupation sustains this special status by 
its persuasive profession of the extraordinary trustworthiness of its members. 
The trustworthiness it professes naturally includes ethicality and also 
knowledgeable skill… The profession claims to be the most reliable 
authority on the nature of the reality it deals with…… a profession is distinct 
from other occupations in that it has been given the right to control its own 
work.186(pxvii) 
 
In addition to dominance and autonomy, the concept of collegiality also forms a central 
aspect of Freidson’s and Johnson’s theories of professionalism.  Collegiality serves to: 
maintain the appearance of equal status; socialise entrants/members into an attitude of 
loyalty to colleagues and maintains a public image of equal competence and 
trustworthiness.95   
 
Analyses utilising the professional dominance perspective have concentrated on whether 
developments as a result of changes to health systems have adversely impacted on the 
profession’s ability to maintain their monopoly and autonomy187-189 or indeed whether it 
ever existed in the first place.190,191 Much of this literature arose in the US and within a 
hospital context and subsequently crossed over to the UK being applied in various medical 
contexts including general practice.192,193  Recent developments in the field question the 
use of ‘ideal type’ of professional autonomy employed by the ‘professional dominance’ 
perspectives.  Specifically, the term ‘discretion’ has been forwarded as more appropriate 
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and representative of the important aspects of professional work and decision making.  
Specifically:  
 
…professional discretion enables workers to assess and evaluate cases and 
conditions, and to assert their professional judgement regarding advice, 
performance and treatment. To exercise discretion, however, requires the 
professional to make decisions and recommendations that take all factors and 
requirements into account. These factors and requirements will include 
organizational, economic, social, political and bureaucratic conditions and 
constraints. Thus, professional decisions will not be based solely on the 
needs of individual clients, but on clients’ needs in the wider corporate, 
organizational and economic context.194(p345) 
 
However, a focus on professional discretion and in relation to various competing factors 
as advocated above is not new. Over thirty years ago Michael Lipsky195 focused on the 
concept of discretion in relation to professionals working at the ‘street-level’ of  public 
services.  His analysis and classification of public servants as street level bureaucrats 
(SLBs) has been widely cited and used as a theoretical framework to analyse policy 
changes at the micro-level of professional work in other areas of the public sector such as 
social work and education; as well as to understand responses of physicians and 
specifically GPs (the focus of this study) to the introduction and implementation of other 
primary care policies.132,196  Specifically, it has been suggested that Lipsky’s work may 
provide a useful way of understanding the impact of the new contracting arrangements 
and in particular its P4P scheme or QOF on the work of GPs.132 On reading, I found that 
key elements of Lipsky’s framework resonated not only with my substantive topic of 
interest i.e. the introduction and effects of a performance-measurement scheme on 
professional work but also with many aspects of the data I was collecting.  These events 
constituted the theoretical starting point for the current study. The next section briefly 
outlines the context and essence of Lipsky’s theory before moving on and presenting in 
more detail the main aspects of the SLB framework.  
 
3.3 Street-Level Bureaucrats 
Lipsky first presented his theory of street-level bureaucracy in an article in 1971197 and in 
further studies with his former research students,198;199 before he expanded on these initial 
thoughts in his seminal book published in 1980.195  In all of these works, Lipsky was 
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concerned with the ‘critical role’ of frontline public servants working in an urban policy 
context during the 1970s in the United States and the dilemmas that such individuals faced 
as a result of the adverse working conditions they found themselves in.  Specifically he 
was concerned with those ‘public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the 
course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work’ 
(ibid p3).  Such individuals he termed ‘street-level bureaucrats (SLBs)’ and are located in 
public service agencies or ‘street-level bureaucracies’ which at the time were functioning 
in an environment characterized by poverty, social diversity and political conflict.200 
Much of his analysis focuses on what he considered as ‘typical’ SLBs such as ‘teachers, 
police officers and other law enforcement personnel, social workers, judges, public 
lawyers and other court officers, health workers…’ (ibid p3).  Such people he discusses 
are often drawn to life in public service as they wish to be socially useful i.e. help others.  
In addition to their altruistic nature, the professional training they receive in their 
respective areas instils a manner of working that is consistent with an ideal model of 
service delivery.  As a result SLBs strive towards responding in the best interests of each 
individual client as they present to the service in questions.  The realization of these 
service ideals are however thwarted by the nature of their jobs which have analytically 
similar working conditions and are commonly characterized by high caseloads, inadequate 
resources, unclear and even contradictory goals due to vague policies and the 
unpredictable source of the raw materials with which they work i.e. people. Despite this, 
Lipsky posits that SLBs believe that they are performing their roles to the best of their 
abilities given the circumstances and conditions they find themselves in.   
 
As a result of the conditions of work, the resulting uncertainties that such conditions 
create and the wide discretion that SLBs have, Lipsky posits that the mechanisms they 
turn to in order to cope i.e. ‘the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope 
with uncertainties and work pressures effectively become the public policies they carry 
out’ (ibid pxii).  In summary, the essence of the ‘dilemmas of the individual in public 
services’ (the subtitle of the book), arises from the fact that they are partly bureaucratic 
and partly professional. The next sections outline the main aspects of Lipsky’s analysis 
and starts with the central issue of discretion. 
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3.3.1 Discretion and policy making 
At the heart of Lipsky’s analysis is the issue of discretion.  Fundamentally SLBs have 
considerable discretion in their roles and in their treatment of clients.  In part, this relates 
to the nature of the SLB role itself which involves tasks too complicated to reduce to 
‘programmatic formats’ (ibid p15) as well as the fact that judgements are required to be 
responsive to the needs of the individual client in unique circumstances.  In other words, 
the overall unpredictability of the nature of SLBs ‘human’ caseload means that they need 
to be able to respond in different ways, depending on the particular situation.  Lipsky 
argues that such responsiveness to the individual situation is not only deemed necessary to 
the nature of the role but is also desired by society.  Despite the requirements for 
flexibility and need for discretion, SLBs do not have complete free reign in their actions 
as their working environment and role is characterised by various rules/policies with 
which they must in some way work with and towards.  However, Lipsky notes that the 
environment is one of uncertainty as the rules and/or policies may be voluminous, vague 
and even contradictory and therefore an impediment to external supervision or scrutiny.  
This, Lipsky notes, is particularly the case for professionals who are: 
 
…expected to exercise discretionary judgement in their field. They are regularly 
deferred to in their specialised area of work and are relatively free from 
supervision by superiors or scrutiny by clients. (ibid p14) 
 
Lipsky argues that SLBs wish to maintain and even expand their discretionary capacities 
in order to continue to work in a manner that is in line with their ‘own preferences and 
only those agency policies so salient as to be backed up by significant sanctions’ (ibid 
p19).  Where SLBs’ priorities are aligned with those of the organisation, there will be little 
issue for the managers of the street-level bureaucracies in attempting to direct SLB 
activity; however Lipsky states that this is not usually the case unless SLBs have been 
recruited with an affinity for the agency’s goals.  In most cases therefore, SLBs’ priorities 
are different from those of the managersm in their agencies who are ‘properly results 
oriented’ and are ‘concerned with performance and the cost of securing performance and 
only those aspects of process that expose them to scrutiny (ibid p19).’ This is perceived as 
                                                 
m It should be noted however that many managers, for example head teachers, have previously occupied the 
position of being an SLB and therefore have some understanding of street-level problems but they no longer 
partake in the day to day client processing work. 
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being intrinsically in conflict with the interests of SLBs, who in a context of constrained 
resources, need to process their workloads expeditiously and as a consequence develop 
shortcuts and simplifications to do so. These coping mechanisms are often unsanctioned 
by their mangers and may not reflect the goals of the agencies.  Managers however 
attempt to restrict workers’ discretion in order to achieve the desired agency objectives, 
but according to Lipsky ‘SLBs often regard such efforts as illegitimate and to some degree 
resist them successfully’ (ibid p19) which can result in non-compliance with agency 
objectives or behaviours to avoid accountability.  As a result of the two major factors: 
SLBs having wide discretion and relative freedom from managerial authority, SLBs are 
key players in enacted policy i.e. that behaviours and actions observed may not actually 
reflect the official policy that the agency is attempting to implement from the top. Lipsky 
states that this is in fact due to ‘the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to 
cope with uncertainties and work pressures effectively become the public policies they 
carry out’ (ibid pxii).  Lipsky’s work was therefore important in illuminating reasons why 
‘top–down’ implementation did not result in perfect translation down the organization to 
the actual form of policy enacted on the ground (or street-level) and hence has led to some 
calling him the ‘founding father of the ‘bottom-up’ perspective.’201 (p51)  The discretion 
and resulting policy making aspects of the SLB role are according to Lipsky located in the 
nature of SLB work and are as a result of the working conditions they find themselves.  
The following section now presents and discusses the working context in question. 
 
3.4 Conditions of SLB work 
Through his analysis across various public service agencies or street-level bureaucracies, 
Lipsky identified the fact that there were common conditions of work experienced by 
SLBs which are as follows: 1) inadequacy of resources; 2) demand for services increases 
to meet supply; 3) goal expectations for the agencies in which SLBs work tend to be 
ambiguous, vague or conflicting; 4) performance measurement towards agency goals is 
difficult to measure and 5) clients are typically non-voluntary.   It is the presence (or 
absence) of these conditions that Lipsky posits as being essential to his analysis of SLB 
behaviour and each are now briefly outlined. 
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3.4.1 Scarce Resources: perpetuated by demand and supply 
The work of the SLBs is characterized by high client caseloads and a need to process this 
workload quickly and efficiently.  The problem for SLBs however is that the agencies 
they work in typically provide fewer resources than necessary for SLBs to do their jobs in 
two ways: 1) they have high client numbers relative to the available pool of SLBs and 2) 
also restrict the available time for SLBs to deal with each client.  Clearly the two are 
related as high case loads affect the available time that can be afforded to the personal 
needs of each client.  As a result, the time available for collecting information and 
decision-making on the basis of that information for each client, are limited.  In addition, 
Lipsky cites two further factors that affect the work of SLBs.  The first, relates to the need 
to attend to organizational ‘housekeeping’ requirements such as ‘form filling’ which act to 
limit time for client interaction. This reflects the fact that although SLBs may be 
professionals, their role is also partly bureaucratic.  The second factor relates to the 
personal resources of the SLB i.e. that the individual SLB may be inexperienced or under 
trained in their role.  Although Lipsky does mention the issue of personal experience, he 
does not expand on it beyond providing an example of where rookie entrants to the 
profession are required to undergo further training before they are allowed to become fully 
fledged members of the profession and/ or have the necessary skills to deal with the actual 
variety of client interactions they are likely to be exposed to. 
 
Lipsky discusses that the main reason for the perpetuation of the problem of inadequate 
resources relates to the fact that even when additional financial resources are directed 
towards street-level bureaucracies they may not in fact improve or alleviate working 
conditions as demand for the service simply increases to meet the supply, should the funds 
be allocated to expand SLB numbers.  Extra funds may therefore in theory be used to 
increase the number of clients served or the number of services provided, however client 
services may not see any such changes as the funds may be allocated to the salaries of 
SLBs.  Thus SLBs are ‘trapped in a cycle of mediocrity’ (ibid p38).  Theoretically, Lipsky 
states that it may be possible to alleviate some of the SLBs working conditions and for 
example with teachers have smaller case loads i.e. smaller class sizes which would allow 
for a more time etc with individual pupils but the cost of providing such services would be 
exorbitant and are politically ‘out of the question.’  In summary, therefore SLBs work in 
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situations where the resource problem is seemingly irresolvable as demand always 
increases to meet supply as there is a great reservoir of demand for public services in 
general.   
 
3.4.2 Goals and performance measures 
Lipsky posits that the SLB role is one that must deal with ‘conflicting and ambiguous 
goals’ (ibid p40).  To illustrate his point, he provides an example of whether the role of 
the police is to maintain order or to enforce the law.  He goes on to discuss that often the 
goals of public service are idealized and therefore also difficult to achieve and this is not 
aided by the fact that there are uncertainties regarding the effectiveness (i.e. what works?) 
of available technologies to reach the desired goals.  He identifies three sources of goal 
conflict which arise when: 1) client-centred goals conflict with social engineering goals; 
2) client-centred goals conflict with organization-centred goals and 3) goals conflict due 
to differing role expectations from multiple and conflicting reference groups.  Each point 
is now briefly discussed.  
 
3.4.2.1 Client-centred goals vs. social engineering goals   
Here conflict arises when the SLBs concerns for an individual client are in contrast to the 
social engineering role of the agency in question.   To illustrate his point Lipsky provides 
several examples of instances where this may occur. For instance, in the case of education 
he discusses the conflict and tensions caused by education oriented towards the individual 
and individual achievement vs. that oriented towards instilling broader political and social 
goals of citizenship and discipline.   
 
3.4.2.2 Client-centred vs. organisational goals 
Here the discussion relates to how the ability of SLBs to treat people as individuals, is 
compromised by the wider needs of the organization to process work quickly using the 
available resources.  He states that the fundamental service dilemma for street-level 
bureaucracies is in essence ‘how to provide individual responses or treatment on a mass 
basis’ and that the study of SLBs may be seen as a study of goal displacement when the 
‘norm of individual client orientation becomes subordinate to the needs for mass 
processing’ (ibid p44).  The tension between efficient agency performance and attending 
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to individual clients is again compounded by limited resources and SLBs are challenged to 
find the best way of attempting to resolve these apparently incompatible goals.   
 
3.4.2.3 Goal conflicts and role expectations 
The final source of conflict stems from ‘the contradictory expectations that shape the 
street-level bureaucracy role’ (ibid p45).  The differing expectations for the SLB role as 
discussed by Lipsky arise from three different groups: peers; other reference groups and 
the public and the extent to which these sources differ in their expectations.  In relation to 
public expectations, he discusses how the role expectations of street-level bureaucracies 
can differ on the basis of public opinion arising from different locations or community 
sectors of the public.  Hence the public does not constitute a uniform voice and demand a 
single approach, thereby producing role conflict.  Peer expectations constitute the second 
dimension of role conflict or ambiguity and primarily arise from fellow ‘workers’ i.e. 
those operating under similar pressures. As a result, this is the only group that understands 
the need for SLBs to have goals that are aligned with the need to resolve their work 
pressures and consequently are a significant component in determining role expectations.  
Finally, despite SLBs’ desire to fulfil their attempts at a client-centred approach to their 
work, their clients are according to Lipsky not a significant determinant of the SLB role as 
SLBs do not think that clients ought to have a say in the nature of their street-level 
practice and at the time he notes led to vigorous opposition from various professional 
bodies to citizen involvement.  
 
3.4.2.4 Performance Measures 
Measuring the performance of SLBs and their work is according to Lipsky, extremely 
difficult.  It is affected by factors already outlined such as: i) goal ambiguity; ii) the fact 
that the source of their work i.e. human interactions is complex and therefore difficult to 
measure; iii)as well as the fact that there is no mechanism to tell how on a regular basis 
client outcomes would be in the absence of intervention; iv) the baseline or starting point 
for assessment can vary from location to location as for example some clients may be 
more oriented and therefore compliant to the goals of the agency in question and hence 
produce better results but through no extra effort on behalf of the agency.  The final factor 
contributing to the difficultly of measuring SLB performance relates to the fact their roles 
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are relatively free from (direct) supervision as their work is conducted in private and this 
situation is perpetuated by professional and peer norms of not questioning or criticizing 
the work of others.  As a result of these factors, managers have little way of determining 
which individuals in their organizations are performing in relation to the desired 
standards.  Despite such difficulties and the fact that SLBs attempt to resist their 
development and implementation, Lipsky highlights some of the ‘crude’ measures 
employed by street-level bureaucracies to control SLB activity, such as for example in the 
case of the police, a target for a number of arrests per month.  Such measures however 
provide no indication of the quality of that interaction, in this case the appropriateness or 
manner of the arrest. Where such measures are in place Lipsky states that the behaviour of 
SLBs comes to reflect those measures and their associated incentives and/or sanctions and 
illustrates the general rule that ‘behavior [sic] in organizations tends to drift toward 
compatibility with the ways organizations are evaluated’ (ibid p51).  At the time of 
writing, Lipsky noted that even where some indication of performance is available, clients 
are disadvantaged as they do not have access to such information which they may use to 
compare and contrast their treatment in one agency with another in the same field.   
 
3.4.3 Client relations  
The SLB relationship with clients according to Lipsky is ‘non-voluntary’ and stems from 
the fact that street-level bureaucracies ‘supply essential services which citizens cannot 
obtain elsewhere’ (ibid p54). Government often holds a monopoly on such services and 
where private provision is available clients may not be able to afford them.  As a result, 
clients are in a relatively powerless position to affect the work of SLBs and the agencies 
they work for have ‘nothing to lose in failing to satisfy clients’ (ibid p55).  This Lipsky 
relates to the fact that in such agencies the situation is one characterized by high demand 
for their services and therefore the loss of any dissatisfied clients will only result in the 
space they vacate being filled by other clients in need.  This relationship also helps 
explain why clients are not amongst SLBs’ primary reference groups, but does not 
translate into their being completely powerless, as SLBs also require compliance; for 
example, Lipsky notes that teachers need to secure the cooperation of their pupils before 
they can begin to teach.  Clients are however largely deferent to the SLBs who hold the 
position of power in terms of their ability to grant access to the resources the client 
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desires. SLBs and their agencies maintain this power differential by structuring how 
clients can access services via the use of queuing mechanisms or when, how frequently, 
and under what conditions, clients can approach them.  Even within the actual client-SLB 
interaction, SLBs control the structure, content and pacing, by for instance, having 
routines of practice that expedite the interaction and allow them to move on through their 
heavy caseload. Lipsky provides the example of lawyers who wish to collate information 
relating to the specific case in a standardized manner that suits their need i.e. clients are 
shut off from discussing non-relevant aspects of their stories. In essence, SLBs effectively 
‘teach’ their clients how to behave in accordance with their desired norms i.e. clients 
undergo a process of social construction.  In addition to these more direct and coercive 
mechanisms, SLBs also attempt to gain client compliance by involving clients in the 
difficulties of their roles for example saying that they are just following orders.  By 
invoking client empathy for the situation the SLB can help bring the client round to the 
agency perspective.   
 
3.4.4 Advocacy and Alienation in SLB work 
3.4.4.1 Advocacy 
In addition to being the ‘rationers’ or ‘gatekeepers’ to agency and wider resources, SLBs 
are also supposed to act as advocates for their clients i.e. to use their skills and knowledge 
of the system in order to secure the best treatments or resources as appropriate.  The 
concept of advocacy is as Lipsky notes one instilled in the ‘professional training and 
canons of lawyers, doctors, social workers…’ (ibid p72).  The conditions of SLB work 
however appear to act to undermine the ability of SLBs to act as advocates, as for 
example, high case loads and needs for mass processing precludes the devotion of 
dedicated time and effort to the individual.  In addition, the street-level bureaucracies’ 
public mandate to treat all clients equally acts against the advocate’s goal of seeking 
special treatment for individual clients.  Whereas Lipsky states that the organization seeks 
to limit access to its constrained resources, the advocates’ actions would indicate that 
resources were limitless. Two further factors also appear to constrain the advocacy role of 
SLBs: 1) the client controlling aspects of SLB work place a tension on the ability to 
advocate for people and 2) the fact that clients may have to be passed on to other 
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professionals, mean that any deviations from the norm here would undermine the SLBs’ 
credibility. 
 
3.4.4.2 Alienation 
Alienation is a term much used and originates with the work of Karl Marx. In Lipsky’s 
analysis it is defined as a ‘concept summarising the relationship of workers to their work, 
from which we may infer, attitudes arise’ (ibid p75).  The issue of alienation in relation to 
work refers to the central issues of the ability of workers to make decisions about their 
work and have some control and creativity over how they produce their outcomes.  
Production line workers have therefore characteristically been seen as ‘alienated.’ Lipsky 
discusses how certain aspects of the SLB role are ‘unalienated’, for example the discretion 
they possess in how they approach the individual clients as well as the fact that the source 
of their work i.e. human interaction is a source of variety in itself.  However, he also 
discusses ways in which the work of SLBs is alienated, and is related to the product of 
their work i.e. clients.  
 
First, SLBs only work on segments of the product and process.  This is due to the fact that 
the pressures of processing their work i.e. people, leads to clients being treated as ‘bundles 
of bureaucratically relevant attributes rather than as whole persons’ (ibid p76).  Lipsky 
states that the consequences of this approach leads to the likelihood that SLBs may miss 
aspects of the presenting problem.  In addition, the drive for efficient approaches to 
resource use means that specialisation within agencies occurs.  As a result, SLBs only 
work on part of the process.  The cost to the agency however, may in fact be the reverse of 
the intended outcome i.e. inefficiency as divisions between intake and casework results in 
poor or inadequate data collection which subsequently affects decision making.  
 
Secondly, and related to the first point, is the fact that SLBs do not control the outcome of 
the work, as specialisation and fragmented contact with clients means that they do not see 
the work through.  In addition, clients’ problems are not necessarily and often are not 
subject to closure, this leads to alienation when the SLBs experience this as a loss of 
control over scenarios they see themselves as being supposed to control. Again, here SLBs 
can develop new psychological modifications of their role in order to bridge the gap.  
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Thirdly, SLBs have on the whole an inability to control the input of their work and again 
this is due to the variable raw materials i.e. the diversity of people that they work in. SLBs 
are unable to affect wider circumstances of clients’ lives.   
 
Finally, SLBs are not in control of the pace of their work as they do not control the timing 
of their decision making as in order to ration resources, including SLB time, street-level 
bureaucracies attempt to control demand and predict demand by for example appointment 
scheduling.  Lipsky posits that where SLBs are alienated from their work, they will be 
more willing to accept organisational restructuring and less concerned with protecting 
clients’ interests and their own connection with clients (ibid p79).  The issue for the 
agencies in which SLBs work is that alienated work leads to job dissatisfaction which can 
result in alienated individuals displaying low morale or absenteeism and thereby results in 
less than desirable levels of productivity.  Should this be the case and should managers be 
inclined to address the problem, Lipsky discusses ways of reducing their workers’ 
alienation by for example restructuring the work to make it less alienating, constructing 
new incentive or sanction structures for compliance or simply by increasing pay.  
 
3.5 Conditions of SLB work: Consequences and coping mechanisms 
The conditions of work as outlined so far illustrate the difficulties facing SLBs, and for 
some, this results in them working in a manner that does not fit with their high ideals or 
personal preferences. This can result in them ‘burning out’ or leaving their roles, whereas 
those who continue, need to adapt and cope with the situation.  The coping mechanisms 
(or patterns of practice) that SLBs develop in order to cope with their adverse working 
conditions as suggested by Lipsky are three-fold; first, SLBs develop patterns of practice 
‘that tend to limit demand, maximise the utilisation of available resources, and obtain 
client compliance’ (ibid p83).  The other two mechanisms both involve new psychological 
adaptations in order to narrow the gap between their personal and work limitations, the 
resulting service outcomes and the ideal service model.  Specifically, they modify the 
concept of their job to narrow the gap between objectives and resources, as well as 
modifying the concept of their clients to render the inevitable gap between objectives and 
accomplishments more palatable (ibid p82–83).  Importantly such adaptations are seen to 
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have a knock-on effect on the way that clients are processed and dealt with; the 
unfortunate result in some cases being that SLBs can give in to personal biases with some 
clients receiving preferential treatment over others.  At the time of writing, Lipsky noted 
that SLBs were the focus of much public controversy due to the apparent observation of 
such unsanctioned biases.  Finally, Lipsky also notes that, SLBs seek to simplify their 
tasks and develop routines and simplifications to aid in the management of the 
complexities involved in their work. Lipsky discusses how this may be seen by some 
analysts as being equivalent to bureaucratization whereas others see this as an inevitable 
response to a high demand and scare resource environment.  He suggests that SLBs 
develop their own patterns of simplification when official ways of categorising clients 
prove inadequate or act as a barrier to expeditious client processing, or indeed if they 
significantly contradict their personal preferences.  These routines may at varying times be 
sanctioned or unsanctioned by the agency depending on whether or not they are consistent 
with agency goals. 
 
3.6 Lipsky’s predictions 
Lipsky made various predictions for the future of street-level bureaucracies and their 
frontline workers in an environment of ‘fiscal crises.’  In such conditions, Lipsky 
discusses how agencies must demonstrate accountability in order to avoid cuts in their 
budgets. The problem for managers in being able to demonstrate such accountability again 
lies in the nature of SLB work namely: 1) that they work in private therefore making it 
difficult to question the SLBs decision making; 2) they have control over the information 
or records they pass upwards to their superiors which facilitate the avoidance of scrutiny; 
3) the nature of the policies and ambiguous or conflicting goals of the agency do not aid 
the identification of priority areas to which they may be held accountable; and finally, by 
attempting to challenge the performance levels of SLBs managers may in fact produce 
negative outcomes for service delivery.  The main mechanism that Lipsky highlights and 
discusses in order to improve the accountability of street-level bureaucracies and their 
SLBs is the use of performance measures. He hypothesised that a valid set of performance 
indicators could in fact make the work of SLBs easier by the fact that they would provide 
goal clarity, in other words SLB discretion would be less necessary if there were greater 
regulation and control: 
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If discretion were constricted street-level bureaucrats would have less need for 
routines and simplifications to deal with uncertainty. If goals were clearer, workers 
could direct their energies with less ambivalence. If appropriate performance 
measures were available street-level bureaucrats could be made accountable for 
their behaviour. (ibid p199) 
 
However, the introduction of such measures also leads Lipsky to make a series of 
predictions which highlights the problems he envisaged with their introduction. Firstly, he 
states that SLBs will “concentrate on the activities measured” (ibid p166). He discusses 
however how such a phenomenon had already been highlighted in earlier studies such as 
one concerning employment counsellors which reported that individuals increased their 
performance in relation to placement rate targets by ‘creaming’ i.e. focusing on those 
clients easier to place at the expense of what they perceived to be more difficult clients.202  
In essence, he predicts that workers will interpret such measures as a sign of management 
priority and therefore by virtue of their discretion direct their activity to those areas as 
required and improve their performance scores. Secondly, ‘fraud and deception can also 
intrude into performance measurement’ (ibid p167) i.e. manipulations of information and 
situations in order to meet targets and thirdly, there is the difficult of relating quantitative 
indicators to actual service quality and he states that “the more discretion is part of the 
bureaucratic role, the less one can infer that quantitative indicators bear relationship 
quality” (ibid 167-8).  In relation to the last point, Lipsky also highlights that it is difficult 
to measure the quality of SLB performances, as such measures do not represent all the 
work of SLBs and in particular it is difficult to measure the most important aspects of the 
service that SLBs provide.  To illustrate his point he provides an example of the police 
force being given a target of the number of arrests to be made and whether or not “the 
arrests were made with care” (ibid p168).  
 
Lipsky discusses how performance measures and the desire for accountability via the use 
of performance measures can have negative implications for productivity. According to 
Lipsky, productivity in the public sector ‘summarises the relationship between the 
utilisation of resources and the resulting public services product’ (ibid 170). In particular, 
he discusses how pressures to increase productivity can result in an erosion of services 
‘qualitatively’ and that services undergo ‘debasement.’  However, he discusses that 
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attempts to measure the debasement of services is difficult due to difficulties in defining 
quality of the service.  As managers are under pressure to increase productivity within the 
same budgets, they respond by asking people to do more or save money by substituting 
the usual professionals with cheaper para-professionals. The debasement of services in 
this way often results in negative outcomes for SLBs in terms of ‘harder work, less job 
satisfaction and greater individual problems with clients’ (ibid p171).  However Lipsky 
does speculate as to whether the technology of performance measurement will improve in 
the future in order to allow the development of effective measures.  The issue of 
performance measures is of particular relevance to the current work which seeks to assess 
the impact of the latest major contractual reform in general practice and its series of 
performance measures as contained within QOF.   
 
3.7 Street-level services - improving the future outlook 
The last section of Lipsky’s work looks at ways to mitigate the negative effects of street-
level bureaucracies.  He argues that the two best defences against negative outcomes are a 
strong ethic of professionalism and the increased involvement and empowerment of 
service users to scrutinise such services.  He  states that client contributions could be 
enhanced ‘if street-level units accepted responsibility for group case loads rather than 
incorporating clients as the case loads of individual workers’ (ibid p208).  This move he 
argues would remove the isolation, pressures and competitive elements of working in an 
atomistic manner and encourage a more cooperative and supportive environment that 
makes the client the responsibility of all the SLBs not, just the individual SLB.  In terms 
of the ‘professional fix’, Lipsky first discusses the prospects for the model before 
outlining the problems associated with this approach then outlining his vision of how the 
professional model may be enhanced in order to provide suitable solutions in order to get 
the type of desirable street-level services in the future.  Lipsky argues that the attractions 
of the model for solving service dilemmas centres around the fact professionals (at least 
theoretically) are oriented and committed to a service orientation.  New recruits enter their 
fields with high ideals and embody the spirit of the ideal service orientation.  However, 
the problem of the professional fix he discusses arise from the fact that the organisation 
and control of professions and their interactions comes from within i.e. the professions are 
self-monitoring.  High status professions such as law and medicine he argues, have been 
 82
shown to fail in attaining the high standards as advocated by their profession, by for 
example, seeking out higher-status clients at the expense of those with lower status and 
who presumably have greater need for the service.  In order to support and facilitate future 
new recruits to practice in a manner that is more akin to the service ideal Lipsky suggests 
that: 1) additional financial support must be made available to provide some slack in the 
system in order to allow SLBs to organise themselves to be more responsive to the 
individual client; 2) financial resources would also allow for the creation of incentives to 
maintain and forge a career in the public sector.  He also states that SLBs need rewards for 
effective and quality performance. This is of key relevance for the current work as 
essentially I am investigating the effects of this suggestion i.e. a new contract which 
contains such a P4P scheme.  Finally, he discusses how there is a need for a new type of 
performance evaluation in order to determine the distribution of any rewards, one which is 
based on peer review and can take into account the qualitative aspects of case handling. 
 
Having outlined the details of Lipsky’s theory, I now briefly provide a flavour of where 
Lipsky’s framework has been previously applied to professional practice within the wider 
non-medical academic literature, before focussing on its application in relation to the work 
of doctors and in particular that of GPs, the focus of my work. 
 
3.8 Physicians as Street-Level Bureaucrats  
The focus of much of Lipsky’s analysis and exemplars of SLBs centres on those 
professionals working in sectors such as social work, education and law enforcement.  
Indeed, in each decade of the thirty years or so since the publication of his work, scholars 
of these areas continue to apply Lipsky’s work see for example.203-207  Despite the fact that 
Lipsky often discusses how SLBs are professionals, he actually gives little attention to 
those who most stridently claim to be so i.e. doctors. Shortly after the publication of 
Lipsky’s (1980) work however, some commentators suggested that the ‘propositions 
embedded in the work are so important that they need to be tried on for fit in the health 
arena.’208(p969)  Subsequently it appears that Lipsky’s work has been applied to health 
workers and physicians, most commonly those working in US public health programs 
such as Medicaid or Medicare. For example, a recent empirical study used Lipsky’s 
framework to illustrate how primary care physicians attempted to advocate for patients 
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with depression whom the physicians perceived, in a publicly funded health program, had 
little prospect of (and desire for) accessing specialist mental health care.209  In such 
circumstances, the physicians who often were not directly reimbursed for mental health 
care, attempted to treat their patients’ depression themselves, using the most efficient 
means they knew of (i.e. via a pharmacological approach) in order to process such patients 
within their limited appointment times. The authors showed how Lipsky’s theory of street-
level bureaucracy not only explained the advocacy behaviour of these physicians but that 
they also were able to rationalize this ‘less than adequate care because of the Medicaid 
patient’s status as a non-voluntary client’ (ibid p156).  
 
In the UK, to date, I am aware of only two studies which have employed Lipsky’s work in 
relation to primary care physicians i.e. GPs132,196 which I  now outline. 
 
3.9 GPs as Street-Level Bureaucrats – the literature 
The first application of Lipsky’s work to GPs related to an ethnographic study that 
explored the process of service planning and health care commissioning for CHD in a 
PCG during the late 1990s.196  The author discusses how concerns over rising costs in the 
NHS, led to the increased use of health economists and so called ‘rational models’ of 
decision making. The study aimed to assess the extent that rationality underpinned the 
decision making of the PCGs multidisciplinary group (which included GPs) who were 
given the responsibility of making recommendations for the care of CHD patients within 
the PCGs remit.  The PCG’s recommendations and actions were however to be made 
difficult by the fact that there was the difficulty of implementing new effective 
interventions which (based on the available evidence) would benefit CHD patients in a 
context where no additional funding was available.  The author showed that in the face of 
multiple competing objectives, clinicians adopted behaviours which were ‘in marked 
contrast to the rational model of decision-making that underpins health economic analysis’ 
(ibid p134).  Rather than following agency objectives and implementing the guidelines 
devised by the PCG team which included GPs, GPs continued to exercise their own 
clinical judgement and discretion and made decisions that would alleviate pressures on 
their own workload.  Specifically GPs were acting as SLBs in that: 
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…the requirements for GPs to fulfil their street-level bureaucrat, client processing 
role conflict directly with the encouragement of a more explicit, proactive and 
systematic managerial perspective (ibid p134).  
 
Indeed the ‘client processing’ aspect of the GP role has been shown to be a powerful 
factor in the implementation and enactment of another policy in general practice that are 
by definition explicit and systematic, i.e. NSFs.132   This second study illustrated that a 
combination of factors such as 1) a lack of a structured implementation process or 
‘information process’ and 2) the fact that implementing and complying with NSFs was not 
a compulsory requirement meant that GPs reacted as SLBs by rejecting some NSFs on the 
criteria of whether or not they made the practicalities of doing their job easier.132 
Specifically, concerns surrounded the size and complexity of the NSFs and such factors 
were cited as barriers to use in their patient processing role.  This was in comparison to 
other existing guidelines which were adopted and used in practice as they were perceived 
as simple and an aid to processing their work.    
 
In summary, both of these studies characterised GPs as SLBs prior to the introduction of 
the new contract in order to explain the responses of GPs to different policies.  It appears 
that viewing GPs as street-level bureaucrats allows one to speculate how changes in policy 
may affect their care-giving or service practices.  Indeed, as highlighted as the start of the 
chapter, one of the outcomes of the latter study was the suggestion that Lipsky’s work 
may provide a useful way of understanding the impact of the new contracting 
arrangements and its P4P scheme or QOF on the work of GPs as they perceive it.  As I 
alluded to earlier, this suggestion appeared highly relevant and on my reading of Lipsky’s 
work as it resonated with key aspects of his theory i.e. discretion, which the substantive 
topic of interest i.e. QOF potentially affects.  The next section discusses how GPs can and 
have be seen to fit Lipsky’s definition of SLBs prior to the introduction of QOF before 
discussing the questions raised by the application of the SLB framework in the context of 
the latest major contractual change. 
 
3.10 Conceptualising GPs as Street-Level Bureaucrats 
This section provides a discussion of the extent to which GPs and their work have been 
seen to fit Lipsky’s main analytical points pre-nGMS and QOF. In addition, within each 
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section the available existing literature regarding the impact of QOF is related to each 
point in order to extrapolate and highlight the areas of investigation for the study. 
 
3.10.1 Discretion and policy making 
SLBs are people who ‘interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who 
have substantial discretion in the execution of their work’ (ibid p3).  Taking the first 
aspect of this statement, the central and traditional aspect of a GPs role (regardless of their 
status i.e. being a partner or salaried) is to attend to the presenting needs of a variety of 
citizens, who in the case of GPs are patients.  In addition, the variety of patients and their 
presenting needs can be seen to correspond to the claim that the work of SLBs involves 
tasks too complicated to reduce to ‘programmatic formats’ (ibid p15), as well as the fact 
that judgements are required to be responsive to the needs of the individual client’s unique 
circumstances.  Discretion, Lipsky notes is a relative concept.  He states that the greater 
the degree of discretion the more salient his analysis is in understanding the behaviour of 
frontline or street-level public workers.  Lipsky’s work therefore seems ideally suited to 
studying doctors who as archetypal professionals are considered to have wide discretion.  
However, wider social changes as described in the previous chapter, as well as the rise of 
EBP and subsequently SBM (i.e. concepts that appear to reduce complex medical work to 
‘programmatic formats’ or rules), can be seen as a constraint on a GP’s ability to have 
discretion at least in terms of their clinical decision making.  Whereas this may be true in 
comparison to the modern pre-EBP era, GPs have in recent times at least, not always 
perceived such ‘rules’ as restrictive. As already discussed, GPs exercised wide discretion 
with regards to a prescriptive policies such as the NSFs and other guidelines, utilising 
those aspects they perceived as ‘helpful’.132  Earlier research also indicated that GPs’ 
positive attitudes towards professionally derived guidelines and these related to the fact 
that they perceived that they had a choice of whether to follow guidelines and that they 
need not to necessarily wholly adhere to them.210   In other words, GPs perceived they had 
discretion, in terms of if and/or when to apply them, and in the case of the latter, how and 
who to apply them to. In fact, the GPs in this study perceived that many factors including 
their personal clinical experience influenced how they utilised guidelines.210 A final point 
relating to the outcomes of these studies is that GPs appeared to ‘make policy’ i.e. the 
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policies or in this case centrally derived guidelines enacted on the ground, did not always 
(or if at all) resemble the official guidance.  
 
The issue of personal experience is not discussed in detail by Lipsky. Experience 
however, may be a moderator of discretion e.g. it may affect how one perceives whether 
or not their personal discretion has been adversely affected or narrowed.  It would 
seemingly affect how the individual had come to understand the nature of their role.  In 
relation to the current work, those trained and socialised in recent times which have been 
heavily characterised by an EBP approach to care (i.e. individuals where such a model of 
care is the norm), would have perhaps a different perception in comparison to those 
individuals trained and socialised in the pre- or early modern EBP era.  However, again 
the issue of experience may come into play, i.e. the tacit knowledge gained over time 
would indicate that up to a point, such people may be able to apply discretion in their use 
of these rules in ways in which those inexperienced would not.  Furthermore, Lipsky 
expands little on its impact and implications for the types of routines, shortcut and mental 
modifications that SLBs are able to make.  For instance, in the context of the current 
work, those practising for a long-time pre-QOF may have considerable differences in 
opinion and ways of working, to the mode of practice this advocates in comparison to 
those only practising in the post-QOF era. This is an area in which the analysis would 
benefit from further research and will be investigated in the current study. 
 
Finally, the other major factor contributing to the fact that GPs have historically been able 
to enjoy wide discretion in their patient interactions, relates to the fact that their work is 
largely conducted in private.  Although it is increasingly the case for GPs, their work and 
their practices, to be exposed to external scrutiny, pre-QOF GP work was still largely 
conducted in private and primarily involved seeing patients on their personal lists.132  
 
The introduction of the new contract and QOF however, has resulted in a number of 
changes that would appear to suggest that GPs are less able to work to their own routines 
and in effect reduce the discretion of individual GPs in their practices. The evidence to 
date regarding the impact on individual GP discretion however, provides a mixed picture.  
The first factor that would appear to suggest that individual GP discretion may be reduced, 
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relates to the fact that the contract is at the practice level. The limited evidence to date 
suggests that GP principals have responded similarly by internally re-organising their 
practices teams in a similar manner around the needs of QOF, with some GPs becoming 
nominally responsible for delivering specific areas of QOF work.153,165  In addition, 
studies have also shown that practices have developed internal surveillance systems which 
now make aspects of GP work visible to others within the practice.153 Prior to these 
systems, the working practices (including the discovery of poor quality work) of other 
GPs would only be apparent via complaints or when dealing with other colleague’s 
patients, whilst for example, providing cover for annual leave or other absences.211  The 
introduction of standardised data entry templates for QOF requirements would also appear 
to suggest that any ad-hoc or prior ways of working would no longer be possible or more 
difficult to maintain.150 Despite such changes however, research also indicates that GPs 
perceived that their discretion has remained intact.146,153 This may be due to a number of 
factors: 1) GPs reported the ability to respond to the electronic templates flexibly;146,150 
and/or 2) GPs have reported that the templates serve as an ‘aide memoire’ in other words, 
rather than perceiving them as a device designed to constrain discretion, they see them as 
tools that ‘made their life easier.’166 However, other studies appear to suggest that GPs 
feel pressured into concentrating on QOF requirements within  their consultations.157   
 
Secondly, early studies appeared to indicate that GPs on the whole appeared to support 
and were positive about the clinical content of the targets contained within the initial 2004 
version of QOF.153  On a related point, both qualitative and quantitative research has also 
indicated that GPs claims that they were already doing the majority of work contained 
within (at least the initial version) QOF, appear to ring true. This is because prior to the 
introduction of QOF, standards of care were already improving, and QOF resulted only in 
‘modest’ accelerations in care.167,212  In other words, GPs may not feel that their discretion 
has been impacted upon as most were already meeting QOF targets, explaining why there 
was little resistance to QOF being introduced.  However, later research appears to suggest 
that the later 2006 version of QOF was less well received, with GPs disputing the validity 
of certain indicators such as those for depression screening and CKD.157,158  Despite the 
expressed reservations GPs held regarding the new indicators, ‘no interviewee challenged 
the importance of these issues or stated their intention not to attempt to meet the 
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targets.’158(p232)  One study however, appears to offer a suggestion of as to why this may 
be the case.213 It suggests that GPs, specifically GP principals, have limited opportunities 
to resist or disengage from the needs of the contract due to their responsibility to maintain 
practice income, or, as the author describes it (via the use of Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus), their ‘economic capital’.  GP principals however, do not necessarily have to do 
the work of the contract themselves, and research illustrates that PNs have been delegated 
many areas of QOF to deliver.153,157-159 This is the fourth point which may have allowed 
GPs, or GP principals at least, to maintain a sense of no change.  Finally, it must also be 
noted that there are large areas of work that QOF does not cover, for example acute work 
and estimates indicate that 75% of the population do not have any of the diseases in 
QOF.214 Therefore, there are a priori still large areas of work for GPs to continue to work 
in line with the personal styles.  Whether GPs perceive the work and discretion they have 
in terms of QOF vs. non-QOF areas differently is a question that appears unanswered in 
the literature. 
 
The evidence to date regarding GP discretion and QOF is therefore a somewhat mixed 
picture and indicates that GPs are at least in some areas doing work that is not necessarily 
in line with their personal views or professional opinions. The current study has the 
advantage of assessing how GPs perceive the impact of the new arrangements now the 
contract has been in place for some time, and to assess the attitudes and perceptions of 
GPs to further changes which, as described earlier, appears to ask practices to do more 
work for less money and to do work that is less in line with their professional opinions.  In 
addition, available empirical research to date has not particularly discussed or 
distinguished between the types of GP in terms of their status i.e. GP principals vs. 
salaried GPs and what implications this may have on areas such as perceived discretion. 
For example, one could hypothesise that salaried GPs, as employees, would be less at 
liberty to exercise their discretion with respect to QOF targets in comparison to GP 
principals who are also their managers/employers.  SLB theory highlights that most 
analysts assume that lower level workers will conform to what is expected of them, but 
Lipsky states that often SLBs ‘do not share the perspectives and preferences of their 
superiors’ (ibid p16). It is therefore possible that salaried GPs, may in fact not share the 
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GP principal’s goals unless they have been recruited and socialised into the GP principal’s 
ways of working with and under QOF.   
 
In terms of the policy making aspect of the GP’s role, a priori one would expect the 
presence of standardised electronic templates to reduce the variability in the outcomes and 
work as related to QOF.  Quantitative evidence shows that practices have from the first 
year of QOF achieved highly and continue to do so.154  In addition most practices (99.6%) 
are participating in QOF,168 indicating that centrally derived policy is being enacted as 
desired across general practice. QOF is not necessarily being conducted by GPs and 
therefore it may be that they see this function as remaining intact. 
 
3.10.2 Conditions of work - resources 
As highlighted by the previous chapter, much of the GP work context has been 
characterised by limited and/or inadequate resources.  Firstly, patient interactions occur 
within the limited time of the ‘pre-planned appointment’ (which in Lipskian terms can be 
seen as ‘access limiting devices’).  The finite resource of GP time has been a recurring 
theme with for example only 6 minutes per patient being allocated in the 1980s.54  Just 
prior to 2004, the situation had improved with the average pre-planned consultation being 
10 minutes.215  However, the issue of limited time for GP-patient interaction and the 
pressure this creates for GPs to process their patients (accentuated by the pressures of a 
busy waiting room, or in Lipskian terms, a device to reinforce the image of the limited and 
precious nature of SLB time) remains characteristic of a GP’s role. Secondly, there is the 
issue of limited financial resources. GPs are primarily independent contractors, and their 
contractor, the NHS, is a publicly funded system, which by its very nature has finite 
resources.  In addition, the way that GPs have historically been funded has placed a limit 
on funds in relation to the number of patients GPs have on their lists. This left little 
provision for variations in GP workload and the fact that the demands on general practice 
have increased over time due to various factors as outlined in the previous chapter which 
has been neatly summarised by the RCGP as including: 
 
…more patients presenting with chronic and multiple health problems, language 
barriers, a greater number of medical interventions, the preventive health care 
agenda and more complex administration.  In addition, there is also a shift in 
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workload from secondary to primary care, resulting in a greater number of 
specialist services in family practices.216(p8) 
 
The increase in demand is also demonstrated by the rise in the average number of 
consultations.  For example, each person in the UK saw their GP on average  5 times 
during 2002, compared to  4 GP consultations per person per year in 2001.217 Whilst it 
would be untrue to say that such demands are borne solely on the shoulders of GPs (other 
members of the PHCT e.g. PNs also share the burden), GPs are still the major point of 
contact and decision-making for presenting patients.218  The picture of increasing demands 
against a situation of limited financial resources again resonates with Lipsky’s analysis of 
the impact of limited resources on the quality of the services that patients receive.   
 
The nGMS contract and QOF have the potential to change the situation of inadequate 
resources which may theoretically be used to alleviate the conditions that led to the low 
job satisfaction and morale amongst GPs prior to 2004.  The issue of time (length of GP 
appointments) has been determined by QOF, as practices are incentivised to provide ten-
minute appointments i.e. most GPs now strive to work within common time constraints.  
However, this does not necessarily translate to GPs having more time with patients post-
QOF, as many already had appointments of this length.215  In addition, QOF has created 
an extra administrative workload in terms of the need to attend to the data collection i.e. 
filling in of templates, therefore actual time for pre-QOF ways of working is reduced.  In 
terms of financial resources, QOF has meant the influx of extra funding for general 
practice.  Ultimately, GP principals decide how to use any of the additional funds and may 
use such resources to alleviate the conditions of their work and perhaps to deliver care in a 
manner consistent with their ideals.  However, many principals appear to have personally 
benefited from the financial influx (as demonstrated by hikes in GP principal ‘salaries’ i.e. 
profit shares) and have not necessarily invested it into their practices in order to change 
pre-existing working conditions.169  Other research however, indicates that practices have 
invested some of the extra finances into staff mainly administrative but also some clinical, 
often less skilled workers such as HCAs.147 
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3.10.3 Goals and performance measures 
3.10.3.1 Goals 
In terms of GPs working in an environment of conflicting and ambiguous goals, one could 
argue that their position as gatekeepers to wider NHS resources, as well as their position 
as the patient’s advocate, is potentially a fundamental source of conflict akin to the types 
of goal conflicts described earlier.  Whereas this may theoretically be a source of goal 
conflict, the fact that GPs’ referral and prescribing activities were unregulated for large 
periods of time, meant that in reality, there was little need for GPs to wrestle with such 
decisions. This situation contributed to the rising costs from general practice and was one 
of the reasons for increased management.  A key decision reflecting this was the 
incumbent government’s decision to cap prescribing in 1985 via the ‘limited list.’  Post 
QOF,  research also indicated that there may increasingly be tensions or goal conflict 
(gatekeeper vs. advocate).146 Specifically, tensions can revolve around GP requirements to 
balance PCT prescribing budgets  whilst achieving increasingly difficult targets which 
potentially involve the use of more resources (e.g. diagnostic tests, prescribing more drugs 
etc).  This will be explored where possible in the current study. 
 
The GP’s espoused focus on the individual and patient-centred, holistic care, has also been 
challenged by the direction of policy in the past two decades which encourages a more 
population approach to care.  For example, in the case of GPFH, GPs were in the position 
of simultaneously commissioning and providing services within general practice, which 
may have created tensions (at least for lead fundholders) in terms of the needs of the 
patient vs. the needs of their wider patient list. Whereas most rank and file GPs did not 
have the decision making responsibility with regards to GPFH they ultimately would have 
to adapt and follow the local agreements made by their fundholding leads.  
 
Another major initiative that went further towards moving GPs away from their traditional 
individual holistic focus was the introduction of NSFs which has been characterised as 
representing a departure in the way of practising medicine for GPs who espouse a focus 
on the individual.132  QOF extends this approach to care and led to the suggestion that the 
future application of Lipsky’s framework may also provide a way of analysing the impact 
of the nGMS contract which ‘institutionalises this change further’ (ibid p954).  This is 
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because the underpinnings of the clinical aspects of QOF are derived from large scale 
population randomised controlled trials and therefore can be said to represent an approach 
more usually recognisable as being from a public health perspective. This is potentially a 
key tension for GPs regarding the ambiguity of goals in their work and is analogous to the 
fact that SLBs characteristically work in an environment with ambiguous or conflicting 
goals.  For instance, Lipsky poses the question of whether ‘the role of the police is to 
maintain order or enforce the law’ (ibid p40). Similarly, one can see that the introduction 
of QOF may be seen to pose the dilemma of whether the role of the GP is to look after the 
individual patient or the population, in this case the whole of the practice population.  In 
addition, as the contracts are held (and therefore QOF performance measured) at the 
practice level, one may also formulate the hypothesis that GPs may also face client-
centred vs. organizational goal conflict.  For example, within routine consultations there is 
now the possibility of conflicting agendas (patient vs. QOF).161  
 
Furthermore, in striving to achieve highly on QOF, practices as described above have 
developed some processes that move general practice towards a more standardised and 
routinised approach to care.  As such GPs may feel that their ability to treat the individual 
patient is somewhat compromised.  Recent research suggests that as a result of QOF 
‘groups of patients with similar conditions are assumed to require standardised 
appointments and follow-up, with little space for personalisation within an automated 
system.’43(p12)  QOF however may mean that some GPs are able to resolve such goal 
ambiguity, as Lipsky predicted in that ‘If goals were clearer, workers could direct their 
energies with less ambivalence’ (ibid p19).  Here the identification of QOF templates as 
‘aide memoires’ would appear to provide such clarity as to what they are expected to 
achieve within their consultations.  However, conversely it is also possible that the 
addition of the goals in QOF has created more ambiguity, specifically client vs. 
organisational, as prior to QOF, one could hypothesise that the goals of the GP were 
clearer i.e. simply attend to the patient’s presenting needs.   
 
3.10.3.2 Performance measures 
GPs have primarily worked in a context characterised by vague policy.  GPs were in 
essence simply trusted to provide the necessary care to patients presenting problems and 
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there were no definitions or standards that represented good quality of care as medical 
knowledge was seen as too complex to distil down to simple formulae.  Such a description 
resonates with Lipsky’s discussion regarding the difficulties of measuring the 
performance of SLBs and their work (i.e. work is complex in nature and lack of ability to 
manage work done in private).  However, since his writings, the ‘technology’ of 
performance measurement has advanced and proliferated and there has been an increasing 
acceptance and use of such measures across public services both domestically and 
internationally. An illustration of both of these points can be seen in the US health arena 
and The Joint Commission (TJC).  The head of TJC recently wrote that ‘the ubiquity of 
quality measurement and reporting makes it difficult to remember a health care landscape 
without them.’219  TJC utilise performance measurements in their accreditation program to 
subscriber hospitals which ultimately decides their eligibility for state (Medicare) funding.  
The TJC website states that ‘the history of the Joint Commission is rooted in performance 
measurement’ and outlines the key stages undertaken in enabling their ability to 
performance manage.220  Details of these stages are not provided here but it is suffice to 
say that they highlight the pivotal role of ICT.  Essentially, ICT allowed TJC to collect 
and analyse performance data from disparate locations and collate it into a centralised 
database.   In other words performance (or rather aspects of it) can now be more easily 
measured and monitored without a physical supervisory presence.  This development as 
highlighted in the previous chapter is one of the key factors enabling successful 
implementation and achievement of the performance measures included in QOF in UK 
general practice.   
 
In medicine, the ability to develop quality markers or performance measures has arisen as 
a result of the EBP movement.  As a result, there has over time been an increasing 
acceptance within medicine that it is possible to measure good quality care, at least for 
some conditions and patients.77  In UK general practice, QOF is to date the ultimate 
symbol of this (i.e. performance management) approach and represents a nationally and 
professionally agreed set of rules and standards against which the work of general practice 
can be measured.  In addition, advancements in ICT plus its widespread 
implementation/use in general practice means that GP-patient interactions, traditionally 
beyond the gaze of outsiders, have been opened up to scrutiny and to influence by others. 
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Those in ‘managerial’ roles are therefore more able to monitor and attempt to align 
‘worker’ activity with the desired targets.  However, the existence of such systems does 
not ensure compliance as users can subvert the system, for example, by manipulating the 
information that is entered.163   
 
Lipsky highlighted the difficulty of measuring performance when different agencies may 
be starting from different baselines. Similarly, QOF was introduced without any baseline 
measurements. Despite this, since the introduction of QOF in 2004, differences in the 
quality of healthcare delivered by practices initially thought to be at a disadvantage e.g. 
those located in areas of relatively high deprivation (compared to practices in areas of 
relatively low deprivation) appear small.221  Whereas in Lipsky’s writing clients had no 
way to compare and contrast the treatment received in one agency or area in comparison 
to another, QOF results are available to the public.  The publication of QOF scores of 
individual practices online allows for the possibility for patients to access information that 
allows them of compare and contrast how well their practice is performing in relation to 
others.  However, given that most practices have and continue to achieve well on QOF, 
the information does not in practice allow for much discrimination.  In addition, research 
has indicated that some GPs suggest that QOF is a limited measure of performance i.e. it 
only measures the measurable. Studies have indicated that important areas of care such as 
personal continuity and interpersonal care both of which are highly valued by patients, are 
not included within the measure and are seemingly suffering since the introduction of 
QOF.157,161 
 
What of Lipsky’s predictions for the introduction of performance measurement? First, he 
predicts that SLBs will focus on the measured aspects of work.  It appears that practices 
have become internally re-organised around the needs of QOF which exerts certain 
pressures on GPs to focus on QOF.  At the individual GP level and in terms of their 
attitudes and approach to care within their consultations, some research indicates that GPs 
have become more biomedical in their approach overall as a result of QOF.43 Other 
qualitative research suggests that some GPs appear to be more QOF-focused within their 
consultations than others;157  although there is no consensus on whether individual GPs 
are focussing on the areas within QOF at the expense of those not included.161  Recent 
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quantitative evidence however, appears to suggest that upward trends for non-QOF related 
activities (measured prior to QOF’s introduction in 2004) have suffered a decline since the 
introduction of QOF.222  
 
Secondly, evidence regarding predicted ‘fraud and deception’ is also limited but indicates 
that where GPs admit to QOF data manipulation157 e.g. under-recording disease 
prevalence,151 the ‘culprits’ appear to be in the minority.223 
 
Finally, what of the evidence for the effect of performance measurement on productivity 
and the erosion of services in areas other than those measured?  Although high QOF 
scores are being attained, there has been concern as to how QOF had impacted the overall 
quality of care received.  An accepted definition of quality of care for individual patients 
defines quality in terms of access and effectiveness i.e. can individual patients access care 
when they need it and is it effective (clinically and interpersonally) when they receive 
it?224    Whereas QOF is directed at and attempts to address the clinical aspects of care, 
there is little provision, other than the patient surveys for assessing the impact on the 
softer aspects of care such as interpersonal care.  Quantitative evidence regarding the 
efficacy of feedback as a mechanism to improve the quality of interpersonal care however 
is limited and mixed.225 Qualitative evidence appears to suggest that GPs have expressed 
concerns regarding the squeezing out of the soft aspects of care due to time limitations and 
pressure to attend to QOF templates.158  Despite such concerns GPs have been reported as 
not perceiving patient concerns to be important measure of practice performance.157  This 
may reflect Lipsky’s view that clients/patients may not be a primary reference group for 
SLBs/GPs. However, practices are now increasingly incentivised on the basis of their 
survey scores, and therefore may react in future in order to re-coup any losses by being 
more responsive to patient feedback.   
 
3.10.4 Clients and their relationships 
The nature of GP-patient relationships can also be seen to fit Lipsky’s analysis. First, one 
can draw analogies in GP-patient terms in relation to the non-voluntary nature of SLBs 
clients.  GPs remain the first point of contact for patients who wish to access wider health 
services, or indeed to get access to publicly funded prescription medications. To access 
 96
such resources patients have little choice but to attend and comply with GP decisions as in 
the publicly funded NHS service there is little alternative provision, private or otherwise.  
This point also illustrates the relative power differential between SLBs and their clients, in 
fact the doctor-patient relationship is characterised by the fact that it is intrinsically 
unequal.226 (p139)  and that patients have in Lipskian terms traditionally not been a reference 
group for GP behaviour. However, as the previous chapter illustrates, the government has 
increasingly attempted to involve patients to make services more responsive. In particular, 
GPFH provided the first formal attempt and opportunity for public involvement.11 
 
Post-2004 patients are still non-voluntary.  Even though GP services can now via the 
APMS contract option be provided by private alternatives, this type of provision remains 
low.227  In terms of the client-SLB relationship or GP-patient relationship, QOF can be 
seen as a device to plan access to services via the call/re-call systems.   These systems also 
act to increase the non-voluntary nature of patients, by sending persistent reminders to 
enhance the likelihood of patient attendance  QOF also potentially presents a mechanism 
for GPs to control the pace and content of the interaction within the consultation. Little 
research and analysis has been conducted on the impact of QOF on the manner that GPs 
use QOF templates within their consultations. One recent study did just this and 
highlighted how GPs were able to utilise QOF templates within their consultations in 
order to minimise disruption and limit the opportunities for patients with long term 
conditions to introduce topics in to the consultation that GPs perceive they have little 
control over.228   
 
3.10.5 Advocacy and alienation  
3.10.5.1 Advocacy 
As identified in the previous chapter, advocacy is a traditional aspect of the GPs’ role.  
There has however been seemingly little attention within the literature on this aspect of 
the GP role.  An illustration of how GP advocacy can be affected by policy is in relation to 
GPFH.  One study reported that GPFH raised ethical dilemmas for fund-holding GPs vs. 
those who were non-fund-holding with respect to prescribing, referral and investigation 
decisions.62 Specifically, fundholding GPs were obligated ‘to consider utilitarian 
principles when deciding about how justly to distribute health care within the doctor-
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patient relationship’ (ibid p 179).  There has been no evidence to ascertain how this aspect 
of the GP role has been affected since 2004 and the introduction of QOF.   One may 
expect from the evidence to date, that the various pressures on GPs to fulfil QOF targets, 
means they have little room or time to advocate for individual patients as QOF has 
encouraged a ‘mass-processing’ approach to patients and attempts to treat all patients 
equally by containing targets that represent national standards of care.  Patients have 
ostensibly less choice about whether or when to attend the practice and have even been 
subjected to home visits and phone calls simply to collect QOF data.150 One mechanism 
within QOF however does allow GPs to advocate for their patients, namely exception 
reporting.  For instance, if the patient does not wish to take medication, the GP can respect 
their wishes and exception-report them.  It may be therefore that GPs do not feel the need 
to attempt to advocate for individuals as they know they are receiving good care as QOF 
is largely evidence based and is reported as ‘becoming synonymous with perceptions of 
good care.’164(p4)   However, as noted earlier it may become more difficult for GPs to 
attempt to secure the best treatment for individuals in the face of increasing budget 
constraints. 
 
3.10.5.2 Alienation 
Lipsky argues that certain aspects of the SLB role are ‘un-alienated’, for example the wide 
discretion they possess in how they approach the individual clients as well as the fact that 
the nature of their work i.e. human interaction, is a source of variety in itself. In these 
terms, GP work (as outlined in chapter 2) has historically clearly fallen into this ‘un-
alienated’ category.  Where it has been alienated however, relates to the inability of GPs 
to control the input of their work i.e. their patients. A GP can request a patient’s 
attendance, prescribe etc but the patient must choose to attend and then comply in order 
for the GPs recommendations to be acted upon and be meaningful. GPs are also relatively 
powerless to affect the wider situation of their patients, for example their ill health may be 
due to poor housing and cannot be resolved by the GP.  The ability to exception report 
means that practices are not penalised for issues largely out of the hands of GPs such as a 
patient’s non-attendance.  However, the nature of QOF i.e. inflexible rules and the manner 
in which it has been implemented can be seen to increase the potential for GP work to be 
more alienated in some ways and remain untouched in others.   
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QOF-induced organisational changes within practices to maximise the likelihood of 
meeting QOF targets, may mean that post-QOF some GPs feel more alienated from their 
work in various ways.  First, the call/re-call systems and common pre-planned 
appointment lengths do not in theory allow GPs to control the pace of their work.  
Although GPs can spend longer than the planned appointments lengths with their patients, 
there are presumably personal incentives for them to attempt to stay within their allotted 
times e.g. to leave work earlier, attend to other aspects of work etc. 
 
Secondly, in the drive for efficient approaches to gaining QOF points, GPs are 
experiencing changes in relation to how they work, as they are now less likely to deal with 
all of the patients’ needs i.e. patient care is more fragmented. As a result of GPs 
delegating aspects of QOF work to nurses, they may now only deal with patients after 
they have already seen another practitioner. In other words, QOF has made it increasingly 
the case that GPs only form part, and in most cases the latter part of the patient care 
process. This resonates with one commentary which suggests that the statement ‘the old 
adage that GPs treat ‘the patient rather than the disease’ may no longer turn out to be true, 
and ‘general’ practitioners may start to feel more like ‘partial’ practitioners.’133(p531)  
Whereas some GPs report this as allowing them to work in a manner they would consider 
less alienating i.e. them doing more complex work,150 it has resulted in the loss of certain 
skills or ‘de-skilling’161 and decreased continuity with patients.157  In other words, some 
GPs are now less satisfied with their work post-QOF.   Lipsky posits that where SLBs are 
alienated in their work, they will be ‘more willing to accept organisational restructuring 
and less concerned with protecting clients’ interests and their own connection with clients’ 
(ibid p79).  Some research indicates that a substantial minority of GPs consider the 
standardized care as provided by QOF to be a ‘box-ticking’ exercise and felt their new 
role to be at odds with their professional training as generalist doctors.157 It may be that 
GPs consider QOF template work to be alienating and therefore structuring QOF work in 
this stepwise manner allows them to avoid it.  The benefits of such arrangements may 
make the loss of continuity of care bearable. 
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3.10.6 Consequences and coping mechanisms 
Lipsky argues that SLBs form routines and shortcuts to cope in the face of scarce 
resources.  Similarly, GPs have been shown to use informal coping mechanisms in order 
to ration scarce resources.196  They may also modify the concept of their job. For example 
evidence prior to 2004 suggested that GPs were re-configuring their identities due to the 
increasing demands they faced from complex and competing agendas (e.g. accept an 
increased volume of patients from secondary care and at the same time, manage demand 
within the practice).229 This study suggests that rather than refuse to cope or resist, GPs 
modified their behaviour and professional identity via ‘identity work’ and re-framed 
themselves as biomedical specialists.229   In contrast, post-2004 evidence indicates that 
GPs are continuing to frame themselves in their traditional rhetoric of holism (as they 
have delegated the biomedical/QOF work to their nurses) despite the nature of their work 
becoming more biomedical.43 
 
3.11 Limitations of conceptualising GPs as SLBs 
Despite previous authors using Lipsky’s framework, and the discussion so far illustrating 
that GPs fulfil many of the criteria for street-level bureaucracy, it must be acknowledged 
that there are some limitations to this analysis. GPs are for the most part not employees 
within the types of large agencies that Lipsky predominantly refers to in his analysis. They 
are for the most part owners of small organisations, which are run by the GP principals 
and their practice management staff.  However, arrangements appear to vary locally, with 
the management of some practices being conducted for instance solely by the practice 
manager.  Regardless of the local arrangements, there remains the theoretical ability for 
GP principals at least to alter the conditions and types of work they do by for example 
lengthening appointments times in order to alleviate some of the pressures they face in 
their practice.  However, this has been discounted as a possibility by some, as the 
influence of demand ‘makes this very difficult to achieve in practice.’132(p956) The author 
goes on to state that despite this difference, GPs (including GP principals) are seen to fit 
Lipsky’s work as he ‘defines street-level bureaucrats in terms of the characteristics of their 
work situations particularly the autonomy they enjoy in face-to-face contacts with the 
public’ (ibid p956).  In the conclusions the author re-visits the limitation of characterising 
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GPs, (at least GP principals) as SLBs and states that they can ‘in part’ be seen as SLBs. 
This was due to instances of behaviour that did not conform to expected SLB behaviour, 
and was more akin to behaviour that would be expected of ‘results oriented’ manager.  In 
other words, GP principals can be seen as a SLB/manager hybrid.  It would appear 
therefore, that any investigation of the SLB role in general practice must take into account 
the dual role of GP principals as workers in, and owners of, the organisation.  In addition, 
the limitations highlighted here only apply in relation to GP partners and not to their 
employee counterparts i.e. salaried GPs, who are increasingly becoming a major sector of 
the GP work force and to date, have received surprisingly little attention within the 
literature.cf.230,231,232  The difference in status between the two roles may have important 
implications for their respective perceptions of working under the new contractual 
arrangements.  For example, Lipsky discusses the fact that most analysts assume that 
‘lower level’ workers will conform to what is expected of them, but often in the case of 
SLBs they ‘do not share the perspectives and preferences of their superiors’(p16).  This 
proposition may explain findings which suggest that GP principals perceive salaried GPs 
as being less attentive to the recording of QOF data within their consultations.230  It is 
possible therefore, that salaried GPs, may not share the GP principal’s goals or concerns, 
in this case the achievement of QOF targets. A suggested explanation for this difference is 
that GP principals have limited opportunities to resist or disengage from the contract due 
to their responsibility to maintain practice income (and their profit shares) or (via the use 
of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus) their ‘economic capital.’213    
 
Despite outlining the differences between the two types of GP, common between them is 
their frequent interaction with the public and as a result they have a major client or patient 
processing role when doing their clinical work. In other words, unlike the managers in 
Lipsky’s analysis who are former SLBs themselves, but no longer see clients, GP 
principals are also still in the main processing patients and are therefore not entirely (if at 
all) removed from frontline services.  Having identified the distinctions between GP 
principals and their salaried counterparts, the analysis in the current study will also 
distinguish between these two groups, which a priori, would seem to potentially affect 
attitudes and perceptions regarding the impact of contractual changes.    
 
 101
 
3.12 Critiques of and developments in SLB theory 
In the thirty years since the publication of Lipsky’s work there have inevitably been some 
critiques and suggested developments to Lipsky’s analytical framework.  Within the 
British public services context, it appears that much of the work has focused on whether 
or not Lipsky’s framework is still applicable in light of the changing contexts found 
within modern public service agencies, in particular within the areas of social work and 
education. Specifically, the focus over the last decade appears to have centred on the 
central issue of discretion and whether or not discretion as Lipsky described it continues 
to operate within the types of organisations where SLBs operate.  Analysts have tended to 
focus on three areas of change that have occurred since the publication of Lipsky’s work 
and that a priori would appear to reduce the ability of street-level practitioners from 
operating with the type of discretion that Lipsky described.  
 
The first relates to ‘top-down pressures’ and increased accountability stemming from the 
NPM movement.  Here critics have in essence suggested that Lipsky’s analysis belongs to 
a ‘gentler age’ of public service i.e. before the rise of managerialism.233   For instance in 
social work, it has been argued that SLBs have less autonomy and discretion as managers 
control more of the content (technical and ideological) of practice;233 thus, Lipsky’s 
central analytical point no longer holds.  This argument is not one shared by many 
contemporary commentators who continue to employ Lipsky’s work in empirical studies 
which appear to illustrate that discretion is still in operation.e.g.234  In other words, the 
increasing prevalence of managerialism does not necessarily nullify Lipsky’s framework, 
as discretion is a relative concept.  Such ‘all or nothing’ approaches are seen as too crude 
as they effectively close off the possibility and consideration of  other types of 
discretion.235  Some studies have utilised  a typology of discretion comprising three 
aspects: 1) judgement in respect to the application of standards; 2) the final responsibility 
for making a decision (within the rules) and 3) discretion in the strong sense which gives 
the decisions and the criteria of decision making to professionals.236  The suggestion is 
that ‘all or nothing’ approaches only focus on discretion in the ‘strong sense’ and pays 
little attention to the ‘weaker’ aspects of discretion i.e. the need for and creation of 
discretion by the act of rule interpretation.  Rule interpretation is important for the study 
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of Lipsky’s work as whereas some appear to suggest that rules are clearly laid out and 
therefore should be clearly interpreted,233 others argue that this view is unwarranted and 
neglects Lipsky’s view of policy as being voluminous and therefore open to 
interpretation.235  In fact a key aspect of SLB theory is the ability of SLBs to interpret 
rules in ways that are not necessarily conducive to managerial policies/goals.  In 
summary, they suggest that paradoxically, the creation of more rules leads to increased 
uncertainty and therefore need for more discretion and interpretation.235  A recent study of 
a social services department illustrates this, reporting that when newly designed 
procedural manuals were introduced, they were seen as so elaborate that they created 
more discretion by requiring people choose what to follow and what to ignore.234 
 
Another recent study of UK education, also ‘unpacked’ concept of discretion into three 
inter-related types: 1) rule discretion which is bounded by legal, fiscal or organisational 
constraints, 2) value discretion which stems from normative professional practice and 3) 
task discretion or the ability to carry out prescribed tasks.237   The impact of various 
factors/changes (e.g. NPM reforms, national curriculum etc) were considered and then 
assessed for their impact against each of the identified types of discretion.  As discussed 
earlier, QOF, a centrally derived (top-down) policy has the potential to reduce GP 
discretion and my work will also use this unpacked concept of discretion and assess the 
extent to which, if any, distinct aspects have been affected/eroded. 
 
Recent attention has also been drawn to a particular facet associated with ‘managing 
SLBs’. Whereas Lipsky assumes an intrinsically conflictual relationship between SLBS 
and managers (due to their differing priorities), it is now suggested that a more nuanced 
approach than this is needed.234  Specifically it has been argued that Lipsky assumes 
managers to be a homogeneous group who act as ‘policy lieutenants’ committed to the 
implementation of organisational policy.  Attention has been drawn to differences 
between layers of (or types of) managers i.e. ‘managers’ are not necessarily a 
homogeneous group.  In the case of social work, it has been shown that local managers 
often still identify themselves as social workers who now have managerial roles, whereas 
higher ‘strategic’ managers view themselves as managers first and foremost.234  
Consequently, different ‘identifications’ have implications for the nature of discretion and 
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the way it is managed as the shared professional commitments transcend the distinction 
between local managers and practitioners.   Local managers, in contrast to higher/strategic 
managers, worked together to promote professionalism i.e. a commitment to the needs of 
their clients and a freedom in their work role, rather than focussing solely on 
performance.234  This study draws attention to the issue of professionalism and how this 
concept can shape the type of managerial approach and discretion that SLBs can wield.  
This again has relevance in the current work as the ‘managers’ in general medical practice 
are most likely to be practising GPs and not removed from being a professional.  This may 
have implications for the way they manage their staff and GP colleagues towards meeting 
QOF targets. 
 
In addition to ‘top-down pressures’, there is also the issue of ‘bottom-up pressures.’ 
Specifically, the government have taken various actions over-time in an attempt to 
increase the accountability of professionals to users, clients or patients of the service in 
question.  As a result, bottom-up pressures have become a key characteristic of public 
service provision in recent decades.237  For example one study focussing on education, 
highlighted the introduction of the Citizen’s charter in 1991 as strengthening the voice of 
the service-user.237   This also resonates with the current work as QOF now provides 
incentives on the basis of the results of the patient survey.  In other words, as a result of 
QOF general medical practice has been moved to a position of increased accountability 
from the ‘bottom-up.’  Whether GPs perceive this to have impacted on their discretion 
however, remains somewhat unanswered in the literature. 
 
In addition to the ‘vertical’ pressures described above, the recent literature on SLB theory 
has also acknowledged that SLBs are also ‘horizontally accountable’ to their co-workers 
who may be peers within their profession or members of other professions.238  It is 
suggested that these relationships also impact on an individual’s discretion and actions in 
relation to policy.  Since the introduction of a practice level contract one would assume a 
priori that the accountability in the horizontal dimension has increased, and evidence to 
date suggests that this may be the case. 
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The final factor that appears to have significance for the exercise of discretion by street-
level bureaucracies is the impact of ICT, something that Lipsky did not (and could not) 
have foreseen.  The widespread implementation of ICT has meant that it is now an 
everyday feature of working life for many people including those operating within public 
service agencies.  This has led some to argue for a change in terminology to reflect the 
impact of ICT which has changed the ‘street-level’ bureaucracy to a  ‘screen-level’ 
bureaucracy and in some cases, depending on the service, a ‘system-level’ bureaucracy.239   
In essence they argue that in some agencies the impact of ICT has been to mediate client 
interactions and in some cases to fully automate (via decision algorithms) the decision 
making process. Whereas practitioners previously had the decision making power to 
determine eligibility of a client for the public services in question, the contemporary 
situation now removes this human interaction (unless the case is highly unusual or the 
client complains) and decisions are made via electronic forms.  Decision making is 
therefore largely automated with little need for SLBs or discretion.  As the authors state in 
their concluding comments however, it ‘remains to be seen whether similar 
transformations can be observed in non-legal, non-routine, street-level interactions such as 
teaching, nursing and policing’ (ibid p 180).   These ideas have implications for the 
current work as ICT has a significant role to play in the data collection for QOF with 
likely impact on discretion 
 
Lastly, there appears to be a focus on the application of Lipsky’s work to specific 
professions and/or contexts.  Lipsky’s work concentrates on the commonalities that SLBs 
share in the nature of their work i.e. processing people and the conditions of their working 
environment.  Whereas these generalisations have provided many useful insights, he gives 
little attention to the differences between the occupations/professions and the variety of 
agencies, functionaries (within those agencies) and the tasks those functionaries 
perform.238  These differences have consequences however, for example the types of tasks 
may or may not be more or less conducive to becoming automated i.e. the extent to which 
tasks are regulated and structured by ICT (and therefore the level of discretion) varies 
across the types of street-level bureaucracy. It has been argued that Lipsky was not 
describing the ‘reality’ of all street-level bureaucracies but provided a ‘starting point’ or a 
‘tentative framework’ that can be  fine tuned to take into account the difference 
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contexts.240  Consequently,  there is scope for ‘in-depth’ studies of a range of occupations 
in the UK.237  
 
3.13 Summary and Research aim 
In this chapter I aimed to provide an outline of the theoretical framework employed by the 
current study as well as to illustrate in detail its relevance to the topic of interest.  In the 
first part of the chapter I briefly outlined the context and main points of the chosen theory, 
namely Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucracy.  I then moved on to highlight how this 
framework had been successfully employed by various analysts from different academic 
disciplines before focussing on its application to general practice in order to explain GP 
attitudes and behaviours in response to previous primary care policies.  The new contract, 
and in particular QOF, have however been seen by some as having the potential to 
fundamentally change the way that GPs work.241   Evidence of the impact of QOF and the 
subsequent changes to date were discussed and related to Lipsky’s framework, in 
particular to the issue of discretion and performance measurement and management.  The 
changes (as derived from the existing literature) appear to be wide ranging and appear to 
impact on several areas of Lipsky’s analytical framework.  I then discussed the limitations 
of conceptualising GPs as SLBs but also indicated how further developments in SLB 
theory appear to strongly resonate with the remit of this research.  I therefore seek to 
assess whether the conceptualisation of GPs as SLBs is still appropriate and useful to 
understanding GP behaviour and responses to centrally defined policy since the 
introduction of the new contractual arrangements, and in particular QOF. 
 
As Lipsky himself stated, any changes to the conditions of work outlined in this chapter 
which not only allow for, but require SLB discretion, may make his analysis less 
appropriate.  In the following chapters I explore the views and experiences of GPs in 
relation to the contractual changes. I investigate how QOF has been implemented within 
GP practices what subsequent impact, if any, this has had on the work of GPs, particularly 
in relation to the substantive element of GP work i.e. the consultation.  In the concluding 
chapter I relate my findings to the existing empirical evidence and use the overall 
evidence in order to assess whether the key aspects of Lipsky’s framework still hold post-
QOF. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology and Methods 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a discussion of the methodology and critiques the methods utilized 
in this thesis. I also outline the sampling approach, details of the sample; interview 
process and analysis are then discussed.  The chapter ends with a brief discussion on my 
personal reflections relating to the research and interview process as well as ethical issues 
and how these were addressed.  
 
4.2 Research Design 
Convention and intuition suggests that the choice of research approach and associated 
methods should be influenced and relevant to the research questions.  In this case, the 
research approach and methods were designed (prior to my involvement on the project) to 
answer the research questions of a wider project (see Appendix 1). However, the plans for 
data collection to address the project aims were congruent with addressing my own 
research questions.  The formulation of these questions i.e. to assess the impact of the 
contract and in particular QOF was however adjusted slightly to reflect changes to the 
original design of the qualitative arm of the project.  The original intention was to work 
within four health economies as fieldwork sites and to adopt a case-study approach i.e. 
recruiting whole organisations (GP practices, pharmacies and dental practices) and 
studying the impact of the contracts on the internal workings of the organisation and its 
staff via participant observation and interviews.  Attempts to recruit in order to populate 
this framework proved very difficult and PCTs were identified instead as proxies for 
health economies based on willingness to participate, diversity of approaches to 
contracting and range of socioeconomic characteristics.  The quantitative arm of the study 
provided data to identify such sites. Initially we attempted to utilise a maximum variation 
sampling approach to identify within PCTs, a variety of practices with respect to issues 
such as the ownership status, the size of the organisation and the level of performance 
against the contract.  The task of recruiting whole organisations in accordance with the 
sampling strategy however proved too difficult to put into place and a decision was made 
by the Principal Investigator (PI), Professor Ruth McDonald (who is also one of my 
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supervisors), to change the design.  Specifically, the decision was made to focus on 
interviewing individual primary care practitioners at multiple time points and where 
possible individual GPs more than once.  Therefore the research topic I was to formulate 
also had to be one that could be answered by the chosen project methods i.e. interviews.  
However, this still left considerable scope as interviewing is the most common method of 
data collection employed in qualitative health research.242 The research questions 
regarding the assessment of the impact of the changes on GP were therefore adjusted 
slightly to reflect the methods and are outlined below. 
 
4.3 Research Questions 
This thesis aims to explore the perceived impact of the new contractual arrangements, and 
in particular the QOF, by eliciting the views and reported experiences of currently 
working GPs. I then ask, given the perceived impact, whether the prior conceptualisation 
of GPs as SLBs is still appropriate and useful to understanding GP behaviours and 
responses to centrally defined policy in the light of the reported results.   
 
4.4 Theoretical considerations 
Much of the research concerning general practice has been grounded in a positivist 
epistemology. The doctrine of Positivism ‘advocates the application of the methods of the 
natural sciences to the study of social reality.’243(p12)  The tenets of positivism have been 
summarised as: 1) only those phenomena and hence knowledge that is observable, is 
warranted as knowledge, 2) it is deductive and knowledge is advanced via hypothesis 
testing under experimental designs i.e. assumes a stable environment, 3) it is ‘value-free’ 
or objective 4) the approach provides predictive power 5) it assumes that reality is 
objective.243  
 
In terms of the current work, the new contract and QOF could be seen to be an 
intervention designed to influence the behaviour of GPs and that of their practices. The 
application or uptake of this intervention however has not occurred across a uniformly 
organised context i.e. it has not taken place under stable experimental conditions as the 
environment in which GPs work is not stable or uniform.  In fact contextual issues are 
likely to be of importance and affect how individual GPs perceived the initial changes and 
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those that have occurred since.  Positivism would obstruct this exploration of complexity 
because it reduces rather than expands the horizon of inquiry.  In addition, as the research 
involves eliciting GP views and perceptions of their experiences working under the new 
arrangements, the data will reflect attitudes and beliefs, rather than being observable.  All 
in all, the positivist approach appeared to fall short when placed in the context of the 
research aims.  The other end of the ‘epistemology spectrum’ consists of interpretive 
approaches. One type of interpretivism that has been adopted in relation to research 
interested in the views and experiences of patients as well as their practitioners (including 
GPs and nurses) is that of phenomenology (see for example244;245).  This approach 
emphasises studying the experience of the issue of interest, from the ‘point of view’ of the 
subject.  The problem with a phenomenological approach in this case is that it calls into 
question the very existence of social structures.246  Specifically, the issue stems from the 
fact that ‘rather than accepting social structures affect the attitudes and actions of 
individuals, for phenomenologists the flow of causality runs in the other direction, in that 
social structures are creation of individual minds.’246(p414)  In summary, both these 
approaches fail to take into account the influence that contextual factors have on 
individual experience of the intervention.  As already highlighted, it is possible (and 
likely) that contextual factors and social structures such as the GP’s status in the 
organisation (i.e. salaried vs. principal), may affect the perceptions and experiences of 
such individuals with regards to the introduction, implementation of and subsequent 
impact of the contract and QOF on their day to day work. Having found neither ends of 
the spectrum to fit with the needs of my research aims, I therefore looked for a ‘middle-
way’ and two viewpoints which appear to fit with my views and needs and which are 
broadly similar are subtle realism247 and critical realism.248  Both approaches take realist 
ontological positions (i.e. that the external world exists independently of our sense 
experience or observer) but have relativist epistemologies, in other words the 
epistemological dimension emphasises the fallibility of human knowledge and how it is 
socially and historically located.  In addition, both views also acknowledge the influence 
of human agency is acknowledged whilst at the same time taking cognizance of the effect 
of structures on action.249,250  The theoretical viewpoint taken in this thesis therefore tends 
towards that as advocated by these ‘middle-way’ approaches. 
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4.5 The Research Approach 
The current study is an exploration of the perceived impact of nGMS on general medical 
practice, and in particular the impact of QOF (and its changing nature) on the day to day 
work and practice of general practitioners.   In order to assess the impact of this centrally 
derived policy, it is necessary to access GPs views and experiences regarding the new 
arrangements and how they may have and continue to impact on their day to day working 
lives. Many authors, emphasise the view that the purpose and context of research ought to 
determine which methodology is chosen.242,251,252  In this section I briefly outline why the 
adopted methodology is appropriate for answering my research questions. 
 
In the case of the empirical research on QOF, there is a growing literature which contains 
both quantitative and qualitative studies.  The outputs of both types of approach reflect the 
types of questions that researchers have been interested to date.  For instance, in case of 
the quantitative studies, researchers have been interested in assessing whether or not QOF 
targets have been achieved as well as how wide-scale factors such as deprivation or 
practice size characteristics may, or may not, have impacted on achievement levels.e.g.221  
This reflects the fact that in general, the goals of quantitative approaches are to enumerate 
the phenomenon of interest. The outcomes of this type of research however are limited (or 
provide a partial view) as they only tell us whether for targets have been met (or not), and 
not how or why.  Qualitative studies on this area to date have attempted to address 
different types of questions such as ‘how’ and ‘why’ QOF has been achieved.  For 
instance, some qualitative studies have revealed how practices have become internally 
organised around the needs of QOF.147  Such studies illustrate the power of qualitative 
methods which allow more in-depth information to be collected that may be difficult or 
impossible to convey quantitatively,253 and reflects the fact that the goal of qualitative 
methodologies is to explore and improve the understanding of social phenomena in a 
natural rather than experimental settings; emphasising the meanings, experiences and 
views of all participants.254  The use of a qualitative approach will therefore allow me to 
answer my research questions by exploring in depth GPs views of how (and if) the QOF 
has affected their daily working practices and working lives.  Furthermore, the 
longitudinal design (i.e. conducting second round interviews) allows for the examination 
of GP views over time, in this case over a one year interval. This was particularly 
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important for the current study as the substantive topic of interest i.e. QOF evolves on an 
annual basis.  This allowed me to assess the stability or trends in GP views and 
experiences in addition to the usual ‘snapshots.’   It also provided a richer data set as I was 
able to explore certain areas of analytical interest in greater depth. This was particularly 
invaluable given the need to balance the data collection needs of the wider project and my 
PhD. 
 
Despite the fact that qualitative methodologies are increasingly used in a wide range of 
research settings including the health services research arena,255 there have been extensive 
discussions within the literature regarding the quality and limitations of these approaches. 
Criticisms typically reflect what researchers employing quantitative approaches (e.g. 
surveys) deem to be the ‘strengths’ of these methods.  In other words, qualitative 
approaches are often criticised for being ‘unscientific’, open to bias, lacking in 
generalisability and reproducibility.256  The application of such criteria arises from criteria 
acceptable within the positivist domain i.e. critics assume that by applying quantitative 
approaches they are able to measure stable phenomena in a ‘value-free’ manner.  Even 
those attempting to measure phenomena and views via surveys are largely unaware as to 
whether those surveyed all uniformly interpreted the ‘questions, categories and language 
used in the questionnaire.’256 (p109)  In other words although the instrument may be 
uniformly presented to participants and therefore data is presumed to be collected in a 
uniform manner, the results may reflect differences in interpretation rather than any 
‘actual’ differences in attitudes etc. Such differences in interpretation are unlikely to be 
picked up by conventional ‘pre-testing’ of questionnaires.257 However, by employing 
certain techniques, researchers have attempted to shed some light on this issue.  For 
instance, utilising the think-aloud258 approach (where participants verbalise their thoughts 
as they perform tasks) reveals how participants bring different meaning to information 
that is presented to them.259  It appears therefore that irrespective of the chosen approach, 
the conclusions made depend upon the judgment and skill of the researcher and the 
appropriateness of the data collected. 256 
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4.6 Quality and Rigour in Qualitative Research 
There is much debate regarding how to judge quality in qualitative research. Explicit 
discussions of quality in qualitative approaches ‘began from concerns designated with 
words such as validity and reliability, developed within the quantitative or scientific 
tradition.’260 (p465) One of the early responses to these concerns from within the qualitative 
research community was to write about issues of reliability and validity in relation to 
qualitative research but to imbue the terms with somewhat different meaning.243 For 
example, some regard the key criteria representative of good quality research as being 
whether or not the interested reader can (should they choose to) replicate the study and 
confirm the findings (i.e. reliability).261 However, other authors have questioned the 
validity of applying such criteria to qualitative research. Taking the example of applying 
the criterion of ‘replicatability,’ in the case of certain types of qualitative research, it may 
be that the researcher is interested in the nature of change of for example a phenomenon 
or within an organisation.  Fulfilling the criteria of ‘replicatability’ in such cases is 
therefore simply not feasible.262  Given this example of disagreement, it is somewhat 
unsurprising then that there has been a proliferation in activity around and publication of 
numerous different quality guidelines or criteria deemed suitable for assessing quality in 
qualitative research.263  This was ‘in marked contrast to the quantitative tradition where a 
consensus around certain ideas (for example, the distinction between validity and 
reliability, or between internal and external validity) has been more easy to sustain 
amongst researchers.’260(p467)  Despite the fact that there is no absolute list of criteria,264 
there do appear to be some commonly agreed areas, as most share a concern for 
trustworthiness and rigour i.e. all of them require such research to be both coherent and 
logical, as well as to  show evidence of systematic and auditable work.  Table 5 
summarises these criteria along with a brief description of how the current study met the 
criteria. 
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Table 5 Quality criteria (content adapted from 242,265 ) 
Judgement Criteria Description Methods used 
Transferability Broadly corresponds to the notion 
of external validity or 
generalisability.  The aim here is 
to give readers enough information 
(‘thick description’) for them to 
judge the applicability of the 
findings to other settings. 
Provision of a full description of 
the sample characteristics (as 
well as comparative national 
figures where possible) and the 
findings 
Dependability Broadly corresponds to the notion 
of “reliability” in quantitative 
research.  The reader should be 
able to establish via the work that 
the research process has been 
conducted with appropriate due 
care and attention i.e. there is 
enough of an audit trail.  
.    
 
Accurate interview transcripts 
were produced 
 
Analysis of whole data set 
undertaken 
 
Regular and ongoing discussion 
of analysis process with 
supervisors 
 
Provide a clear account of the 
research process 
Credibility Akin to the notion of internal 
validity i.e. do the findings make 
sense? 
The provision of sufficient 
information regarding the 
findings, study and other 
empirical literature. 
Confirmability Refers to the confidence the reader 
has in the findings. 
Analysis of deviant cases and 
disconfirming data 
 
4.7 Methods 
4.7.1 A consideration of Semi-structured Interviews 
Interviews are commonly defined as a conversation with a purpose.266  They are the most 
commonly used qualitative method,242 and have been described as ‘the gold standard’ of 
qualitative research.267 There is however no single method of interviewing. Interviews 
vary in their form. On one side of the spectrum there are structured interviews which are 
narrowly defined conversations with a specific ordered set of questions.  Those with 
positivist tendencies tend to employ such approaches in order to attempt to ensure the 
uniform asking and answering (in terms of order) of questions.  This approach ultimately 
attempts to ensure a high degree of comparability between accounts.266  In addition, such 
an approach is also assumed to minimise the role of the interviewer on the interviewee.267 
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On the other end of the spectrum are informal or unstructured interviews which rely on the 
spontaneous generation of data via natural opportunistic interactions within the field (i.e. 
they are often associated with observational methods) i.e. there is no pre-defined interview 
guide or schedule.  These are often employed when the researcher begins with the 
assumption that they do not know in advance what the necessary questions are.266  
Interviewers are supposed to adapt throughout the encounter and explore, probe areas that 
arise spontaneously during the interview. Semi-structured interviews, the approach chosen 
in this work, lie in between these two extremes.242  
 
The semi-structured interview has been described as being: 
 …conducted on the basis of a loose structure of open questions which define the 
area to be explored, at least initially, and from which the interviewer or interviewee 
may diverge in order to pursue an idea in more detail.’ 268 (ibid p106)   
 
As the research aims to assess the impact of the new contractual arrangements and in 
particular QOF, this meant there were pre-determined broad questions, and hence, the 
semi-structured interview was deemed most appropriate.  However, I also wanted to 
ensure that I wasn’t imposing or restricting the issues that were discussed within the 
interviews solely to those I had formulated in advance.  Again, the strength of the semi-
structured interview was useful here as it allowed me to respond with flexibility in the 
interviews in order to explore emerging issues that were not necessarily anticipated at the 
start of the research.269   
 
In terms of answering my research questions, i.e. assessing the impact of the introduction 
of the new contracts and QOF, I was in effect asking people to recall experiences, events, 
feelings when for example asking people (where appropriate) to compare their working 
lives pre- and post-April 2004.  As QOF is designed to evolve over time, I was also 
interested in GP views on the nature and direction of changes.  These requirements fit well 
with what some consider to be the advantageous properties of interviews:   
  
We cannot observe feelings, thoughts and intentions. We cannot observe 
behaviours that took place at some previous point in time….we cannot observe 
how people have organised the world and the meanings they attach to what goes 
on in the world – we have to ask people questions about those things. The purpose 
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of interviewing then is to allow us to enter into the other persons’ 
perspective.’270(ibid p 196) 
 
However, some highlight the fact that interviews record what people say, rather than what 
they may actually do or think, undermines their value.242   Further criticism has been 
levelled at the reliance placed on memory in the construction of accounts i.e. there is the 
potential for recall bias.242,271 Others discuss the issue of ‘social performance’ and 
‘impression management’ (terms originating from Erving Goffman’s272 work) which may 
occur during the interview.266  This point touches on a particular issue with regards to the 
way that data collected via interviews is treated and traditionally this has been seen in one 
of two ways.273 The first sees interview data as a ‘resource’.  This approach views the data 
as reflecting (or a window on) the reality of the interviewees’ outside of the interview.   In 
this view language is largely unproblematic as it functions to provide ‘facts.’  An 
alternative view perceives interview data as a ‘topic’ which is (more or less) reflecting a 
reality that is jointly constructed i.e. between interviewer and interviewee.  However, from 
everyday experience we know that language is not a neutral tool. For instance as 
highlighted above, during the interview, an interviewee may wish to present themselves in 
various ways and from this perspective the interview is an opportunity for impression 
management.272 In the case of this work as I am interviewing professionals I may expect 
them to present themselves as being ‘competent’ and ‘professional’.  However, given that 
I was to interview a wide range of GPs, it is unlikely that all these varied informants will 
engage in convergent retrospective or impression management.274   
 
Some analysts are wary of discounting the data from interviews due to the reasons 
outlined above.275  They accept that the data cannot be treated simply as a representation 
of an individual’s world and are shaped by the context in which they are produced. They 
insist that accounts from people who participate have special knowledge of interest and 
are therefore an important resource. Others state that interview data is valid ‘so long as the 
interview is treated as a contextual account, not as a proxy representation of some other 
reality.’242(ibid p89) However, as in real life, the account obtained in an interview will have a 
mixture of the real and the representation.276   I attempted to take this into account during 
the analysis by carefully examining the data and probing it in relation to any underlying 
tensions and apparent contradictions contained within.   
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4.7.2 A consideration of telephone interviews 
The project’s aims of collecting a large amount of data at repeated time points meant that I 
utilised telephone interviews in a small number of first round interviews (n=7) and for all 
second round interviews (n=24).  Telephone interviews have been used extensively in 
quantitative research277 but have not traditionally been a major way of collecting data in 
qualitative research.266,277  Their use is considered to be advantageous within project 
settings as they permit data to be collected with minimal costs (e.g. no travel costs) and 
allow data to be collected easily from geographically diverse areas.266,278  My use of 
telephone interviews was in fact largely due to such practical reasons however, some 
concerns have been raised regarding their use in qualitative research.  The first appears to 
be the view that telephone interviews are an inferior mode of interviewing when compared 
to face to face.277  A recent review of the use of telephone interviewing in qualitative 
research revealed that this ‘biased’ view (as the author terms it) is ‘implicit both in the 
omission of telephone interviews in qualitative research texts and in the small number of 
articles on telephone interviews.’277(p394)  This lack of presence in the qualitative literature 
appears to reflect doubts about the quality of the data gained via telephone methods, 
compared with face-to-face interviewing.278   However, other researchers who having 
initially shared these doubts found that their use of telephone interviews produced 
unexpectedly rich data.279  All in all, there appears to be little consensus on this issue, 
nevertheless the debate about face to face vs. phone interviewing was a point that I was 
careful to take into consideration when analysing those interviews conducted by phone vs. 
those conducted face to face.  The other commonly cited disadvantage of telephone 
interviews surrounds the inability to pick up on any visual cues. There is however little 
research confirming these effects, and there is no clear understanding of how they might 
compromise qualitative data.277  
 
Whereas there has been an apparent bias against the use of telephone interviews in 
qualitative research, there are in addition to the practical advantages of reduced cost other 
reported advantages.  These have been summarised as 1) allowing participants to remain 
on their own turf, 2) permit more anonymity, 3) decrease social pressures and 4) allow 
participants to disclose sensitive information more freely.  I also found the ability to jot 
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down notes (unobtrusively) on areas to go back and probe further on certain issues 
extremely helpful.277  In addition, it has also been argued that qualitative telephone 
interviews are best utilised when 1) the researcher is employing either structured or semi-
structured interviews and 2) when they are conducted among people with whom the 
interviewer has already conducted face to face interviews with.266  My use of telephone 
interviews therefore largely fulfils these criteria as I was using semi-structured interviews 
and that most of them were utilised in the second round of data collection. In addition, I 
feel that GPs are in fact a very suitable group for conducting telephone interviews with, in 
that they are a natural medium for them as much of their day to day business is conducted 
on the phone, including telephone consultations with patients.  Finally, both the face to 
face and telephone interviews were digitally recorded (and then professionally 
transcribed) and therefore the audio quality of the accounts was comparable. 
 
4.8 Sampling 
Appropriate methods of sampling are dependent upon the aim(s) of the research. 
Quantitative studies aim to produce a statistically representative probability or random 
sample (where each member of the population has an equal chance of being selected) of 
the whole population.242  In contrast, in qualitative work: 
 
…randomness and representativeness are of less concern than relevance…Does 
the sample produce the type of knowledge necessary to understand the structure 
and processes within which the individuals or situations are located?264(p346) 
 
Furthermore the premise of the qualitative sampling approach has been described as: 
 
...to identify specific groups of people who either possess characteristics or live in 
characteristics relevant to the social phenomenon being studied. Informants are 
identified because they will enable exploration of a particular aspect of behaviour 
relevant to the research. This…allows the researcher to include a wide range of 
types of informants and also to select key informants with access to important 
sources of knowledge.280(p12-13) 
 
Thus initial sampling is usually purposeful or purposive i.e. it is guided by the need to 
select subjects that are able to provide relevant data or are “information-rich.”252(p203) 
Some suggest that in order to achieve this, a number of different sampling strategies are 
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possible and include the technique employed in this study i.e. snowball sampling. I now 
discuss how the decision to adopt ‘snowball sampling’ was made.242  
 
Given that the research aims to investigate the effects of the new contract and specifically 
QOF on the work of GPs, those approached to take part in the study were GPs.  As 
described earlier, it initially was planned to recruit practices as a whole entity i.e. adopt an 
organisational viewpoint due to the fact that under the new contracting arrangements the 
contract is held at the practice level, as opposed to individual GPs. However, as this 
strategy was abandoned in the wider project due to the fact that it was not possible to 
engage and recruit whole practices and it was decided to focus on interviewing individual 
practitioners.  Therefore, in order to collate the necessary participants and data it was 
decided to take a pragmatic approach based on ‘snowball sampling’ in view of the time 
(as project time had been lost in attempting to recruit whole practices) and resources 
available.  
 
Snowball sampling involves identifying a few potential cases of interest, verifying their 
interest as well as eligibility, and accessing potential further cases via the initial 
participant’s social or professional contacts. It was developed and has subsequently been 
utilised by researchers as a solution to researching ‘hard-to-reach’ or ‘hidden’ 
populations.281  Such populations are those which are ‘not validated by society’ and often 
tend to be small and attempt to remain off the societal radar.282  They  may therefore, be 
deterred from engaging in research due to the fear of legal sanctions, for example, sex-
workers or illicit drug users.  Although GPs are a socially visible group, I think they can 
be considered ‘hard-to-reach’ in that it is fairly well known within the health service 
research community that it is difficult to access GPs and to persuade them to take part in 
research. There are various factors that contribute to this such as constraints on their time 
due to clinical practice and the need to process their patient workload. In addition, it is 
virtually impossible to access them directly to discuss research which they may be 
interested in taking part in due to the fact that they employ staff which act as gatekeepers.  
Such factors therefore also led me to perceive GPs as an ‘elite’ group, because they are 
‘relatively more powerful then the interviewer’ and culturally different if the interviewer 
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is a student…’ 242(p94)  This of course applied to my own work and I presented myself as 
both a student as well as an employee on the wider project.  
 
The difficulty with snowball sampling lies within the mechanism itself, in other words 
particular people may be included or excluded as a result of the initial participants who 
then refer the researcher onto other participants who may share similar viewpoints (which 
may in fact be atypical) as they belong to the same social network i.e. the sample may be 
too restricted and reflect a homogenised sample.  In other words the accounts and in turn 
the research outcomes may be biased.281,283 Despite the potential for this to occur, the 
approach employed did in fact produce a wide range of participants in terms of key factors 
of potential interest and importance such as status (principal or salaried), years of clinical 
experience, locations, practice size, and deprivation (see Section 4.10). Before discussing 
the recruited sample, I briefly outline the various strategies employed in attempting to 
access participants recruited in this study. 
 
4.9 Negotiating and Gaining Access  
I employed a number of strategies in order to access GPs.  Firstly, given the fact that I 
work in a primary care research centre which has a number of jobbing GPs, it seemed a 
logical starting point to consult them and ask whether they or their colleagues would be 
interested in participating.  This ‘convenience sample’ provided a small number of 
interviewees within the sample. Once this avenue had been exhausted, I then turned to 
other ‘key informants’ that I had encountered during the project research, namely PCT 
leads who were specifically commissioners of care within primary care and provider 
contract managers i.e. people who had access to the group of interest.  After interviewing 
PCT leads for the wider project, I would then take the opportunity to ask if they had direct 
contact details in the form of e-mail addresses for their practitioners. Where PCT staff 
were willing to share this information I utilised the lists and individually e-mailed GPs in 
order to inform them of the research and ask them if they were willing to participate in the 
study.  This tactic again produced a small sample of GPs which I was able to interview. 
Other attempts to contact GPs directly involved doing a mass mail out, which again 
produced a small number of participants. I also developed the tactic of speaking to the 
practice managers who were then interviewed for the project and asked to recruit any 
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willing GPs from their practices.  I was directed by one practice manager to a local 
practice managers meeting which allowed me to speak to representatives of several 
practices in one go. This allowed me to present the aims of the overall project as well as to 
state my intentions to utilise the data for my own thesis.  This again eventually produced a 
small number of participants. I also contacted one of the Local Medical Committees 
(LMC) who agreed to put an advert for the research project in their newsletter and as 
result some GPs actually contacted me voluntarily. The largest factor however that 
enabled both myself and the PI to recruit the numbers of GPs (and other participants) 
required was the inclusion of the project into the Primary Care Research Network (PCRN) 
portfolio.  The PCRN portfolio is a subset of the National Institute for Health Research 
Clinical Research Network (NIHR CRN).  The significance of this occurrence was the 
fact that we could now access support costs. Such costs are supplied by PCTs and are 
designed to cover the cost of the interviewee whilst they are undertaking research.  This 
allowed us to contact practices with the carrot of funding and this significantly improved 
our recruitment. The other major asset that came with the project’s inclusion into the 
PCRN portfolio was that the PCRN have specific contacts whose role is to aid the 
recruitment of suitable participants into the portfolios’ projects.  Such people, to whom I 
and the wider project team are extremely grateful to, were an invaluable resource.  Finally, 
the inclusion of the project into the portfolio meant that the research moved from the 
immediate geographic setting i.e. the Greater Manchester area to other geographic 
locations. 
 
4.10 Participants 
In total I conducted 62 first round GP interviews (with have an average duration of 41.72 
minutes and range of 26.09 to 62.81) between Feb 2008 and Sept 2009. A further 24 
second round (R2) interviews also took place between November 2009 and January 2010 
which in all cases was over one year after the initial interview (average duration of 21.3 
minutes and a range of 13.2 to 30.3 minutes). The total sample comprised, 41 (or 66.1%) 
GP principals and 21 (or 33.9%) salaried GPs (see table 6). Just over half of all 
participants (54.8%) were male with the split between the two GPs groups in terms of 
status being: principal GPs 73.2% male and salaried GPs 19% male.  
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The composition of the whole sample in the study appears to compare well with national 
figures published in 2010 which report that in 2009, males comprised 53.9% (vs. 54.8% in 
the sample) of the overall GP workforce.284  The dominance of the female representation 
in the salaried group of 21 participants also reflects the fact that it has also been reported 
that many women seem to have chosen to move into the area in the last 10 years, which 
has resulted in a 69.3% increase, changing from 32.6% of the workforce in 1999 to 43.7% 
in 2009.285  In addition this trend i.e. the feminisation of the workforce appears to be 
continuing as in 2009 there was a bias of female registrars with 61.7% of registrars being 
women compared with 58.6% in 1999.   
 
The average clinical experience of those in the sample was 14.5yrs (range = 0.5 to 35yrs) 
and principal GPs had an average of 19.1yrs experience in general practice comparison to 
salaried GPs who on average had 5.4yrs of experience.  The difference here between 
salaried and principal GPs is also somewhat reflective of nationally derived figures which 
show that the proportion of practitioners aged 45 and above has risen from 49.2% in 1999 
to 56.9% in 2009.  In addition the numbers of under-35s are also increasing, rising from 
11.9% in 1999 to 12.6% in 2009.285 
 
Table 6 Sample Characteristics 
Study ID Sex 
Date of  
Interview 
Year medical 
degree gained  
(as listed in GP 
register) 
Self-reported time 
(yrs) in general 
practice at time of 
interview Status Practice # PCT # 
1 F 11/02/08 1972 30 Principal 1 1 
2 M 08/02/08 1996 4.5 Principal 2 9 
3 M 07/03/08 1976 30 Principal 3 12 
4 M 27/05/08 1969 32 Principal 3 12 
5 M 19/03/08 1991 13 Principal 4 1 
6 M 01/05/08 1980 24 Principal 5†† 1 
7 M 12/05/08 1986 17 Principal 6 1 
8 M 17/06/08 1984 20 Principal 7 1 
9 M 23/06/08 1983 20 Principal 8 5 
10** F 27/06/08 2000 1 Salaried 2 9 
11 M 27/06/08 1998 5 Principal 2 9 
12 F 22/07/08 1991 11 Salaried 9 5 
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13 M 23/07/08 1989 12 Principal 10 12 
14 M 24/07/08 1983 20 Principal 10 12 
15 M 31/07/08 1978 26 Principal 11 11 
16 F 11/08/08 1984 18 Principal 12 5 
17** F 26/08/08 2002 2 Principal 13 8 
18 F 26/08/08 1982 20 Principal 13 8 
19 M 29/08/08 1967 35 Principal 14 12 
20 M 10/09/08 1977 26 Principal 15†† 5 
21 M 18/09/08 1986 18 Principal 16 8 
22 M 19/09/08 1983 23 Principal 17 5 
23 M 29/09/08 1988 14 Principal 13 8 
24** F 10/10/08 1992* 2.5 Salaried 17 5 
25 M 03/10/08 1974 30 Principal 18 11 
26 M 10/11/08 1978 28 Principal 19 8 
27 F 10/11/08 1988 15 Principal 19 8 
28 M 11/11/08 1992 17 Principal 12 5 
29 F 01/12/08 1978 31 Principal 9 5 
30 F 08/12/08 1985 18 Salaried 20 2 
31** F 10/12/08 2002 3 Salaried 21 13 
32 M 05/01/09 1998* 2 Principal 22 7 
33 F 05/01/09 1984 21 Principal 22 7 
34 M 07/01/09 1984 20 Principal 22 7 
35 F 09/01/09 1983 25 Principal 22 7 
36 M 12/01/09 1991 16 Principal 22 7 
37 M 12/01/09 1991 16 Principal 22 7 
38 M 14/01/09 1976 30 Principal 22 7 
39** M 14/01/09 2002 3.5 Principal 22 7 
40** M 16/01/09 1992* 3 Salaried 23† 5 
41 F 16/01/09 2001 5 Salaried 23 5 
42 F 20/01/09 1985 17 Principal 24 8 
43 M 20/01/09 1990 12 Principal 24 8 
44 F 20/01/09 1983 20 Principal 24 8 
45 M 21/01/09 1990 25 Principal 24 8 
46 F 21/01/09 1995 9 Principal 24 8 
47** F 30/01/09 1984* 2 Salaried 22 7 
48** F 10/02/09 2002 2.5 Salaried 25 13 
49 M 09/02/09 1982 12 Salaried 24 8 
50 M 13/03/09 1986 19 Principal 26 3 
51** F 09/03/09 2002 2.5 Salaried 27 8 
52 M 09/03/09 1985 19 Principal 27 8 
53** F 06/04/09 2000 4 Salaried 28 6 
54** F 17/04/09 2000 3 Salaried 29†† 10 
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55** F 17/04/09 2004 1.5 Salaried 29 10 
56 F 17/04/09 1995 5 Salaried 29 10 
57** F 28/04/09 2001 3 Salaried 29 10 
58 F 06/05/09 1990 6 Salaried 29 10 
59** M 15/06/09 1994* 2 Salaried 30 7 
60** M 30/06/09 2000 0.5 Salaried 31 8 
61 F 01/07/09 1990 16 Salaried 32 4 
62 F 08/09/09 1992 10 Salaried 33 14 
* = previous career in hospital medicine before entering general practice 
** = only worked under the new contractual arrangements (QOF) from April 2004.  
† = APMS practice 
†† = PMS practice 
R2 interviews indicated by shaded areas 
 
Finally, an illustration of practice characteristics in terms of list size and deprivation are 
listed in tables 7 and 8.  The practices in my sample had an average Index of Multiple 
Deprivation (IMD)† of 27.5, indicating that they were marginally more deprived (on 
average) when compared to the average practice nationally which has an IMD of 23.7. 
 
Table 7 Sample deprivation 
Index of Deprivation quintiles
(1= most affluent and 5= most 
deprived) 
No. of practices No. of GPs 
1 4 17 
2 6 11 
3 6 7 
4 5 9 
5 12 18 
Total 33 62 
† the IMD consists of a number of indicators, chosen to cover a range of economic, 
social and housing issues, into a single deprivation score for each small area in 
England.285 
Source: Constructed by: Social disadvantage research Department of social policy and 
social work university of Oxford 
Data obtained via GEOCONVERT : http://geoconvert.mimas.ac.uk 
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Table 8 Sample practice size characteristics 
 
 
4.11 The interview process and content 
All interviews began by reiterating the nature and purpose of the study, allowing the 
interviewee the opportunity to read the participant information sheet (see Appendix 2) and 
to ask any questions before obtaining consent (see Appendix 3). All interviews were 
conducted in the participants’ own premises, specifically their offices. Each interview 
began with a set of general background questions such as ‘how long they had been in 
practice for? What made them choose general practice as a career?” By asking such open-
ended and non-controversial questions, it is suggested that a comfortable rapport between 
interviewer and interviewee may be built.242 This type of questioning also encourages the 
participant to talk descriptively, thereby aiding in the collection of detailed data.252 During 
data collection the topic guide evolved to include new areas that arose from the interviews 
as well to ask about contract/QOF changes during the data collection period. Examples of 
broad areas covered in the interviews were (See Appendix 4 for the topic guide): 
 
• What effects, if any, the new contract and in particular QOF had on the participants 
themselves – at the time, over time etc 
• What effects the new contract and in particular QOF had on others – colleagues, 
patients, relationships with the PCT etc 
• What organisational changes had occurred as a result of or in anticipation of the 
contractual changes e.g. QOF teams 
• What the differences were pre- and post- contractual changes (for themselves and 
others including patients) 
Patient List Size (L) No. of GP practices No. of GPs 
L< 4000 5 7 
4000 < L < 8000 15 27 
8000 < L < 12000 9 10 
L>12000 3 16 
Total  32 60 
Note: Data for practice 13 (n=2GPs) unavailable as newly opened. 
Source: Copyright © 2004. Re-used with the permission of The Health and Social Care 
Information Centre. All rights reserved. 
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• How they perceived the changing nature of the contract and QOF content 
• What they liked or disliked about the QOF 
 
Second round interviews covered a number of topics of interest that arose in round one 
and through further investigation could provide further detail on the general phenomena 
identified in round one.  Some questions were largely related to areas that arose 
specifically in an individual’s transcript.  For example, if in the first round the interviewee 
identified themselves as the overall QOF lead, I asked them whether all practitioners were 
equally good at fulfilling QOF requirements, how they dealt with under-performance etc. 
For this reason I have not included a generic R2 topic guide. 
 
4.12 Data Analysis 
The analytical approach adopted in the current study closely followed that described by 
Miles and Huberman.265,286  They suggest that analysis consists of three concurrent flows 
of activity: Data reduction, Data display and conclusion drawing /verification.  A 
diagrammatic representation of the process is shown in figure 2.  It illustrates the iterative 
nature of the analytical process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A diagrammatic representation of the analysis 
process 
 
 
Data Display 
 
 
Data reduction 
 
Data collection 
 
Conclusion 
drawing/verification 
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The three main aspects of the process may be summarised as follows:  
 
Data reduction - refers to the process of selecting and extracting 
information from the raw data (which in this case were interview 
transcripts) which reflects the topics of interest. In other words the process 
involves data fragmentation and labelling. 
 
Data display - the organisation of the ‘reduced data’ in such a way that it 
enables a clearer understanding of it.  This may involve the display of such 
data via use of tables or charts.   The use of such ‘cognitive devices’ are 
intended to the make the data appears more accessible as well as 
comparable in order to look for relationships and connections within the 
data. 
 
Conclusion drawing/verification – essentially refers to the process of 
interpretation.  Possible conclusions identified early on in the process via 
the identification of patterns and anomalies are tested, re-interpreted, 
modified and even discarded where appropriate as the process continues 
until ‘final’ conclusions are made. 
 
It should be noted that although I have chosen the approach advocated by Miles and 
Huberman,265,286 it is broadly similar to that also advocated by other analysts.  For 
instance, those using approaches derived from ‘grounded theory’287 employ the technique 
of constant comparison, which also involves iterative data collection and analysis. The 
idea being that initial pieces of data (an interview or a theme) is taken as a starting point 
and subsequent accounts are compared in order to establish similarities and/or differences 
and therefore conceptualisations of the possible relationships between various pieces of 
data.288  In fact, the three stages of constant comparison can be compared with that by 
Miles and Huberman265,286 in the following way: open coding (data reduction), axial 
coding (data display) and selective coding (conclusion drawing).   
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4.12.1 Process of Analysis 
 
Essentially the approach chosen involves segmenting the data and categorising it into 
themes. The process was both inductive and deductive in that I was interested in assessing 
the impact of the contract inductively but I also had Lipsky’s theoretical framework to 
take into account therefore analysis was also deductive i.e. by looking for data that would 
fit or not into the main analytical points of his framework as outlined in the previous 
chapter. 
 
First it should be noted that all interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed by 
professional transcribers.  I then checked them for accuracy against the audio files. 
Transcripts were then uploaded into ATLAS.ti which was used specifically to aid in the 
data storage, management, and coding process.  
 
Although I do not doubt that the actual ‘doing’ of the interviews and then checking the 
transcripts for accuracy started the initial informal analysis process in my head, the first 
active analytical step taken was the process of familiarising myself with the data simply 
by reading the transcripts at length.  Notes were made during each reading, (using the 
memo facility in ATLAS.ti) of any points of particular interest. I then sought to ‘reduce 
the data’ by starting the process of coding i.e. attaching labels to pieces of in this case 
textual data.   
 
Initial codes were assigned to the transcript text on the basis of the topic guide questions 
so as to provide a sensible descriptive ‘framework’ in which to retrieve segments of the 
transcripts that were comparable in that they were broadly talking about the same issues. 
Secondly I, then went through the transcripts again to code in the manner that shares some 
aspects of the ‘open coding’ employed when conducting a grounded theory approach, but 
as has already been described, the research was not being conducted in a theoretical 
vacuum as I had Lipsky’s framework in mind.  Essentially, these provisional codes were 
labels that indicated part of the transcripts that triggered an association in some manner 
with a particular category or idea. For instance I searched for data that related in some 
broad way to the concept of discretion.  
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The next stage involved the data display. The power of the computer package in this type 
of analysis meant that I was rapidly able to retrieve at the mere ‘cost’ of a few mouse 
clicks, all the data from all accounts pertaining to the same initial codes in order to form 
further codes that for instance linked the presence of phenomena.  Data was kept in its 
verbatim form in order to reduce the likelihood of refining things too early and to maintain 
close contact with the raw data.  I then produced charts of concepts (in Excel) with all data 
pertaining to the codes in order to allow comparisons across the participants as well as 
keeping key participant characteristics in mind. This allowed for data interrogation in 
relation to participants characteristics such as status or experience.  From this stage I had 
regular meetings to discuss the emerging data both with my supervisors as well as the 
project team.  In this way the themes identified in the early stages were able to be 
explored in later and even second round interviews. 
 
The process of coding transcripts i.e. fragmenting the data means that the analysis 
essentially takes place within the selected data.  This process however risks de-
contextualising data.289  In an attempt to avoid this, I utilised a spreadsheet (i.e. data 
display method) that I had produced and updated throughout the data collection, which 
listed all the main characteristics of the participants as well as a summary of key points 
from the account as a way of providing context to what and why the particular participant 
may have responded in certain ways.  In essence, I was attempting to keep a broad 
‘narrative’ of each participants or cases account.  Most analyses adopt an either or 
approach to thematic and narrative approaches.  However, the idea of adopting a narrative 
type approach (or aspects of it) in addition to a thematic approach is one advocated by 
some analysts who suggest that the techniques are in fact complementary and helpful to 
tease out different layers of understanding represented in the data.290   
 
4.13 An account and consideration of my role in the construction of the interview 
data 
It is acknowledged that within qualitative research, the researcher who conducts the 
research has an influence on the way that the data is collected and interpreted.  This begins 
with the way that the aims of the work have been described to participants, how they were 
recruited (including by whom), and then how participants respond within the interviews.  
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Given that the participants in this study had been recruited via a number of different 
means and therefore may have received differing information and/or opinions of the 
research from those who had already participated, I felt that it was important to ensure that 
I presented myself and the research to the participant in as uniform a manner as possible.  
Firstly, I wanted to ensure that participants were aware that the project was funded by a 
body who produces ‘independent research about the organisation and delivery of 
healthcare for NHS commissioners, providers of health care, partner organisations such as 
local authorities and the voluntary sector, and for users of health care.’291 In other words I 
wanted the participants to be aware that there was no conflict of interest in taking part 
(few participants however had heard of the National Institute for Health Research, let 
alone the Service Delivery and Organisation programme).  In addition, I presented myself 
both as the jobbing researcher on the project as well as a PhD student.  
 
Given that the phenomenon of interest (i.e. the contract and the contained QOF) is held at 
the practice level, I wanted to ensure that people felt that they were able to give their 
personal views, attitudes and experiences, whether they were positive or negative.n  
Therefore I stressed to participants that it was their individual views that were of interest 
and how they had perceived the impact. However, given that in many cases I was able to 
interview multiple GPs within a practice, in order to encourage participants to speak 
freely, I also stressed that I would not divulge any information pertaining to other 
individuals in their practice, or beyond.  In addition, I guided the participants to the 
relevant section of the consent form which indicated that all interview data would be held 
in a secure manner and would be anonymised. Furthermore, I stressed that should they 
read any of the project outputs, that they the individual may recognise their own words, 
but that others would not. 
 
Again to ensure uniformity of presentation, the interviews began by reiterating the nature 
and purpose of the study, allowing the interviewee the opportunity to read the participant 
information sheet and to ask any questions before obtaining consent.  At this point, 
participants were given an opportunity to decline to be interviewed. I felt that this was 
                                                 
n All interviews were conducted in the participants’ own private consultation rooms.  Given that these are 
used to discuss confidential patient information, it should allow for a sense of privacy. 
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extremely important to stress, particularly in the case of salaried GPs who may have felt 
some pressure to comply.  
 
During the interviews I attempted to convey my position as the interested and attentive 
listener.  I was aware that the information disclosed to me was largely directed by line of 
questioning and also recognised that participants may have felt that they were expected to 
answer such questions in a way that they perceived and felt was acceptable and desirable 
by me the interviewer.  However, as alluded to earlier I feel that in the case of GPs, an 
‘elite’ group this was less likely to be the case as they were in fact the ones in position of 
having the knowledge that I was interested in.  In addition, in order to avoid any 
‘researcher blindness’ on responses, I regularly engaged in discussions with my 
supervisors on transcripts and throughout the analysis in order to get feedback on both my 
interviewing style and the analysis itself. Therefore I feel that what I present in the results 
chapters is as honest an account of the information I obtained as was possible. 
 
4.14 Ethics and research governance  
Multi-centred research ethics approval was granted from the Leeds East NHS Research 
Ethics Committee (REC; Application 07/Q1206/2). The University of Manchester REC 
ratified the study on the basis of NHS approval. In addition Research governance approval 
was sought and attained from each PCT as the research spread beyond the initial chosen 
sites. 
 
4.15 Summary 
In this chapter I have described the methodological approach that underlines the current 
work as well as a description and critique of the methods for data collection and analysis.   
The next two chapters present the results obtained from the data collection and analysis 
methods outlined in this chapter.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Exploring the impact of contractual change: the  
views and experiences of GP principals 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I explore the attitudes and experiences of 41 GP principals in relation to the 
contract introduced in 2004. Particular attention is given to QOF and its variants in the 
years since.  I begin with an exploration of GP principals’ attitudes to the overall structure 
and content of these arrangements as well as their views regarding the concept of QOF.   I 
then move on to examine whether any practical measures were undertaken by participants 
in their practices in order to meet the demands of the new ways of working. The views of 
GP principals are then examined regarding the consequences of taking such practical 
measures as well as changes relating to the ICT systems, the repercussions of which 
appear to affect not only the principals and their wider practice staff but also their patients, 
in terms of the type and quality of care their patients receive.  
 
5.2 Attitudes to and experiences of contractual change: 2004 and beyond 
 
Participants were asked for their views and attitudes towards both the initial contractual 
change that occurred in 2004 as well as to the general direction and content of subsequent 
changes.  Their accounts were largely ambivalent reflecting the fact that many saw it as an 
evolving ‘package deal’ which had both good and bad points, with the latter increasing 
over time. Participants identified four key areas in which they perceived the new 
arrangements as positive i.e. where ‘gains’ had been made in comparison to the previous 
version.  Many of these gains however also often appeared to be interpreted as involving 
losses, some of which were unforeseen, but many of which were deemed as acceptable 
either for themselves, their profession or other parties including patients.  
 
5.2.1 Contractual change: the gains 
5.2.1.1 Opting out: a good deal but for whom? 
The first and most cited gain, as well as the reason that many voted for the new contract, 
centres on their ability to opt out from out-of-hours responsibility.  Many had been in 
general practice for a considerable period time prior to 2004 and recalled negative 
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experiences of having to provide out-of-hours care themselves.  They described the 
situation prior to 2004 as ‘unsustainable’ as their normal surgery days were becoming 
more demanding due to the increasing complexity of work conducted in general practice. 
They perceived that the typical working day combined with on-call duties produced 
negative consequences for the quality of care delivered to their patients.  By contrast they 
perceived that the new system was better for patients as they would not see tired GPs:  
 
Participant: Some GPs [still] do out-of-hours. But after my 10 hours here, the last 
thing I want to do is out-of-hours.…Would you really want to see me after I've 
been here 10 hours and brain-dead and you come in with a pain in your side that 
you are worried about and I'm thinking, are you male or female? (GP5 - male, 13 
years experience) 
 
Although participants warned of the dangers of working long hours under the old system, 
most participants also stated that they were in co-operative arrangements with other local 
practices to provide out-of-hours. Therefore their actual personal share of out-of-hours 
duties was small in comparison to the time when co-operative systems were not common-
place.    However, despite the fact that co-operative arrangements placed less of an out-of-
hours burden on the individual GP (i.e. they may have on been on-call a few times a 
month) most still wanted to opt out and had chosen to do so. 
 
Even though most participants had actively chosen to opt, with some seeing this as 
beneficial to patients, a greater number expressed concerns about the type of care their 
patients received as a result of the out-of-hours changes.   Concerns surrounded the use of 
doctors who had no prior knowledge of their patients. However, as the following quotes 
highlight, some rationalised and countered any concerns or ‘guilty’ feelings as (GP38) put 
it about the new service by arguing that patients often inappropriately used the ‘old 
system’: 
 
Participant: …We've lost the out-of-hours. Patients don't get as good a deal at 
now as they used to. But then again, they got too good a deal really. I think, they 
can stand that. We did get a fair amount of stuff that was unnecessary at night, 
which is a shame it's gone the other way now. (GP7 –male, 17 years experience)  
 
Participant:  out-of-hours had become such an abuse by many patients. I 
remember my last out-of-hours, I went in at 6:30am to see a kid with a runny nose 
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who'd had it for five days, and they had two cars parked in the drive and weren't 
bringing him out. I thought, "Right! That's solved it for me. I'm not feeling guilty 
about this. (GP38 – male, 30 years experience) 
 
Many also highlighted that the cost of opting out was relatively small (approx. £6,000 per 
GP per annum). They felt the government had failed in their valuation of the level of 
service that they and their fellow GPs were providing: 
 
Participant: ...one of the main reasons for me voting for the new contract was 
taking away of that obligation, because out-of-hours was becoming sillier every 
week, more and more, and busy. And you couldn't do a day's work afterwards. No, 
I wasn't sad to see that go…I'm quite amused that it was completely underfunded 
in the new contract, but then GP's have always said it was worth a lot more than 
the government recognized. (GP33 – female, 21 years experience) 
Despite any concerns regarding the consequences of opting out, most were positive about 
the removal of out-of-hours care as it allowed them increased personal flexibility.  For 
example they could cheaply trade a portion of income for decreased responsibility and 
increased leisure-time. As the following quote highlights for many the trade-off was 
deemed particularly attractive to those with family: 
 
Participant…and then when we decided we would opt out, it was brilliant from a 
personal point of view. It cost me money, but it was brilliant. Because I've got a 
two-year-old and that's great. But I could see from the community’s point of view 
that it was crap. (GP35 – female, 25 years experience) 
 
Despite most participants choosing to no longer provide out-of-hours care, a small number 
of participants continued to provide out-of-hours care as part of the service commissioned 
by the PCT.  Some of these did so as they felt it was a core part of the work of general 
practice and their role as a GP: 
 
Participant:  I still feel the on-call vocational challenge, I suppose. I still see out-
of-hours as part of our workload and therefore I'll do two shifts a month at the GP 
out-of-hours. And I've been involved with the administration of the out-of-hours. 
(GP37 – male, 16 years experience) 
Others reasons for continuing out-of-hours care included the lack of external 
commitments (e.g. family) and the desire for extra earnings.   
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5.2.1.2 Improved income: the recognition of effort or under-estimation? 
The second important gain related to the fact that most participants felt that the new 
monies on offer with the contract were a timely and deserved ‘pay rise.’ They perceived 
that they had already been providing a high quality of care.  They described already 
following other evidence based guidance or policies such as the NSFs and as a result, 
many highlighted that their practice had easily achieved high QOF scores in the first 
year(s):  
 
Participant: We looked at the performance indicators on QOF, and we thought, 
"This is a license to print money for us!" Because we were already doing... we 
didn't have to change. We had to change very little of what we did. In terms of 
medical management, we changed nothing. (GP22 – male, 23 years experience) 
 
However, participants bemoaned the fact that in their view the government had under-
estimated the amount and quality of work that was previously being conducted in general 
practice and hence didn’t expect such high achievement.  They were also aware and 
troubled by the negative media reaction to their initial and continued success resulting in 
high earnings.  They felt unfairly portrayed, citing that they were made to seem ‘greedy’, 
an adjective used by several participants.  The line from the quote below ‘instead of being 
praised we just got slated’ sums up the sentiments in the accounts from many GPs who 
felt somewhat unfairly treated by both by the government and the media simply for 
performing well in what was after all a negotiated contract: 
 
Participant: it was all agreed by the Department of Health, they'd agreed to the 
new contract...It was as if we were the greedy ones taking money off our 
patients…the pay scale [is] dependent on us jumping through numerous hoops, [it] 
had been agreed, and we managed to jump through those hoops. And our 
government wasn't very happy that we had achieved, which I found bizarre, really. 
They'd set out these targets for us and we achieved them and instead of being 
praised, we just got slated. (GP36 – male, 16 years experience) 
Many therefore related that in some ways QOF had actually been beneficial as the 
achievement of high scores had provided a type of ‘evidence’ in that they were now able 
to demonstrate they (i.e. their own practice and the profession) provided a high level of 
service:  
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Participant: You've got this feeling of, "We know we're a good practice." And 
one of the ways of demonstrating it is to show that we hit all the targets. (GP18 – 
female, 20 years experience) 
 
5.2.1.3 Improved recruitment and retention 
A less cited gain related to the new contractual arrangements being more attractive to 
medical students and hence improving recruitment and retention into the specialty.  
Participants highlighted that general practice was less attractive to medical students than 
other medical specialties, and cited that both the improved pay and ability to `opt-out of 
out-of-hours responsibilities would make general practice a more attractive option.  They 
perceived that younger people were reluctant to work in the manner that the old system 
required:    
 
Participant: I think, QOF-wise, it was a significant change, [it] needed to happen 
because in general practice people were leaving in droves…you couldn't get 
doctors into general practice…The trouble is that with the change in ...hospitals 
where you can be a consultant after five years, it was a lot easier to obtain the 
goals that you wanted. So people weren't interested in general practice. So they 
had to do something significant. Of course, that's what we have done. Now people 
are attracted by the salary. (GP5 – male, 13years experience) 
 
Participant: I'm not sure that old-style general practice, with the practices 
particularly being responsible for night and weekend cover, was going to be 
sustainable in terms of getting younger people who were prepared to do it any 
longer. So, I think some things had to change. (GP26– male, 28 years experience) 
 
Only four principals had recently entered general practice (having five years or less 
experience) and most cited factors such as variety of work and experiencing continuity of 
care with their patients as their reasons for choosing to work in general practice. Of these 
four, only GP32 cited the working hours of general practice as one of the key factors for 
her career change from hospital work. 
 
5.2.1.4 QOF equates to improved and ‘standardised’ care 
The final major gain cited by some participants did not relate to personal or wider 
professional gains, but to gains for patients and the quality of care they now received. 
Most perceived that since there was both a high uptake and achievement of QOF, the 
general patient population were now more likely to receive a good (as they felt that QOF 
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was largely evidence-based) and more consistent standard of care.  Whilst most 
participants claimed that they were already providing high levels of care (claims they 
supported by citing their consistent achievement of high QOF scores) they also 
acknowledged that there had prior to 2004 been differences in quality of care provision 
across general practice.  They felt that post-2004 the financial incentives contained within 
QOF had provided the impetus and motivation for those not practising appropriately to do 
so: 
 
Participant: But the actual concept of QOF isn't a stress to me at all. It's just a 
more formalized way of what we were doing anyway. And we get paid for it, so 
brilliant! That's not a hardship. Where I would see QOF being a nuisance is if 
practices weren't necessarily doing all this stuff, then QOF was really going to give 
them a boot in the arse. But they need to get moving, and I think that's probably 
where the disgruntlement comes from. (GP37 – male, 16 years experience) 
 
Despite many claiming to change little except to record their existing activities, it also 
became apparent during the interviews that many had in fact changed and/or improved 
their practice in some ways/areas.  As this quote illustrates, this includes the fact that some 
felt that QOF improved health outcomes: 
 
SCS: Do you think QOF has actually produced better patient outcomes? 
Participant:  I think quality-wise it probably has. Because certainly we're picking 
up a lot of undiagnosed, whereas previously maybe we wouldn't have checked 
blood pressure on everybody that came through the door, certainly not on a regular 
basis. We're diagnosing more and treating more, so I think from the patient point 
of view, that's likely to improve their outcomes. (GP9 – male, 20 years 
experience) 
 
In addition to care quality, another motivating factor for practices to want to meet (and 
continue to meet) QOF targets related to the fact that GPs were now able to demonstrate 
and compare the quality of care their practice offered with other local practices.  Some 
participants discussed how this triggered a competitive element to the doing of QOF 
which also contributed to improving and maintaining standards: 
 
Interviewee: ..I like QOF, I like QOF even if we didn’t get paid for it because erm 
in general especially in our area where there are six practices, erm you tend to be 
very competitive and you want, you know I want my diabetic figures to be the best 
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of the 6 practices here, if I can get 100% it’s, I am sort of one up on next door sort 
of thing and I think what happens generally with this sort of thing is that it 
stimulates practices who may not have the enthusiasm lets to say, to have as good 
care other practices, it stimulated them to improve their practice. (GP5R2 – male, 
13 years experience) 
 
5.2.2 Contractual change: the losses 
Although many participants were largely positive about the new arrangements, many of 
these participants also pointed to specific areas where they considered there had been 
losses of some kind either to themselves, their wider profession or their patients. 
 
5.2.2.1 Locked in? On the contractual treadmill 
The vast majority of participants had voted for the initial 2004 version of the contract as   
it provided an attractive proposition giving them 1) the opportunity to remove their out-of-
hours responsibility and 2) gain a pay rise.  A small minority however felt that these gains 
had come at a considerable cost as they were now under a system in which they had lost a 
degree of control over the way they were able to work:     
 
Participant: It’s this new way of having to achieve targets. Audit everything and 
basically justify everything you do…suddenly, you are told this is what you have 
got to do, and you know you do get quite annoyed at being told what you should 
do. Maybe that's because we worked independently all these years and that's been 
taken away from us really (GP1 – female, 30 years experience) 
 
The loss of some control due to QOF was also stated by others but some also felt that 
QOF was an acceptable and timely development.  Many pointed to the fact that evidence-
based practice was and had for sometime been the norm both in general practice and 
medicine more widely. Therefore they were now simply paid in line with what was 
considered to be ‘best’ practice:  
 
Participant:  I mean, sometimes we're our own worst enemies, really. I think, 
we're a really challenging group, probably, for…national government, because 
we're essentially used to being unmanaged…and we're used to getting our own 
way... And I think, some of us are really awkward about not being told what to do. 
And the reality is medicine has changed. And you cannot justify not following 
something where there's not an evidence base for it. And I think we sometimes 
shoot ourselves in the foot by talking about losing our autonomy and things…So, 
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I've no issue about following evidence based. (GP23 – male, 14 years 
experience)  
 
Whist QOF is voluntary, the importance of QOF to practice finances, combined with 
uncertainty over future funding were reported as being the major influences not only on 
their initial decision to choose to implement it but continued to be a major influence over 
time as I show below. 
 
Whereas the initial version of the contract in 2004 was voted for by the majority of the 
profession and was seen as largely positive, later versions were perceived as being less so.  
GPs perceived that the contract was becoming more difficult for them to work under.  
Many felt that the ‘goal posts' kept moving and that ultimately, this was as a result of their 
‘over-achievement’ in the first year.  A major change that participants were particularly 
negative and even angry about during the interviews was the introduction of the Extended 
Access DES in 2008.  A good portion of the interviews were conducted around this time 
and therefore allowed for an in-depth discussion and collation of initial reactions and 
decisions regarding the contract amendment ‘as it happened’ so to speak. Participants did 
not feel that this DES was required or necessary and supported their perceptions by citing 
survey results that indicated high patient satisfaction with regards to access.  In addition, 
many felt that they were being forced to accept the changes as otherwise they would be 
financially penalised i.e. they had little choice but to comply as the following quote 
highlights: 
 
Participants: From an average practice they took £17,500 out of the contract and 
they said if you did extended hours -- for an average practice worked an extra three 
hours per week -- they will give you £17, 500 back.  So it's no money. Yet we're at 
a loss because we have to pay an extra receptionist. There's lighting, heating, 
electricity, wear and tear. So we're actually losing. But we can't afford as a practice 
to take such a big chunk of loss, £17,500 and therefore our hands were tied and 
we’ve got no choice but to do it.  (GP13 – male, 12 years experience) 
 
The line ‘we’ve got no choice but to do it’ in terms of the financial implications summed 
up many participants sentiments regarding the DES and therefore unsurprisingly, most 
participants said that they had ‘chosen’ to implement it. Many were subsequently 
frustrated not only by this, but also that the new appointments on offer weren’t being used 
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by patients that the government had argued needed them i.e. the busy working public. In 
particular, those located in deprived areas with high unemployment or areas with an older 
population (who could attend during normal surgery hours) cited this frustration. Such 
factors were also cited by the few participants who had decided not to implement the DES 
in their practice and to take the drop in income instead. In essence many regarded the DES 
as a mechanism for the government to increase its value for money or to ‘claw back’ 
monies.  They again pointed to the fact that the initial contract had been negotiated by 
both the government and their professional body, and that the government was 
subsequently reneging on that deal. 
  
Participants also felt that QOF targets were also becoming more difficult to achieve.  
Some changes were seen as valid given that clinical evidence can change but other 
changes were viewed as a cynical ploy by the government to claw monies back as 
practices were year on year expected to expend greater efforts, for no additional 
compensation: 
 
Participant: I think the 2004 one, the QOF aspect has been very good. I've been 
very positive for it. It's just that it’s always changing. They're always trying to 
change it. It's OK, as long as the changes are attainable. It's when they try and 
make it as a part of a destructive scheme to reduce a practice's income, then that's 
when I don't think it's a good thing. (GP8 – male, 20 years experience) 
 
 
The quote below highlights another example of a perceived cynical move, namely the 
incentivisation of the patient survey results.  
 
Participant: QOF was meant to be evidence-based. So there's a reason for treating 
someone's blood pressure. There's a reason for lowering someone's cholesterol. 
We can buy into that. Start putting things into QOF that aren't evidence based but 
are politically-driven, Start putting patient surveys in which have got no validity, 
it's not QOF anymore… (GP34 – male, 20 years experience) 
 
Furthermore, many prided themselves on gaining full QOF points year on year and such 
changes were seen as a barrier to this trend.  
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Many also described making additional investments in their practices around 2004 in 
anticipation of the additional QOF monies (for further details see section 5.3). Principals 
also stated that they had had other rising year on year costs e.g. salary increments.  They 
all pointed to a continuing need to maintain their practice income and that continuing to 
achieve well against QOF targets aided this quest.  They related that this need combined 
with the perception of a worsening financial situation placed them under increasing 
pressure and almost meant a scenario of ‘no choice’.  This appeared to extend to them 
pursuing targets that were not necessarily aligned with their professional and/or personal 
opinions. Many for example cited that the additions in 2006 of the CKD and depression 
indicators were not evidence-based; nevertheless most participants reported that their 
practices were hitting these targets and taking unusual measures to do so: 
  
Participant: And then we have this sort of silly situation when you haven't got 
enough of them. We ended up one year having one of our practice nurses taking a 
couple of days out to phone people up to ask them if they're depressed or not, out 
of the blue. I wouldn't be terribly happy if someone rang me up at home for that, 
really, but that was what was decided had to be done. (GP50 – male, 19 years 
experience)  
Only two GPs (GP28 and GP16 from practice 12) reported that they had collectively 
decided not to pursue certain areas of QOF as they did not consider them to be evidence-
based.  The quote below illustrates how GPs do have a choice but that they must be 
prepared to sacrifice income, in order to practise in a manner that was consistent with their 
personal and professional opinions: 
 
Participant: So the quality indicators and the quality framework is to try and level 
the playing field a little bit, and maybe bring it up a little bit. The problem is it is 
herd medicine…So if you wish to deviate from that because of the individual need 
it is credibly possible to you. You have complete autonomy to, but there are 
financial implications to you because of that. So if you feel after consulting with 
your certain colleagues, looking at the evidence that one part of QOF makes no 
sense whatsoever. You choose not to do it and you choose to do something else, 
which may supersede it but is not being scored for, you will not get paid. So you 
still have autonomy, but you lose income. (GP28 – male, 17 years experience) 
 
Participants also expressed concerns and uncertainty for the future outlook of the financial 
situation in general practice.  For instance, there was some concern over the potential 
proliferation of APMS practices and the threat they could pose.  Participants also cited 
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demands from the wider changes occurring within the health system.  GPs were concerned 
as to how they would continue to manage given the recent lack of increase in finances: 
 
Participant: I think that any [work] that is being taken away [by the nurse] is 
being replaced by just the greater numbers. By the fact that we've got greater 
demand, greater expectation. 
SCS:  Is that patient expectation? 
Participant:  Patient and political. We're now expected to deal with large groups 
of people who were treated in hospitals…all sorts of things… So all this is extra 
work, which means that anything that is freed up by us paying for extra staff or 
getting extras has been gobbled up. (GP6 – male, 24 years experience) 
 
There was also concern as to how they could achieve tighter control of patient conditions 
in view of the fact 1) GPs cannot control their patients’ actions/choices and 2) they were 
increasingly coming under pressure from PCTs to control their prescribing:  
 
Participant:…[we ought] not to be penalized for not achieving because there are 
other factors into place. A patient might not want to take on board all the lifestyle 
advice. They might not want to take an extra blood pressure tablet. (GP36– male, 
16 years experience) 
 
Participant: Er, we, we have the tougher target that we try to adhere to and we get 
er, we get our wrists slapped because we’re using too much mm, Atorvastatin as 
opposed to Simvastatin which doesn’t bring the cholesterol below five in most 
cases.  
 
SCS: Right, and when you say you get your wrists slapped, who’s, who would be 
slapping them? 
 
Participant: We er, well we get judged on it by all our targets mm, letters and 
testimonies from the PCT, we have the, we have a visit tomorrow by the 
management, the Prescribing Management Team to come out and discuss why 
we’re not achieving our statin targets. 
 
SCS: But you're trying to do the best, I guess, by the patient? 
 
Participant: Well we’re doing best for the patients rather than mm, what the PCT 
tell you …they just want to save money. (GP29R2 – female, 31 years 
experience) 
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As a result of the various financial pressures many described making particular decisions 
which were motivated primarily by finance such as for example replacing staff with 
cheaper alternatives e.g. outgoing partners with salaried GPs.  A small number however 
were less concerned, stating that even though the financial situation was worsening they 
were still well remunerated.  Some described themselves as financially secure either due 
to holding other income-providing roles (such as GPs 28 and 16) or because they were 
nearing the end of their careers and had secured a good income and future pension. 
 
Given that GPs perceived themselves to already be under increasing financial pressures, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that when asked about a future scenario of a more outcome based 
QOF, many were extremely negative.  The following quote summarises the concerns 
raised by many GPs: 
 
Participant I think one should not bring the payments and the outcomes into this. 
You have to see the effort. What are the efforts being made? What kind of work is 
being done? There are so many deprived areas and so many cultural issues, so 
many educational issues, in which the outcome is not necessarily influenced by the 
GP. There are so many other factors that come into it. (GP25 – male, 30 years 
experience) 
 
5.2.2.2 QOF and quality of care 
Despite many describing QOF as beneficial in terms of raising the general standards of 
quality across general practice for the wider patient population, many also felt that it was 
limited.  Firstly, they pointed to the fact that general practice by its nature had a wide 
remit and that QOF only focused on a fraction of their work.   
 
Secondly, they felt that QOF was limited to only the measurable aspects of their work.  
They reasoned that this was why QOF was largely based on the undertaking of specific 
tasks.  It also meant that other aspects of their role that they considered as important e.g. 
being holistic or providing good interpersonal care were not included and hence not 
valued, by the government at least.   
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Thirdly, there was also a perception that there were various ways and means of scoring 
well against the targets and that high QOF scores did not necessarily translate into the 
provision of good quality care for three main reasons.   
 
First, a ‘tick-box’ approach could also achieve high scores i.e. targets could be achieved 
by a cursory approach, one not consistent with their perceptions of what good GP care 
involves: 
 
Participant: what they actually ask us to record, it's just like a tick-box mentality. 
I mean, in particular, the cancer one is ridiculous. You could spend hours and 
hours and hours talking to a cancer patient or you could spend five minutes. They 
just require that you discuss the diagnosis and the management plan. It's just 
ticking a box, so you could do it proper or you could do it very briefly, and you'd 
still get the same outcome for QOF. (GP29 – female, 31 years experience) 
 
Participant: There are some surgeries who aren't as good as others who can still 
get good QOF scores. It hides them. (GP34 – male, 20 years experience) 
 
Secondly, many were concerned that the focus on QOF targets meant that some practices 
were spending too much time and effort on their attainment at the expense of other areas 
and there was a risk of non-incentivised areas becoming neglected: 
 
Participant:  I think it's probably improved some care. I'm not sure, because of the 
emphasis it puts on some conditions, whether it may have improved some cares at 
the expense of others. I think that would be very difficult to demonstrate, but you 
just have your doubts a little bit. 
SCS:  You mean because people are focusing so much on... 
Participant:  Yeah. Because if you don't have one of the things that QOF looks at, 
maybe you get slightly neglected… (GP26 – male, 28 years experience) 
 
However, others were keen to stress that their professional training and role was to attend 
to all patient needs and that their professionalism would act to combat such an occurrence: 
 
Participant: it's just an insult to professionalism. The idea that if you're not a 
QOF scorer, you don't get through my door or I don't pay any attention to you is 
not acceptable. And I don't think that there is any evidence whatsoever that that 
has occurred (GP38 – 30 years experience) 
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Thirdly, some also perceived that it was possible for people to achieve well on QOF by 
‘gaming’ the system.  Many did not discuss this beyond recognising the potential for it to 
occur, or claiming to know of other practices where it did.  However, one participant 
actually discussed changing blood pressure readings which were on the cusp of target 
levels: 
 
Participant: Ah if it’s 51 yeah I think you would record that as 50.  I mean I 
suppose if - if the difference between 152 and a 150 makes no difference clinically 
and it’s not appropriate to change someone’s medication then you record a 
hundred and fifty. Erm is that cheating? I don’t know. (GP18 – female, 20 years 
experience) 
 
Finally, participants were also concerned as to what the population based approach meant 
for certain individual patients. Some perceived that it was leading to the ‘over-
medicalisation’ of patients, particularly in the case of the elderly who may not want or 
benefit from medication but are now pushed towards it. They related this to the pull of 
financial incentives as the quote below highlights: 
 
Participants: you have prescribing incentives and you have your statins being 
prescribed, what sense does it make for somebody who is demented and is 89 or 
90 years old, and her cholesterol is six plus or five plus? That also requires 
prescribing statin because otherwise then I'm losing money. (GP25 – male, 30 
years experience) 
Many felt that this would become an increasing problem as the targets became tighter over 
time and highlighted the new HbA1c targets introduced in 2009 as being potentially 
dangerous if they were chased for all patients.  They stressed the importance of 
practitioners utilising discretion with regard to assessing and treating the individual patient 
in view of target levels. It was unclear whether this would result in targets being 
unachieved but they highlighted the ability to exception report as an important mechanism 
to avoid inappropriate treatment. 
 
5.3 Practical responses to QOF 
5.3.1 Organisational changes 
 
Despite the fact that many partners held ambivalent views on the changes, virtually all 
participants (n=39) reported wholly implementing QOF within their practices.  
 144
Participants described various changes that had occurred within their practices around the 
time of the introduction of the new contract in 2004 and beyond in order to respond to the 
needs of QOF.  Three broad areas of organisational change were identified.  The first area 
of change that participants discussed regarded staffing capacity.  
 
5.3.2 Staffing capacity  
Most participants reported that prior to the introduction of QOF they had already been 
doing most of the clinical work required to fulfil the clinical targets.  Some principals 
therefore reported that for their practice QOF simply required additional administrative 
efforts and therefore recruited additional administrative staff.  Others however, despite 
claiming that they were already doing the required clinical QOF work, discussed the need 
to recruit additional clinical staff (or extend the hours and/or training of some existing 
staff) to do QOF related work, especially that associated with managing chronic diseases. 
The vast majority of clinical additions however appeared to be at the level of PNs and 
HCAs, not GPs:  
 
 Participant:  The healthcare assistant has come in since the new contract. 
SCS:  Why did you make that decision? 
Participant:  Basically because the workload had increased particularly as goes 
monitoring-wise, with the QOF part of the contract.  We needed to do an awful lot 
more bloods, and awful lot more monitoring of the routine measures. So the 
combination of that, plus the fact that our nurse had done the diabetes course and 
asthma course and a prescribing course, we felt that she could move on to 
something a bit more senior and someone else could do the routine blood pressures 
and bloods. (GP9 – male, 20 years experience) 
 
Where participants had reported investing in additional staff capacity they noted that this 
had to varying degrees offset the potential financial gains that came with QOF monies.  
The following quote is from a GP in a small two-partner practice that had extended their 
PN time and also invested in additional administrative staff which had translated into a 
large increase in their wages bill: 
 
Participant: For us it has cost us. Our wage bill has gone up from £4000 a month 
in general wages to £6000 a month, and our overall wages bill has gone up to 
£10000 a month from £5000 a month. It doubled our outgoing wages….Our actual 
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real term, my [participant’s emphasis] wage increase has been negated by our wage 
increase just to make sure that the time spent doing all that crap does not impact on 
the time at the front desk and things. (GP28 – male, 17 years experience) 
 
It was clear from such accounts that despite the additional costs that such changes 
represented, many felt that they were essential as they would have been unable to cope 
with pre-QOF arrangements, particularly in reference to the additional administrative 
work generated by QOF.  In view of such changes, many complained that they had been 
unfairly represented in the media as having received large rises in their income and 
pointed to the fact they had in fact invested a good portion of QOF monies back into their 
practices and services. 
 
Participant: We've made quite a significant increase in staff budgets. Our budget's 
gone up by 25% or something, within a couple of years. Where you get all the 
headlines, "Your evil GP earns X amount of money, and it's all about QOF 
money," where, actually, we've invested loads of it back into staffing, as most GP 
practices have. So yeah, we've increased our staff, definitely, the nursing staff. 
(GP39 – male, 3.5 years experience) 
  
In contrast to those that had reported making such investments, a small number of 
participants reported making no QOF associated staff changes, stating that they had 
already invested in their practices prior to QOF and were doing most of the clinical work 
covered within QOF targets and therefore could cope with their existing arrangements.  
Many participants echoed these claims, citing changes as marginal (e.g. only taking on 
one HCA).  Here QOF monies were seen as a much needed boost to practice and partner 
income.   
Participant: I think to some extent it didn't overly concern us in this practice, 
because a lot of it was for things that we had been doing already. I think the 
majority of GPs who were reasonably clued-in would be watching a lot of these 
things anyway. As well as the fact that now we would be paid for what we'd been 
doing for years without pay was seen as a good thing. (GP9 – male, 20 years 
experience) 
 
5.3.3 A focus on skill-mix – altered roles and responsibilities 
 
The second type of organisational changes reported to have occurred in response to QOF 
regarded skill-mix in order to ensure that work was done by ‘appropriate’ practitioners 
within their practices.  Many participants highlighted that there was already a trend for 
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delegating some chronic disease management (CDM) work to their nursing staff prior to 
the introduction of QOF.  However, it was clear from the accounts that the introduction of 
QOF and the increased work that this entailed in some cases had increased the delegation 
of work previously conducted by GPs down to their PNs and subsequently a shift of 
‘nurse work’ down to HCAs.   
 
Participant: HCAs have taken on basically all of the bloods, whereas the nurses 
would do those before. And they've taken on quite a bit of nurse work in some 
respects. The nurse practitioners have taken on some of the doctor work, and the 
things the nurse practitioners would have done over the ordinary nurses, the 
ordinary nurse is now doing. So there has been a realignment of stuff. (GP35 – 
female, 25 years experience) 
Much of the work that had been delegated down from GPs to PNs was perceived as being 
template-driven and participants felt that PNs were better suited to such ‘task-oriented’ 
work.  They perceived that PNs were better at such work as they were less likely to 
deviate from the templates than GPs were: 
 
Participant: [nurses] are doing a lot of the routine stuff, they are doing annual or 
twice yearly checks for people with asthma, COPD and diabetes and they have 
been involved, within sort of the guidelines they are managing high BP a bit, 
they’ll refer back to the GP if they get stuck. … 
 
SCS: And what is their approach to the templates in comparison to yours, if any, 
do you think?   
 
Participant: You might expect, nurses are better at it than GPs. Generally 
speaking one of us will probably have to design a template or tweak it, if it is an 
existing one, but the practice nurses are better at using them than we are (GP26 – 
male, 28 years experience) 
 
Where increased delegation had occurred, many participants perceived that PNs had 
become increasingly important within their practices with respect to the doing of basic 
chronic disease work that comprise the majority of QOF targets.   
 
SCS:  Has the role of nurses changed with regard to the contract?  
Participant:  They are doing more work…you do feel that they've become a lot 
more important within the practice, rather than just being used for the peripheral 
stuff. They have become quite a part of the fundamental part of the work of the 
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practice. And obviously, regarding a partner's income, that practice nurse becomes 
worth her weight in gold. Absolutely. Also, when we have discussions about 
disease management, the nurses are always there. Whereas in the past, you might 
have had the GPs chatter about asthma or whatever. You have to have the nurse 
involved in all that. Which I think makes the nurse's position in a practice a lot 
higher. (GP2 – male, 4.5 years experience) 
  
Some also highlighted that the ‘two-tier’ approach to patient care meant that they as GPs 
were now more able to utilise their skills better as they were spending less time doing 
simple tasks and more time on the many other aspects of general practice work and work 
suited to their skills: 
 
Participant: It should leave us free to be more diagnosticians. Obviously, the 
chronic diseases are fairly specific things. There are plenty of chronic diseases that 
aren't in the QOF and there are plenty of acute conditions that become, not 
chronic, but have a time in which people need treating. It should leave us free to 
see those. (GP45 – male, 25 years experience) 
 
It also meant that GPs could use their time to use the information collected by PNs within 
consultations e.g. medication reviews. 
 
Participant: We tend to now have people who prepare the ground for us to then 
see the person, with all the information available to us. Someone with diabetes, 
heart disease and COPD would see the nurse for all the bloods, BP, urine, full 
check, spirometry. And then they come back a week later and all the results are 
back and we go through it from top to bottom. (GP34 – male, 20 years 
experience) 
 
Despite any apparent focus on ‘appropriateness’ of who did what within their practice, it 
was also clear that many participants regarded the largely template related work now done 
by PNs as ‘routine’ and therefore undesirable.  They also reported delegating ‘disliked’ 
areas such as the CKD and depression screening work to PNs.  The ability therefore to 
‘offload’ (GP14) therefore also had personal advantages: 
 
Participant: There is a group of patients that just want to see the doctor. It is very 
difficult to get them to see the nurse. So our nursing appointments for this 
particular nurse are quite quiet. So we try to work on that and build that up and get 
her filled a bit better, and try and offload some of our routine stuff to them, which 
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is fine because I don't want to be doing a blood pressure clinic day in and day out. 
(GP14 – male, 20 years experience) 
 
Finally, in a few cases, a focus on ‘skill-mix’ (a term used spontaneously by some 
participants) meant the replacement or substitution of some staff of a higher grade with 
‘cheaper versions’ primarily using HCAs instead of PNs.  For example, GP22 discusses 
the appointment of a HCA and subsequent redundancy of a PN after the introduction of 
the new contract: 
 
SCS:  So, was that at all in response to changes in 2004? 
Participant:  Yes because we found, by analyzing what the nurses were doing, 
that they were doing a lot of relatively low-tech tasks. For example, routine 
spirometry, a lot of blood pressure checking. But we cured that by buying a fancy 
automated blood pressure machine where the health care assistant monitors the 
results of that  not the nurse, because it's not in their... and we pay our health care 
assistant half what we pay the nurse. And the health care assistant can do ECGs -- 
we found that nurses were doing ECGs, relative waste of nurse time, and once we 
started chopping out the things that nurses don't need to do, it became clear that we 
didn't need two nurses like we used to have (GP22 – male, 23 years experience) 
The introduction of QOF therefore prompted increased attention to the notion of 
‘efficiency’ within practices, not only in terms of matching roles and skills with QOF 
related tasks but also to financial efficiencies.  A focus on financial efficiencies had in a 
small number of cases led to the introduction of ‘business managers’ in participants’ 
practices. 
 
5.3.4 Sub-specialisation  
 
Many participants described how the advent of QOF had led to increased sub-
specialisation within their practices either as a result of PNs receiving additional training 
in a chronic disease or as a result of newly set-up disease specific ‘QOF clinics’.  As 
described above, some PNs had been sent on additional training courses in order to be 
able to effectively deal with conditions such as diabetes but also to work ‘autonomously’ 
within these clinics.  Participants perceived that PNs had benefited from such changes as 
they were able to develop their roles and were perceived as having improved job 
satisfaction and that patients received ‘better’ care as PNs were ‘specialists’ (who some 
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perceived knew more than they did about their specialist area) and have more focused 
time to spend with patients.    
 
Participant: Well the nurses can spend longer. With us it is 10 minutes. And if 
they have got three or four problems it is going to be rushed. The nurses will see 
them for one problem only, and then call them back and maybe book double 
appointments if they have got other issues to talk about. So they actually get better 
treatment time wise with them. (GP13 – male, 12 years experience) 
 
In contrast however, some participants perceived that PN-run disease specific clinics were 
not in fact an efficient use of resources (staff or time) and had scrapped them.  They felt 
that they were better able to deal with a variety of patient needs in one appointment, which 
also meant that patients with multiple QOF-conditions were less likely to have to re-attend 
the practice for separate clinics.   
 
Participant: Some practices will have a COPD clinic, and they'll come in once a 
year or whatever, sit them with a COPD nurse for 25 minutes, and she'll do their 
breathing checks. She'll check their medication. But they might have three chronic 
illnesses, and they come back to three separate clinics. That's over an hour of 
appointments, whereas I can do that all in one go. (GP39 – male, 3.5 years 
experience) 
 
Whereas there may be some perceived organisational benefits from sub-specialisation, 
there were also some resulting personal concerns and perceived losses. Firstly, some 
participants were concerned about the possibility of becoming ‘de-skilled’ over-time as 
they were not regularly seeing chronic disease patients.  Others reasoned that whilst this 
was a concern in theory, in practice, they still saw ‘complex’ chronic disease patients and 
that some patients still preferred to see a doctor over a PN and would therefore often book 
a separate appointment to do just that.  Secondly, where PNs were seeing the stable and 
well-managed patients, this meant that their own workload had become more complex and 
demanding as GP35 put it, there was less ‘light relief’. Thirdly, as a result of PNs 
increasingly seeing chronic disease patients regularly, there was some concern over losing 
continuity with their patients, which some perceived made their work harder.  Finally, 
whereas some relished the opportunity to become more specialised, others felt that they 
were increasingly required specialised and were concerned about losing the variety in 
their work  
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Participant: Now you're no longer a generalist, you have to know a lot more 
about lots of other things and keep up to date with it. For example, if you have an 
interest in diabetes you're just pushed in the direction. And, yes, I do have an 
interest in diabetes, but I'm not a diabetologist. I don't want to be a consultant 
diabetologist and therefore you're seeing lots of different patients from other 
partners because you have an interest in diabetes. And you don't know them, you 
don't know the family history, you don't know the ins and out, you don't know the 
personality. They don't know your personality.  I think that is a big difference. 
 SCS:  Who's doing the pushing then? When you say you're being pushed. 
Participant: The way we're organized now, in order to make it more effective and 
financially affective, it has to be structured in that way. So you do need someone 
who has an interest in diabetes, for example, to run the diabetic clinic and makes 
sure it's on top of things… (GP13 – male, 12years experience) 
 
5.3.5 Internal QOF teams – QOF ‘leads’ and ‘non-leads’  
In addition to the type of sub-specialisation described above, there was also another type 
of specialisation within practices as a response to QOF.  All participants described the 
formulation of internal ‘QOF teams’ who were nominally responsible for, and focused on, 
to varying degrees, the administration and the actual ‘doing’ of QOF related work to 
ensure that QOF targets were met. These arrangements resulted in participants holding 
one of three ‘positions’ 1) an overall QOF lead, 2) a partial QOF lead and 3) a ‘non-lead’ 
(Appendix 5 illustrates the sub-set of GPs who held overall lead positions and the 
participants they oversee within my sample).o Whereas the title of non-lead is fairly self-
explanatory i.e. they held no nominated responsibility for QOF other than the expectation 
that they would conduct where possible the necessary QOF requirements on a day to day 
basis, the other two labels warrant more attention.p   
 
 
 
                                                 
o This appendix was a useful analytical tool by allowing the comparison of accounts of those holding 
different QOF positions. It also affords the reader the opportunity to compare the data displayed in the thesis 
for participants in the same practice.  For example on page 162 the quotes from GP23 and GP18 correspond 
closely, adding richness and confidence to the findings. Not all GPs are represented however as many were 
the only representative from their practice. 
 
p As section 5.3.5 discusses the composition and range of positions that individual GPs can hold within their 
practice QOF teams, the GP identifiers are altered here to illustrate this.  Subsequent sections in this chapter 
(5.4 onwards) utilise the standard identifiers employed thus far. 
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5.3.5.1 QOF Leads  
5.3.5.1.1 Overall leads: Who are they and why them? 
Participants considered the role of overall QOF lead as one which had a large 
administrative element to it and therefore was considered time-consuming.  Subsequently, 
a small number of participants reported that non-clinical staff, specifically practice 
managers who did not have clinical commitments and other partnership demands on their 
time would be most appropriate.  In most cases however (n=33), participants reported a 
GP partner holding the role (as QOF is largely clinical) and seven GP partners in the 
sample identified themselves as being ‘overall QOF leads’.  Given that the role was seen 
as time consuming and additional to normal partner related duties, some overall leads had 
been given additional protected time.  In other cases the GP simply had to absorb the new 
requirements on top of existing clinical work and other partner duties. In either case the 
overall leads bemoaned the fact that time allowed fell short of what the work required: 
 
SCS: when you were doing the role full time did you have additional time for it, 
protected time or? 
 
Participant: Yeah, erm, not enough! but the idea was that I did have protected 
time yeah. (GP34R2 – overall lead) 
 
On probing for reasons as to why that one particular individual GP became the lead within 
the practice, participants reported various factors.  The first being voluntarism. As the role 
was perceived as largely administrative and time-consuming, it was not seen as desirable 
by many participants and therefore those who came to hold the role simply volunteered.  
 
SCS: Was it that other people wanted to do it [the overall lead role]? 
 
Participant: I don’t know, I think he [overall GP lead 43] was the lone voice. I 
used to do it when we were a small.., we amalgamated as practices and I used to 
do it when we were half the size erm but it is quite time consuming and I have 
other interests and it was ideal really (GP45 - non-lead) 
 
Those that volunteered were also identified perceived themselves as having a particular 
personality type deemed suitable for the role as the following quote illustrates: 
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Participant:  I quite like the number crunching, having done a PhD, a PhD in 
physics. It’s quite nice looking at it, you do some changes and then you see what it 
is the next day. It’s almost like a bit of research to be honest. It’s an audited, 
number crunching proposal, which you sort of get satisfaction from. Even if you 
got no money from it I quite like doing it, because I'm a bit of a nerd as far as 
numbers are concerned. (GP5 – overall QOF lead) 
 
Another lead GP, (GP34) described himself as having an ‘obsessive nature’ and was 
similarly described by another in his practice GP37, as someone who likes ‘micro-
managing numbers’.  
 
The second factor in choosing a GP lead was that the overall lead came to the role as they 
were perceived by their colleagues (and themselves) as holding a particularly suitable 
‘prior partner role’ within the practice, (such as being ‘the business partner’) and/or 
thirdly that they held particular traits and skills that would make them suitable to perform 
the role.  In particular, participants related that the role required good ICT skills.  Most 
overall leads were perceived as being the most ICT literate within the practice) and those 
who occupied such roles also identified this as a key factor in their ‘appointment’. 
 
SCS: I understand from the last interviews that you are the overall QOF lead for 
the practice. 
 
Participant: Yes. 
 
SCS: How was it decided that you would take on that role? 
 
Participant: Erm, I’ve always been more of the, sort of the computer partner in 
terms of setting up templates and doing searches and things like that…and it just 
sort of tended to come my way erm, from the outset. (GP34R2 – overall lead) 
 
5.3.5.1.2 Overall leads: the role and remit 
All GPs overall leads were clear that their role was focused on the monitoring and 
administration of the clinical aspects of QOF and that the administration of non-clinical 
elements was the responsibility of their practice managers.  Despite this similar remit, the 
amount of work and responsibilities varied amongst leads. Part of the variation in the lead 
role was as a result of the amount of delegation of QOF tasks and responsibility by the 
leads to their fellow practice staff. Some leads appeared to take the overall lead role and 
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did not delegate or devolve sub-clinical areas for other practitioners to be responsible for. 
They therefore have the sole responsibility of attempting to monitor and deliver all the 
areas of QOF in order to attain a good practice QOF score.q  Other leads however 
delegated areas of QOF to their practitioners, who were then responsible for the day to 
day management and QOF work within that area, with the lead retaining the overall 
monitoring role. The role and responsibility of a lead therefore appears to be contingent on 
the locally chosen managerial approach.  Where delegation was the chosen approach, it 
was usually done by the lead identifying and matching QOF area(s) with the individual 
practitioners’ areas of interest or expertise: 
 
Participant: The practice nurse has some clinical areas where she is responsible, I 
have some that I’m responsible for, and Doctor [name] has some that she's 
responsible for and they tend to be towards what we mostly do, so mine are 
epilepsy and mm, some of the, mm, the heart stuff and Doctor [name’s] is the 
depression and the things like that. And mm, and they we, and so, so then we share 
the tasks. (GP28R2 – overall lead) 
 
Although there were variations in the overall level of responsibility, there were some 
common features. All overall leads spoke of a need, in their role, to be aware of the annual 
changes happening within QOF and therefore acted as the practice “information lead.” In 
order to attempt to assure that their practice achieved well against the targets, they had a 
responsibility to not only be aware of the informational changes to QOF targets, but also 
to ensure that they passed on those changes to the rest of the staff via their ability with and 
control over the IT system: 
 
Participant: Certainly I've tended to find that you know myself and [his GP 
partner] would be at the beginning - the head of the game because we would be 
making sure we're finding out and learning, and then we would be pulling people 
to catch up with us.  And obviously we'd still be learning, you know, and we'd be 
finding out how to get to - even now, with the new QOF thing for depression, 
having to do a second HAD [Hospital Anxiety and Depression] score you know 
six to 12 weeks later, whatever it is, you know. We've all found that we've not 
really been able to keep up with that so we've all had to kind of encourage each 
other and bring it up on the meeting.  So we've all been guilty on that one.  So 
yeah, new - new things kind of takes a bit of time to kind of catch up with and get 
                                                 
q In their R2 interviews, overall leads GP43 and GP34 reported reducing their overall lead commitments by 
appointing deputies (e.g. in case of GP34 it was GP32) as they no longer wanted sole responsibility for 
ensuring QOF success. 
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used to working like that, but once that happens it becomes your routine. (GP2R2 
– overall lead) 
 
Even though they identified the need for their role as ‘information leads’ and the 
difficulties and extra workload that annual QOF changes can bring, some also highlighted 
(as in the extract above from GP2) that once the initial system had been implemented, 
annual changes were comparatively easier to deal with and once in place they eventually 
become routine to practice work. 
 
Finally, as they were usually the most ICT literate they were also ‘data leads’.  This meant 
for example that overall leads would be responsible for ensuring that the templates used 
for data collection were fit for purpose and accurate by for example reflecting changes in 
QOF requirements.  The quote below highlights the reliance of other practitioners within 
the practice on their overall lead: 
 
Participant: And so we had one fairly recently about erm, you know, we need to 
ask patients about LARC  [Long Acting Reversible Contraception] erm, so erm, 
and then when they come to add, change the templates for the letters etc he [the 
overall lead] lets us know as well. (GP9 – non-lead) 
 
As data leads, such participants would also be responsible for the data monitoring, 
analysis and dissemination of that data analysis. Overall leads spoke of this aspect of their 
role in terms of monitoring progress against QOF targets and communicating that progress 
to the rest of the staff. The implementation and subsequent importance and the perceived 
impact of the role of ICT with regards to QOF work was discussed at length by many 
participants and is discussed in detail later. 
 
5.3.5.1.3 Partial leads 
This second group of GPs are also defined as ‘leads’ in the sense that they are also 
responsible for delivering QOF, but their individual focus in much narrower as they are 
responsible for delivering the results specific to their nominated area(s) of QOF. Sixteen 
of the forty one GP principals all described themselves as being nominally responsible for 
the delivery of their QOF areas (s) at QOF ‘year-end’ and are therefore classified here as 
‘partial’ QOF leads.    Some of these had an additional overall QOF lead whereas others 
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did not; however, all described being largely free to decide how to organise their own 
QOF related workloads. 
 
Partial leads came to be responsible for their areas either via delegation from the overall 
lead or they simply divided it up amongst themselves. In either case most partial leads 
came to be responsible for areas in which they held particular clinical expertise or interest 
and for which as the GP below puts it they were ‘ultimately responsible for’ delivering:  
 
SCS: Is there a sort of overall QOF lead …. 
 
Participant: Yes, yes there is, one of my partners is a QOF lead but we got 
allocated certain areas to each partner and we are ultimately responsible for those 
areas. (GP29R2 – partial lead) 
 
Whereas in most cases, GP principals acted as partial leads, some participants reported 
that salaried staff also held partial lead responsibilities. In the case of two overall leads 
(GP28 and GP2) they had delegated some areas of QOF to their salaried staff, a PN and 
salaried GPs respectively. Both referred to a perceived need to share the workload: 
  
Participant: The practice nurse has some clinical areas where she is responsible, I 
have some that I’m responsible for, and Dr [name] has some that she's responsible 
for and they tend to be towards what we mostly do, so mine are epilepsy and mm, 
some of the, mm, the heart stuff and Dr [name’s] is the depression and the things 
like that. And mm, and they we, and so, so then we share the tasks. (GP28 – 
overall lead) 
 
Participant: what I've done is I've decided, right, well, it's coming to April. We 
need to just check all the final bits. So I've dished out QOF areas to everybody so 
that we're not one big burden. (GP2 – overall lead) 
 
The delegation of QOF areas to salaried staff was by necessity in the case of GP28 who 
worked in a small two-partner practice in which both partners were part-time.  In contrast, 
GP2’s decision to designate his salaried staff as ‘partial leads’ appeared to arise from a 
need to ‘encourage’ them to attend to QOF elements: 
 
Participant: I mean obviously myself and Dr [name] are the partners so we've got 
a quite a strong vested interest in making sure the QOF points are up.  So erm, you 
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know, we've two salaried GPs and the practice nurse.  So obviously they do 
sometimes need kind of encouraging [them] to be part of it…So we do distribute it 
evenly amongst the different people.  And also just to raise the awareness of the 
requirements of that - of that area so people will start learning right, for epilepsy, if 
I see someone I know to make sure that I ask when their last fit was or,  you know, 
for CKD make sure that they've had their last urine test and stuff like that. (GP2R2 
– overall lead) 
 
Although some partial leads were nominally responsible for their areas of QOF and this 
meant they were also doing most of QOF work in that area, for others the role simply 
meant overseeing QOF related work that the PNs or HCAs were doing: 
 
Participant: You delegate what you can but you still have to have a doctor with 
an input into what's going on, really. So we have a lead GP for each of the areas, 
but you know, where possible, you get nurses to do it. So you have hypertension 
diabetes, whatever, I mean, we have nurses that run those clinics anyway. So they 
do produce quite a lot of the work, but you still have to have a doctor sort of 
keeping tabs on what's going on (GP1 – partial lead)  
 
5.4 The role and impact of ICT 
As highlighted previously, participants claimed to be doing the most of the clinical work 
required by QOF targets prior to 2004 and as a result many identified that the most 
significant change as the introduction and use of ICT.   Participants described the initial 
ICT implementation phase and/or changes to the existing systems as a particular period of 
upheaval which required substantial additional administrative time and effort:  
 
Participant: It was just data entry. All it was making sure that you read-coded 
with the right read codes. That's all it was…We had no problems. It was just data 
entry was the only issue. We weren't read coding properly…So we had to spend a 
lot of time, and that's where we invested in our administrators and our 
summarizers, to try and look at all of that for us and bring the notes to us and sort 
out the read codes and sort out the registers. (GP13 – male, 26 years experience) 
 
Given that the ICT systems had been in place for approximately 4-5 years when 
participants were interviewed (and that previous research had examined this at a much 
earlier stage), I was keen to explore whether participants felt they had since adapted to the 
systems and what repercussions, if any, there were from these changes.  It became 
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apparent from the accounts that the ICT systems were perceived as having both positive 
and negative effects. 
 
5.4.1 ICT: enabling and demanding a systematic approach to care 
Most participants perceived that the new ICT systems were beneficial for their practice 
population in a two-fold manner. First, the systems were perceived as improving patient 
records via the regular and repeated collection of accurate data aided by standardised 
templates. As a result participants felt they were now more able to audit and structure their 
work more effectively and that this had led to improved care: 
 
Participant: you can see who is and isn’t erm having appropriate treatment at the 
touch of a button instead of having to do a fairly long-winded search and then 
trawl through the list of patients. So I think the biggest change has been how easy 
the IT is and you can have alert on every patient afterwards that need a little thing 
doing, which I think probably it’s the IT that’s improved the patient care. (GP18 – 
female, 20 years experience)  
  
Secondly, many QOF indicators required repeated measurements to be taken from patients 
and resulted in new patient call/re-call systems being implemented.  Consequently, 
participants perceived this to be a positive development as this meant that fewer people 
‘slip through the net’ 
  
Participant: I think it's more when they look at recall and that side of it, there's 
some benefits. Less people slip through the net than used to happen. It used to be 
relying on the patient for having some responsibility for their care, whereas now 
we're very much responsible for it. We will make sure you have this test done. 
We'll make sure you've done that…before if people had diabetes and they didn't 
turn up, we often didn't chase them, which was bad in a way. In some ways, you've 
got to say, "That's part of the contract between doctor and patient and they should 
take some responsibility." (GP6 – male, 24 years experience) 
 
Whereas the standardized call/re-call systems would mean that fewer patients would ‘slip 
through the net’ their rigidity also had negative implications as, patients with multiple 
QOF related diseases were required to make repeated visits to the practice, particularly 
where practices had disease-specific clinics.   This was perceived by some as not only 
inefficient for the practice and the number of appointments that such patients required, but 
also inconvenient for patients who prior to QOF may have had more choice over when to 
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attend.  Finally, some related that demand had increased as a result of the formal systems 
and the target system: 
 
Participant: ….some of the quality markers about when you bring patients back 
and how often you bring them back, we do set our prescriptions up and other 
things around those, like the nine month and the twelve stuff and then what 
happens is, if a patient’s come in the middle, you….it can be the wrong time for 
you… Mm, with QOF you tend to bring them back again because, because if it's 
inside the nine months you want, you want to see them two months later to be able 
to get it inside the next nine months. Mm, and that’s, without a doubt, has 
increased our appointments and made patients feel we’re a bit weird I think 
sometimes.  (GP28R2 – male, 17 years experience) 
 
The quote from GP6 also highlights another perceived change.  He states that the new 
QOF systems were positive for patients as GPs now had greater responsibility for ensuring 
their patients received the necessary care. A small number were concerned that patients 
were now less able to exercise choice regarding management of their own conditions 
reducing responsibility for self care: 
 
Participant: I’ve always felt some sort of responsibility should be given to the 
patients, that they should take care of their own health. It's a partnership. That's the 
way I view it. At the moment, it's more the doctor chasing them, which is wrong. I 
mean, nothing is wrong, but that's the way I feel it. (GP4 – male, 32 years 
experience) 
 
Whereas many regarded increased data collection as beneficial, they felt it should be 
collected for a useful purpose, but some areas of QOF seemingly required ‘unnecessary’ 
data of little benefit for patients.  Smoking indicators were an example frequently cited:   
 
Participant: Having smoking data on everyone. Yes, that is very good health 
promotion, but health care for individuals what do you do with that information 
when you've got it? And theoretically, QOF isn't saying we want you to do 
anything with it. We just want you to collect it…QOF is very good, I suppose, in a 
way, on a population basis, but if you're looking as an individual, it's not that great 
sometimes. (GP17 – female, 2 years experience) 
 
5.4.2 ICT as surveillance 
As, described in section 5.3.5.1.2 those who were QOF leads within their practices, in 
particular overall leads (see Appendix 5 for those overall leads in the sample) also had a 
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responsibility to monitor QOF progress. They described regularly accessing the 
population manager system to identify deficient areas. As the extract below highlights, the 
data generated by the ICT system allowed for the identification of indicators that were 
below target levels, and these were often areas that practitioners did not like or felt were 
lacking in an evidence-base: 
 
Participant: Yeah, yeah. I might as well speak to a brick wall sometimes but you 
know yes that’s the way of it. 
 
SCS: So do you like that aspect of your role? Is it something that works for you or 
do you just.....? 
 
Participant: Its fine if I do it, bearing in mind its -  that’s fine, its getting people to 
do things because they’re not terribly much in agreement with in terms of evidence 
based medicine. (GP22 – male, 23 years experience) 
 
The system however could also be used to identify individual staff members whose 
performance was failing to meet the targets: 
  
Participant: It was interesting because everybody thinks they're perfect and when 
you start looking at it, you realize that nobody's perfect, but some people are more 
imperfect than others. And there were a couple of things - you start going through 
that list of people who've missed one parameter and the same name keeps coming 
up. (GP34 – male, 20 years experience) 
 
In addition to monitoring their own areas of responsibility, some partial leads appeared to 
extend this remit to monitoring to the work of other partial leads.  In addition to the overt 
monitoring that overall leads conducted, there was also the possibility of both overt and 
covert monitoring by other partial leads: 
 
SCS: When you say you have your own areas, do you do your own monitoring of 
the progress yourself within the area? 
 
Participant: Yes I do, I keep an eye...fairly frequently on various bits of the 
system, certainly the bits I’m responsible for and sort of half an eye on other bits 
cos it’s interesting to see where the problems are (GP26 – male, 28 years 
experience) 
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It became apparent that all participants were aware of the fact that ICT had made their 
QOF related work and performance regarding QOF targets visible: 
 
Participant: within a practice, especially a large practice, ours isn't that big. But, 
for the large practice the doctors now can't hide and do their thing. They are 
accountable. Everybody is accountable to everybody else. The audit trails show 
that …So, there is less room to hide for either under performance or over 
achievers. (GP15 – male, 25 years experience) 
 
They were also aware that their individual actions (or rather lack of) could now impact 
directly on each other and that the demands of QOF required an increased team effort: 
 
Participant: it's made us work more together as a practice. Prior to that, the way 
we operated we had more individualistic lists, whereas that's gone now. We all see 
each other's patients, and the assignment of a patient to a particular doctor doesn't 
really seem to make any difference to who they see. I think it's just made us 
generally operate much more as a team, because the entity that has to jump 
through all the hoops is the practice, not the individual doctors…we were 
operating much more individually before.  (GP50 – male, 19 years experience) 
Despite being aware of the visibility of their individual contributions, many participants 
were aware that within their practice, some practitioners were not as engaged in meeting 
QOF targets as others.  Indeed some participants ‘confessed’ that they were not as 
enthused about the targets: 
 
Participant: We all should be doing that in our respective areas, but speaking for 
myself, it's not something that I keep up with….. 
SCS:  But, you are still doing well as a practice? 
Participant:  Precisely. I think, it would be different if we weren't. Then, I think I 
probably would take a different attitude. So, I guess, I'm leaving it up to others. 
(GP27 – female, 15 years experience) 
 
The introduction of ICT and the new ability to monitor each other’s work therefore had 
the potential to cause issues within partnerships.  Whilst participants acknowledged the 
potential for issues to arise, many did not feel that it worth causing any arguments over as 
disparities in effort were often not considered wide enough to address and cause bigger 
 161
problems within established partnerships and/or they perceived that people contributed to 
the practice in other ways as the extract below highlights. 
 
Participant: Certain partners, if the alert comes up -- the BP or the smoking check 
-- they'll do it. Certain partners will. They just find they're busy enough to do 
[snaps fingers]. Which is understandable, really, with all the rest they have to do.  
 
SCS:  How's that managed, then? That sort of... 
 
Participant:  You have to be careful how you talk about it. 
 
SCS: Yeah, exactly. Is it sort of done on an individual basis?  
 
Participant:  It's encouraged. We have a QOF meeting twice a year, and everyone 
is asked to do what they can. And pointed out what was short. As we're hitting the 
targets anyway, you know. That's the same with a lot of partnerships. People pull 
their weight in different ways. They're liable to be doing something else when 
they're not doing that thing. Otherwise all partnerships would split up. It's put 
partnerships under a lot more pressure, that sort of idea. (GP14 – male, 20 years 
experience) 
 
In the case of participants from one practice, the overall lead described how formal legal 
measures had been taken to protect the interests of each partner in the event that one or 
more failed to contribute fairly. 
 
SCS:  I think there's been a worry, obviously with it being in practice-level 
contracts, that some people don't of pull their own weight. 
Participant:  The partnership agreement actually does cover that now. If someone 
is shown to systematically not pull their weight, then they can be financially 
penalized…It was something the new partnership lawyers introduced. It's never 
been to blows, but it's a good idea. (GP34 – male, 20 years experience) 
Whereas such measures could be seen to be effective for GPs in partnerships, they do not 
of course apply to salaried staff who were deemed by some as being somewhat less 
motivated than principals when it came to attending to QOF.  In an attempt to engage their 
salaried staff, some, as highlighted earlier, had designated their salaried staff as partial 
leads.  Others however chose to boost the motivation of staff by offering a financial ‘QOF 
bonus.’ Although many participants had offered this in the first year and perceived that it 
had been an effective motivator, many had now ceased to offer bonuses for one of two 
reasons: they perceived QOF work as now routine general practice work and therefore 
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should be treated as such; they felt unable to, in view of the perceived worsening financial 
situation.  
 
In addition to such tailored measures, there were some commonly employed tactics 
utilised by leads in order to attempt to motivate and direct practitioner activity towards the 
targets. QOF leads appeared to frequently utilise a form of ‘peer pressure.’  They chose 
the ‘public’ forum of practice meetings in order to communicate areas of QOF and 
therefore often by implication the practitioner(s), who were under-performing.  Some 
adopted a subtle approach by simply presenting the data which they felt spoke for itself in 
terms of motivating those who needed to up their game:   
 
Participant: we can see on pop[ulation] man[ager] where the gaps are and 
actually which patients are needing to be reviewed and where the clinical issues 
are and there’s a GPs name alongside that, it tends to become fairly clear to 
everyone and I find just by repetition and by demonstration in front of everyone of 
where we are and that I get the message out... (GP23 – male, 14 years 
experience) 
 
In the case of GP23, this tactic appeared to work as one of his GP partners (in an all 
partner practice) describes in the following quote that she doesn’t want to be the one 
singled out as not contributing:  
 
Participant: we’re so small we - we - it’s almost like if you see your name there 
you think, oh! no I need to go and sort that out. You know I don’t want to be the 
one that’s got - you know stopping it happening you know, the case you think oh 
gosh that’s my patient I’ have to look in and see what’s going on. (GP18R2 – 
female, 25 years experience) 
 
Other overall leads however did not employ the subtle approach adopted by GP23 and 
adopted a more punitive style where they actively ‘named and shamed’ those not up to 
standard.  A small proportion of those who were on the receiving end of such measures 
reported that they made little difference in changing their behaviour: 
 
SCS:  Some practices, they're naming and shaming people. Again, it's just 
interesting how practices have organized themselves to cope with the same 
demands…. 
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Participant:  Yeah. I believe I've got emails or Power Point of the lead tables of 
who we caught [not doing the] smoking or whatever. But it doesn't make any 
difference. (GP52 – male, 19 years experience) 
 
In contrast to GP52, most participants described themselves as being on-board with such 
measures and doing whatever was necessary as they as it was to their collective benefit 
that targets were met. 
 
Overall leads appeared to be aware of the burden that the perpetual doing of QOF caused 
as well as the extra effort required around QOF year-end when QOF-related activity 
within the practices appeared to be cranked up.  In response to this some of the overall 
leads allowed for a ‘QOF holiday’ where they did not pursue colleagues over QOF 
targets: 
 
SCS: Aha. And what are people’s reactions when you know you’re sort of having 
to remind [them regularly]? 
 
Participant: brow beaten. We give them a couple of months off QOF a year but 
otherwise its sort of, ‘oh well, okay yeah fine.’ (GP22 – male, 23 years 
experience) 
 
In addition, participants from one practice (ID22) had also structured their surgeries so 
that they had a combination of appointments and were not just doing a series of 
routine/repetitive QOF-related appointments e.g. medication reviews. 
 
5.5 QOF and the consultation: concerns, consequences and solutions 
Whereas participants often claimed that the introduction of QOF had made little 
difference to the overall type and quality of care that they provided within their practices, 
many perceived that it had impacted on them personally in terms of the substantive aspect 
of their daily work i.e. conducting patient consultations.  In order to provide some context, 
I asked participants to estimate the proportion of their consultations that were in some way 
QOF-related.   The answers varied widely from 10% to 50% and although these estimates 
may not be accurate, they serve to illustrate the variation in QOF exposure that could arise 
as a result of for example, variation in the degree of delegation to PNs.  Regardless of the 
estimates however, participants reported many similar concerns.  
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Prior to the advent of QOF, participants described how they were able to concentrate 
solely on the presenting needs of the individual patient.  Many perceived however that this 
had become more difficult post-QOF.  They described QOF as a ‘new agenda’ to consider 
within the consultation process and one which was often not aligned with that of the 
presenting patient’s.  This posed an issue for some participants who felt that they were 
less able to practice in the manner instilled in them during their professional training: 
 
Participant: I suppose I was anxious, and continue to be anxious, to some degree, 
that the focus on my agenda, when patients come to see me, is a big of a shift from 
when I started in practice. My training was all about eliciting the patient's agenda 
and pursuing and following that, and enabling them to sort of clarify what it was 
that they had come about. We still do that, but there are increasing elements of us 
having our own agenda, which may actually be quite distant to and different from 
what the patient has at the top of their list. (GP23 – male, 14 years experience) 
The quote above also highlights what others described as a ‘discomfort’ when attempting 
to attend to QOF  by asking patients to answer questions which were ‘inappropriate’ or 
seemed unrelated to what the patient was attending for and left many wondering how their 
patients interpreted such occurrences.  When asked whether they thought patients had 
noticed a difference in the consultations, responses were mixed.  Some reported that 
patients had not noticed a difference or at least had not commented on it to them, whereas 
others said that patients had commented on the fact that they were now being asked such 
questions as they were aware that this is how GPs were now paid. 
 
The issue of competing agendas was highlighted by many and was exacerbated by the fact 
that the majority of participants had limited time (ten-minute consultation periods) to 
work within.  In order to alleviate such QOF related tensions/pressures, 3 GPs in the same 
practice (ID13) reported increasing their consultation lengths (to approx. 12mins).  These 
participants however were extremely unusual and most GPs still had their pre-2004 ten-
minute consultation slots.  These participants also described how QOF created additional, 
largely administrative work (e.g. recording data) which somehow had to be absorbed. This 
appeared to translate into the perception that the consultation was more pressured and had 
created new tensions and dilemmas over how to address the competing agendas. The 
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decision over which to attend to has different consequences as the second of these quotes 
highlights: 
 
Participant: It does put us under a lot of pressure because the patients come in 
with their agenda, I look at the computer, the computer reminds me about all the 
things that we still haven't done on this patient. So, we're coming to two agendas 
which may actually be pulling us apart…and of course, that ends up with a certain 
amount of conflict. You either do it, or you don't do it. If you do tend to do it, it 
means that the 10 minute appointment is now being rushed because what you want 
to do, what I want to do, may take five minutes. And now obviously you're down 
to five minutes with the patient's agenda. That puts you under pressure. (GP5 – 
male, 13 years experience) 
 
Participant: So that, you know, the patient might want come in and discuss the 
rash on their big  toe or the fact that they're depressed, and actually you've got the 
hypertension review, the blood pressure due, HbA1c due, have had their eyes 
checked. And you're also thinking, well, what do I deal with? because you're aware 
that if there are these things flashing and you don't respond to them, then the 
practice loses income. And I guess you can be judged by your colleagues or in this 
case my GP partner and the nurse, as not doing my job properly. (GP16 – female, 
18 years experience) 
 
Many purported a desire to continue to practice in a manner they felt was in line with their 
professional training i.e. to put the patient’s needs first.  This preference however was 
seemingly in contrast to how the ICT systems they used were designed and functioned 
within the consultation.   Participants described how various pop-up boxes would appear 
on opening a patient record that immediately drew attention to the outstanding QOF 
requirements for that patient.  This appeared to shape the process of the consultation 
some: 
  
Participant: we're on the EMIS system, so when they come in the population 
manager screen pops up and says smoking, blood pressure, X, Y, and Z. The 
problem with the system is that disappears as soon as you start the consultation. So 
you've either got to scribble down this list and try to remember it, or grab the 
patients and say, "Quick, before we do anything else, we've got to do X, Y and Z." 
(GP9 – male, 20 years experience) 
 
A small proportion reasoned that many of QOF requirements represented good care and 
that they could be of greater importance than the patient’s presenting needs.  
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Consequently,  they described attending to QOF first, and perceived that this was best for 
the patient, regardless of whether the patient ‘liked’ them for it or not.  
  
Although many described having a computer within the consultation room prior to QOF, 
the new requirements of attending to QOF pop-up boxes and templates appeared to 
increase the presence of the computer within the consultation.  Many described how this 
translated into them having less eye-contact and time to talk with their patients, both 
factors that were important to their role: 
 
Participant:  Yeah. Medicine is like a second-hand car salesman. I'm watching the 
eyes, I'm watching to see whether people are lying to me. I'm going to throw out 
suggestions and watch their facial reaction. I'm actually, literally playing... I would 
liken it to being a second-hand car salesman. I'm looking for weakness, I'm 
looking for truth, I'm looking for tips to get the answer, and anything that actually 
distracts me from doing that is actually going to make me less effective at what I'm 
doing. It's as simple as that. (GP37 – male, 16 years experience) 
 
In addition, the pressure of needing to fulfil the requirements of QOF in combination with 
limited time and the design of the systems in them becoming more ‘QOF-focused’ over 
time, i.e. consultations were becoming more doctor- rather than patient-centred.  As the 
quote from GP35 puts it, the strains of attempting to meet QOF at times meant that ‘you 
don’t always see the person as a human being’  
 
Participant: One of the problems with this sort of target-based culture and 
external pressure is that we've lost a little bit of the holistic type of medicine that I, 
as an old-fashioned sort of GP, like and I think patients like…To a degree, we're 
so busy with a consultation, trying to make sure that you've ticked all the boxes so 
that you can prove you've done what you said you've done, that you don't always 
see the person as a human being, if you like (GP35 – female, 25 years 
experience) 
In the following quote, the GP not only highlights how one colleague in his practice is 
known for adopting this QOF-focused approach but that he had also experienced this first 
hand when attending another practice as a patient: 
  
Participant: We've got one particular doctor in our practice who, sometimes the 
patients will mutter that they came in with a problem and all he did was ask a 
bunch of malarkey and take their blood pressure, weigh them, and they actually 
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didn't really get a chance to address what their problem was. That's definitely 
happening, and from my own point of view as a patient, when I went to my GP a 
little while ago, there was a locum there and I think he was under strict 
instructions. I went in to ask if I could see someone about my dodgy knee, and as 
soon as I sat down he said, "Oh, my God. We haven't checked your blood 
pressure! Put your arm out." (GP50 – male, 19 years experience) 
 
Others reported that whilst this was a concern, or that it may be the case when it was 
approaching QOF year end, they felt that for the most part they were still putting their 
patient’s needs first.  
 
Given that the ICT systems had been in place for a number of years, many felt that their 
practice had largely adapted to the new ICT way of working with phrases such as ‘ticking 
along nicely’ being used.  Many also described how they had become accustomed to 
weaving in QOF elements to their consultations by working in a flexible manner.  They 
described judging each individual consultation and then adopting an opportunistic 
approach to fitting in QOF. Where they were unable to fully attend to both agendas, 
participants stated that they simply asked patients to re-attend. 
 
SCS:  I mean in terms of the computer, obviously, you've got the patients here and 
the computer there, and the computer's asking you for various bits of information. 
Yet, the patient's come in with their own agenda of - how do you sort of manage 
that? 
Participant:  Again, a case-to-case basis because they're coming for a simple 
cough and a cold and or for a pill check or whatever doesn't take you very long. 
Fine, then there's maybe a couple of things that you can do and that meantime, the 
smoking or the blood pressure. (GP43 – male, 12 years experience) 
Whereas many participants highlighted the new concerns and issues described above, 
some felt that QOF and related ICT had in fact made their consultation work easier.  They 
perceived that the templates were a useful ‘aide memoire’ and helpful guide: 
SCS:  So you feel like you've absorbed it all into your consultation routine, if you 
like, when someone comes through the door? 
Participant:  You kind of know what you're doing, you know what questions you 
have to ask, you know what test results you're looking for, you know what levels 
you have to achieve, that you're striving for. So it's certainly easier. (GP36 – male, 
16 years experience) 
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In contrast however to QOF being perceived as helpful some perceived that the addition 
of another set of ‘rules’ merely served to cause confusion over which set of rules to 
follow.  Participants commented on the disparity between the targets levels in QOF and 
those in other guidance:  
 
Participant: Yeah. I mean, it is really confusing that there's no kind of consistency 
of guidance and I suppose, thinking about things like hypertension, particularly, 
and coronary heart disease risk, there's no consistent national guidance as far as I 
can see. (GP23 – male, 14 years experience) 
 
Whereas some simply stated that any rules ought to be followed and adapted in light of 
the individual patient, others resolved any dilemmas that the disparities may cause by 
choosing to follow other guidance in preference to QOF, reasoning that it was more 
stringent and that one would hit QOF targets along the way anyway. 
 
Finally, in addition to the general concerns regarding the addition of QOF, it was also 
clear that some aspects of QOF were considered more problematic within consultations 
than others.  One area in particular that was disliked and perceived as difficult to 
accommodate within consultations was the requirement to use depression 
screening/assessment tools. The addition of such ‘tools’ was perceived an insult to their 
professional knowledge and that the fact that they felt they had been effectively 
diagnosing and managing the condition prior to 2006 when the tools were introduced. In 
addition to these ‘professional objections’, some also felt that the tools were amongst 
other things time-consuming, cumbersome and therefore impractical to build into a 
consultation, especially such a sensitive topic.  However, they also felt under pressure to 
use them otherwise the practice would lose income.  Many therefore reported simply 
doing it as a paper exercise but that in practice it had not altered the way that they 
personally diagnosed and managed the condition: 
 
Participant: if somebody is mildly depressed, they're a 7, if they're moderate, 
they're 14, if they're bad they're 21. And really, I want to make sure they don't kill 
themselves while I'm sorting it out. What their score is academic! Do you know 
what I mean? 
SCS:  So you find it annoying that you have to do it? 
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Participant:  No! All I do is intelligently bypass it. If I think something is wasting 
my time, in terms of getting through to the crux of what needs to be done for 
somebody, then why waste my time doing it? I'll fill the box. If I you want me to 
fill a box, I'll fill a box. I feel I'm bright enough to fill a box so nobody would 
know the difference, but I'll do it my way and I'll hopefully do it with the patients' 
best interest at heart. (GP37 – male, 16 years experience) 
 
A few however felt that the addition was positive as they highlighted that depression was 
under-diagnosed whereas others were concerned as to what increased diagnosis would 
mean for demand on a system which already had inadequate resources.  Finally, some 
participants, who initially disliked the tools, appeared to change their view over time as 
they found that patients liked them: 
  
Participant: I use a PHQ9…I started to realize that patients are quite keen. I've 
had quite a few who were quite keen to take them away, and they actually check 
them and use them as a monitor of themselves and that's not what's in the 
guidelines. It's not how you should use it. But it's how patients sometimes find 
they're useful. And that was quite novel to me. I think GPs use what's given and 
modify in a way that suits them. And certainly I've sometimes found it's been 
useful for patients to say actually, "You are quite bad." Or maybe it's not that bad. 
…So I have mixed feelings about PHQ9. To some extent, I feel deskilled in my 
routine questioning. But on the other hand, I've seen some patients benefit from it 
and use it in a different way. And seeing us score them, and getting them to think 
it's dropping and they're getting better can be quite useful.  So I was quite surprised 
at that. It wasn't what I was expecting. (GP18 – female, 20 years experience) 
 
5.6 Summary  
The accounts of GP principals were largely ambivalent and reflect the fact that many saw 
the contract as an evolving ‘package deal’ which had both good and bad points, with the 
latter increasing over time. 
 
The initial 2004 contract was well-received and GPs cited various benefits arising from it 
for both themselves and their overall patient population.  They felt rewarded for providing 
good quality care and they perceived that the direct link between finance and clinical 
activity had led to the standardisation of clinical care for patients with the incentivised 
conditions.  Furthermore, the financial incentives were directed at areas considered to be 
of clinical importance and for the most part rewarded what they considered to be 
evidence-based practice i.e. the goals of QOF were largely aligned with their professional 
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aims of providing high quality care.  Despite these gains, many cited QOF-induced 
changes as detrimental to their personal relationships with and/or ability to focus on the 
substantive element of their work i.e. individual patients.  However, much of the 
perceived negative consequences had seemingly arisen from the way participants had 
implemented QOF.  
 
Participants reported undertaking similar actions within their practices in order to 
maximise the efficient use of their practice resources and importantly the probability of 
meeting their QOF targets.  As a result the approach to patient care (for the conditions 
included in QOF) was now highly structured and resulted in patient care becoming 
increasingly fragmented.  Whereas some of the internal changes were a continuation of 
those already happening prior to QOF, others arose specifically as a result of QOF, 
including the development of QOF ‘teams.’  The purpose and function of this sub-group 
of practitioners is to scrutinise and direct the work of their practice colleagues in relation 
to QOF targets. As a result, many related that they were now working in a less atomistic 
manner but for the most part this was not seen as a negative. 
 
Finally, the issue of finances was something of a recurring and significant theme within 
the account of these participants.  Many described how post-2004 versions of the contract, 
in effect, asked them to do more work without recompense that was not necessarily in line 
with their professional opinions.  However, rather than reject those areas that were not in 
line with their professional or personal opinions, the vast majority of participants reported 
pursuing them.  They reasoned that they were in a position of increasing demand on 
practice finances and that in the face of a worsening financial situation they had ‘no 
choice’ but to comply. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Exploring the impact of contractual change: 
the views and experiences of salaried GPs 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As highlighted in chapter 3, only two studies have attempted to ascertain the views and 
experiences of salaried GPs directly post-2004.230,231  Of these, one focused primarily on 
the educational support needs of ‘sessional’ (locum and salaried GPs) and does not discuss 
salaried GP work specifically in relation to the contract and/or QOF.231  The other study 
reported the post-2004 experiences of salaried GPs as far less positive than their principal 
counterparts who reported positive changes to their working lives.230  The evidence 
suggests that salaried GPs experiences are dependent upon their principals,230,231 
specifically regarding the type of work they were allowed to engage in with many being 
delegated ‘the left-over or discarded jobs, mopping up the less complex and perhaps less 
professionally satisfying or challenging work.’231(p914)  These findings are in contrast to an 
earlier study  who found ‘early-career’ salaried GPs (interviewed early in 2004) as 
reporting high job satisfaction and doing what they considered to be ‘nice-work.’232  
Although this latter study did not explore the views of the eighteen participants 
specifically in relation to the new contract, the difference in findings appear rather drastic 
given the relatively short intervening period.  In this chapter I hope to shed further light on 
the diametrically opposed findings of these studies by providing an in-depth analysis of 
the attitudes and working experiences of 21 salaried GPs in relation to the nGMS. 
 
6.2 Attitudes to, experiences of and consequences: contractual change 
 
In contrast to GP principals, most of the salaried GPs (n=13) had in fact only worked 
under the post-2004 arrangements. They therefore obviously had no basis for comparison 
to perceived differences in ways of working pre- and post-change in 2004. In addition, 
these participants had also not been in a position to vote either for or against the changes 
they now work under.  Despite these differences, and the differences in status between the 
two groups the attitudes of salaried GPs to the overall structure and content of the contract 
as well as QOF showed many similarities to their principal counterparts but with some 
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notable exceptions.  Accounts were again largely ambivalent with most perceiving that 
where gains had been made in one area, they also translated into losses in others. 
 
6.2.1 Contractual change: the gains  
As well as asking for their unprompted attitudes towards the new arrangements, I was also 
keen to assess whether any of the gains identified by GP principals were similarly 
perceived by salaried GPs.  For example in the previous chapter, most GP principals cited 
the two main advantages of the new contract as 1) their new ability to opt out of providing 
out-of-hours care as they found the old system ‘unsustainable’ and 2) the increased 
monies on offer as a result of QOF.  In addition, they felt that these factors had in-turn, 
positively impacted on recruitment into the profession.  As a large proportion of salaried 
GPs had recently entered general practice I was keen to assess whether any had chosen to 
do so in light of these specific changes.   
 
6.2.1.1 Opting out: a good deal but for whom?   
In contrast to their principal counterparts, salaried GPs’ attitudes to the ability to opt out 
of out-of-hours care seemed largely apathetic.  Their views appeared to be influenced by 
their perception that the pre-2004 out-of-hours workload was not in fact particularly 
onerous as they highlighted that out-of-hours provision had predominantly occurred via 
local co-operative arrangements.  As such many reasoned that their actual personal 
responsibility would have been of an acceptable and manageable level had the 2004 
changes not occurred.  In the following quote GP31 reasons that being on-call for one day 
per month (as she perceived the old local system to be) would not be too onerous and 
acceptable should there be a return to the previous system: 
Participant: Before, they had [a] co-op, so it was all the practices in the area got 
together to run the co-op. Some people didn't do it. Some people did…But, 
basically the practices were allocated a share, and I don't think it was too onerous, 
anyway. So, if it went back to that system, I think that would be fine. And I think it 
just worked out that you did one a month or something like that. (GP31 – female, 
3 years experience) 
Despite this apparent apathy, many participants cited the working hours in general 
practice as good and preferable to those in hospitals.  For some participants it was one of 
the major reasons cited for choosing general practice and it was the main reason for two of 
the three GPs who had chosen to transfer to general practice after having a ‘first career’ in 
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a hospital environment.  Later on in the interviews I attempted to assess the importance of 
the ‘new’ ability to opt-out to their career decision making by asking participants whether 
they still would have chosen general practice if the ability to opt-out had not been 
introduced.  Many said that ultimately, it would not have affected their decision, assuming 
again that the old co-operative system was not in fact too demanding.  They also cited 
other additional or compensating benefits in choosing general practice such as 
experiencing continuity of care with their patients and/or variety in their work. One 
participant however who had transferred over from hospital medicine did say that he 
would have chosen to continue to work in hospitals and not transfer to general practice, 
had the change not occurred.  
 
All but two participants stated that they had chosen to opt out of providing out-of-hours 
care and cited a variety of reasons including: wanting a good work/life balance; they held 
other demanding posts for example within PCTs or had had young families as in the case 
of several female participants including GP53 below:  
 
SCS: What are our thoughts on that [out-of-hours] not being a part of general 
practice anymore? 
Participant:  It's nice in a way, because I've got a young family. So for me, that 
suits me just fine. I'm at the moment opting out of doing that, which I can do. But I 
know the two full-timers opt in because they also take registrars with them. I 
suppose you do miss a bit of critical care, and it's lovely for patients if it's your 
own doctor who is coming to see you in your hour of need (GP53 – female, 4 
years experience) 
 
Where participants cited any personal benefits they may have gained under the new ‘opt-
out’ system, they were for the most part, like some GP principals, also concerned as to the 
impact on patient care as under the new system.  They perceived that patients were now 
less likely to receive good quality care and/or care from doctors they had no prior 
relationship with. 
 
SCS:  when [the contract] came in there was also the ‘removal’ of out-of-hours.  
What were your thoughts on that?  Do you think that was a good thing..?  
 
Participant:  Yes, course I did!!  I don’t know, in some ways it is good, I mean I 
think the idea of having an on-call cooperative is a good idea; I mean I think 
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different PCTs handle it differently, and I am not sure if I rate it too highly the way 
that the PCT here has done it.  I think how it was beforehand, where it was local 
GPs, and you all to do your share, I think it was probably a better idea you 
know…I think standards have slipped a little bit because it is not local GPs, that 
are doing all the sessions. (GP48 – female, 2.5 years experience) 
 
6.2.1.2 Increased income – a gain, but not for us, at least not for now! 
Participants were all aware of the increased monies since 2004 due to the high levels of 
QOF achievement across the country. They perceived (and assumed in the case of those 
not in practice prior to 2004) that most GPs had already been providing good quality care 
and that the increased income was therefore deserved.  Few however, discussed income 
rises as a reason for choosing general practice and again cited other motives such as 
continuity with their patients and having a wide variety of work.  All were aware that any 
financial gains made were primarily for principals and that this had created large 
disparities in earnings between themselves and their principals.  Some perceived that this 
disparity fairly reflected the differences in responsibility between their employers and 
themselves and felt they were fairly rewarded for their work.  Others were more resentful 
of the differences as many thought that the largest aspect of both their and principal 
counterpart’s role and workload was largely the same and as GP49 put it created ‘two-
tiers’ of GP: 
  
Participant: I think because I've got my own list, I do sometimes feel that I'm 
there always doing almost as much work. Clinically, yes, I do all the patients that 
are in my name, I have to deal with. And I have the same amount as the partners. 
And I get half the pay. Literally half the pay. So yeah, that starts getting a little bit 
frustrating. I mean, obviously I don't have the extra admin side to it, but I don't 
know how it's worth half pay. Do you know what I mean? (GP55 – female, 1.5 
years experience) 
Participant: There are lots of good things of being salaried, but equally you are.. I 
will get paid less than the people who do the same, the guy next door who is the 
partner and will have more responsibility because of the way they run it and it is a 
norm is that we have a pecking order of which clinics get filled first, so salaried 
will get filled before the non-salaried, and sort of extra home-visits you, will get 
the extra home-visits, than the partners etc…So in a sense it is a two-tier, probably 
it is inevitable.   (GP49 – male, 12 years experience) 
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As the quote from GP49r above also highlights, as well as their negativity towards the 
disparities in pay, some participants also felt that they were more likely to have to do less 
desirable work or work that partners did not want to.  Certain duties, such as doing more 
home visits or working in extended hours clinics were included in their contracts of 
employment and therefore some felt unable to complain or that the situation was fair as 
they had agreed to it upon signing their contracts.  Others felt that they were fairly treated 
with regard to the sharing of ‘undesirable tasks’ and perceived themselves as ‘equals’ to 
their employers.  However, even in such cases some went on to describe frustration they 
held that although they may be included in practice or GP-level meetings, their views and 
opinions expressed within such fora were not necessarily acted upon or taken on-board.s 
Having asked all the various participants about their experiences and treatment as a 
salaried GP, their accounts suggest that their experiences were somewhat dependent on 
the individual practice: 
 
SCS:  Some people have said things like they end up doing more visits or their 
surgeries will be the ones that are booked first… 
Participant:  You know, that's that doesn't happen here, and where I trained, it 
did. Where I trained it was salarieds [sic], trainees and registrars, who basically 
took the brunt of all the rubbish! …But here, actually everyone does an equal 
amount of stuff, I think... So I think it is really quite fair here compared to other 
places. And on the visit screen it's obvious who's got which visits that day. And 
everyone does a pretty similar amount, actually. So, yeah, that doesn't bother me. 
(GP51 – female, 2.5 years experience) 
A factor that appeared to mitigate the strength of feeling concerning the perceived 
disparities regarding pay and their treatment appeared to relate to whether or not the 
individual wished to become a partner in the future. Some had actively chosen and sought 
a salaried post and were largely pragmatic about the differences in pay, stating that such 
differences came with the territory. In these cases, participants acknowledged the 
difference in earnings but felt fairly rewarded for the work they did and that being salaried 
had other compensations as for example it allowed them to pursue other roles (as in the 
case of GP49) or priorities such as spending time with their family.  The quote below is 
                                                 
r GP49 was a principal in another practice prior to deciding to become salaried in order to pursue an 
additional career. 
s Some e.g. GP62 however did not work on the days when the practice had their meetings and felt more 
excluded.   
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from a GP who had once been a partner in her current practice and switched to a salaried 
role in order to pursue her interest in academic research.  She describes that despite the 
‘poor timing’ of her decision, the trade-off for her was worth it: 
 
Participant:  I stopped being a partner in August 2003. And GPs got a 25-percent 
pay raise in April 2004.  So that was the worst financial decision I ever made!! 
However, it didn't really matter because it was the best clinical decision, or life 
decision, I ever made. (GP30 – female, 18 years experience) 
Whereas some had actively chosen a salaried post, others took one with a view of 
eventually becoming a partner at some point in the future, either in their current practice 
or elsewhere. Others described their current salaried situation as acceptable for the time 
being whilst for example they had young children or because they wanted to concentrate 
on clinical work: 
 
Participant: I think it's changed because over the years people went from 
qualifying, from a GP registrar into a partnership. So then I think due to change of 
contracts and things like that, partnerships started drying up…It could lead to 
partnership in a few years. Then I know some people have definitely wanted 
partnerships quite early on, after qualifying but I felt quite happy really getting a 
salaried post first and just consolidating what I know. Also building up my 
knowledge and learning about more about management and a bit more before 
moving on to partnership. (GP55 – female, 1.5 years experience) 
 
6.2.1.3 Improved income but fewer ways of accessing it – consequences for the 
future? 
The section above indicates a significant degree of agency in terms of GPs choosing to be 
a salaried GP; however, it was not clear as to how much of this was simply rhetoric or 
how much was an active choice.  For some, as in the case of GP30 and GP49, there was 
clearly an active choice as both had rejected their prior principal status.  Some also stated 
that the salaried option suited them for the foreseeable future. Others however stated that 
they would have preferred to have moved from training to a principal position or at least 
have the option when they felt ready to take on greater responsibility.  As the previous 
quote from GP55 illustrates, at the time of conducting the interviews partnerships were 
perceived as being in short supply and that the new contractual arrangements had 
influenced this situation.  Most were aware of this situation but many who wished to 
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progress to a principal role hoped that the situation would resolve itself as eventually they 
would reach a point where they would become dissatisfied with their salaried posts.  The 
main reasons cited for wishing to move into a principal role related to a current inability to 
affect practice policy and a desire to exercise more control over their own destinies.  The 
first quote below indicates that this GP is nearing that point whilst the second is from a GP 
who had reached it:   
 
Participant: I think so. I'm at that stage now where there are certain things that 
start to irritate you a little bit, and because you're not a partner and you don't tend 
to have the say - you can nag people and say, "We need to do this," or "This needs 
to be sorted out." There's only so much nagging you can do. You get to the point 
where you start to get a little frustrated, thinking, "Oh, if I was a partner, I would 
have more say in this happening." And those sorts of things. So I think I'm getting 
to that stage in the next year or two as well. (GP61 – female, 16 years 
experience) 
 
Participant:  if you're salaried, you don't really have a huge say in practice policy. 
The partners decide…whether you're allowed to see 10 patients or whether you 
have to see 30… I felt like I was stagnating a bit in a salaried job, so that's why I 
wanted to move on to a partnership, because I thought it would just give me a little 
bit more insight and ability to change and mold a practice and help my patients a 
lot more. (GP41 – female, 5 years experience) 
GP61 along with most of the other participants who expressed a desire to eventually 
become a principal appeared content (or felt they had to be) to wait out the situation out 
(for many hoped that the situation would resolve itself). However, GP41 had taken 
decisive action and moved on from her old practice to her current post. She related that at 
that time she wished to move onto a partnership there were few opportunities within 
traditional partner-run practices.  As a result she decided to take a post as the lead 
clinician in a new privately-owned practice which had recently won an APMS contract.   
 
She appeared to have no qualms over working for a private company reasoning that all 
practices were profit-making organisations, privately run or not.  Throughout the 
interview she was critical of traditional practices and her attitudes appeared to reflect a 
sense of rejection from her old practice and the lack of opportunities currently available. 
For example, she criticised the professional uproar and traditional practices who were not 
offering extended hours relating that they were shirking their professional responsibilities 
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as ‘when you enter the healthcare profession, you're offering a 24 hour service, because 
people don't choose when they get ill, you know (GP41).’ She reasoned that her new 
practice was offering a ‘better’ service due to their longer opening hours.  However, her 
move had been instigated by a desire to gain influence and control over practice affairs.  
Although she was the lead clinician in her new practice, her desire to gain control over the 
practice was seemingly not realised.  Whereas she described being able to influence action 
by for example the company taking her concerns on board regarding staff (highlighting 
the subsequent removal of a member of staff who she deemed ‘compromised patient 
care’), in the quote below she also describes how she has no real ‘powers’ or control 
relating to the running of the organisation.  This is however not stated as a negative by 
her, in fact she relates it as being as positive as both she and her GP colleague are on a 
level-playing field: 
 
Participant:  So, there is a hierarchy to some extent. But, the good thing is, it's 
much more uniform. Because I don't have the power to hire or fire. I don't have the 
power to manipulate people. I don't have the power to say, "Well, you're working 
these hours, and I'm working these hours." In that sense, you're working for a 
company, and there are guidelines for all the employees who work for that 
company that are very similar. So, you're kind of autonomous, but you're part of a 
company. You're given responsibility for certain things. But, equally, you can't use 
that position to abuse others (GP41 – female, 5 years experience) 
Both GP41 and her colleague GP40 (who also took his post due to a lack of available 
partnerships) however were unusual cases as they had both had wholly positive attitudes 
towards privately-run general practice and were currently working in them.  In contrast, 
most of the other participants working in traditional partnership arrangements were far 
more critical of privately-owned practices, despite having no experience of working in 
such organizations.  They perceived that patient care was less likely to be of the standards 
in traditionally run organizations. They posited that unlike traditional partner-run practices 
who were of course partly motivated by finances, privately-run counterparts were only 
motivated by profits and therefore they were more likely to compromise professional 
standards in order to pursue money.  Some felt that as professionals, the staff in such 
organizations would not let standards slip, at least not intentionally but that they may 
eventually hold more of a worker (‘9 to 5’) mentality; i.e. there would be less effort or will 
to go the extra mile and less loyalty towards the organization.  In addition, whereas within 
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traditional partnerships they as employees were managed primarily by other doctors, the 
idea of being managed by non-medically trained staff was also less attractive: 
Participant: If I was working for Virgin and I did my hours eight to four three 
days a week, and then went home and this money just went into a big pot and it 
just got paid, I don't think I would get the same job satisfaction for one. I just don't 
think I would want to do a good job for them, to be honest. Whereas I know my 
partners and I know that they are decent people and so I want to do a good job for 
them as well. But maybe that's me being naive. That's how I feel. (GP56 – female, 
5 years experience) 
Participant: I think [as] doctors we do like to able to be able to make certain 
management decisions, as well. And I don't know if you know all salaried working 
for bigger practices. Private...how much of those choices and decisions would be 
able to make as salaried doctors. Some of the decisions are clinical as well, and 
maybe out the realm of someone who is just trained in purely management. (GP55 
– female, 1.5 years experience)  
 
6.2.1.4 QOF equates to improved and standardised care  
Many perceived that most practices (including their own current practice) had prior to 
2004 already been providing good standards of care and reasoned that this was why QOF 
achievement had been high overall.  The quote below is from a GP who recalls minimal 
disruption (except for the administrative effort to implement the ICT) during the 
introduction of QOF to her practice (during her training) as she perceived it to be 
‘evidence-based’: 
 
Participant: … the nice thing was that this practice was already so well organized, 
the bits that QOF put in were already happening …I think, for the surgery here it 
was relatively easy, except for the computer point of view, to put all the data in, 
because it was already there…It's a very evidence-based surgery. It does things 
because it makes sense. And so regular blood pressures on people who have got a 
diagnosis of hypertension is a logical thing to do. So that was already there.  
(GP53 – female, 4 years experience) 
Many related that QOF was therefore in line with the way they ought to practice, claimed 
to have already practised and/or that this was the way they had been trained.  It was 
apparent that EBP was of key importance and that their views on QOF were affected by 
their views that QOF was also largely evidence-based: 
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Participant: …on the whole, if you read about it [QOF], and then you go back, 
and you know it’s evidence based, this is good. Evidence based medicine basically 
is what's important at the end of the day (GP24 – female, 2.5 years experience) 
However they also believed that QOF had been largely positive for the general patient 
population who were, post-QOF, more likely to receive better and/or more uniform 
standards of care as outlying practices/individuals were more likely to be motivated (via 
financial or competitive drivers) to improve their standards: 
Participant: Unfortunately, there are pretty appalling GPs out there. So I think 
QOF is making them think about I haven't taken a blood pressure for five years 
and this diabetic I suppose should have retinal screening, shouldn't they? …It was 
being missed and it was poor care for people…so patients from their point of view 
it's much better. (GP56 – female, 5 years experience) 
Some identified that as QOF evolved, it would continue to improve standards as well as 
being a useful educational tool.  Some related that although they did not like the 
depression tool, they felt that its inclusion was important as depression was a prevalent 
and under-diagnosed condition.  They also highlighted that medicine evolved, hence QOF 
should evolve and that QOF effectively kept practices up to date.  However, some also 
highlighted that QOF did not match the latest available guidance, particularly those that 
had only recently entered practice.  This group felt the most up to date with current 
guidance as a result of their recent examinations and training.  A small number suggested 
that ‘older’ GPs may have stagnated in their approach and knowledge and that QOF was 
helpful in keeping their practice relatively up to date: 
Participant: I suspect probably a lot of us are more, even more up to date with 
guidelines than, than some of the older GPs, because we’ve, we you know we’ve 
had to learn them for our, for our exams and learn the new evidence and things. 
Erm so no, I think, I don’t think it -  no I don’t - no I don’t think it’s certainly more 
important for us erm than it is for older GPs…they’re a little bit more set in their 
ways really (GP31 – female, 3 years experience) 
Finally, a small number related that the widespread introduction of a single set of 
standardised targets and guidelines for all practitioners to work towards was positive for 
patients who were now likely to see a number of different professionals within their 
practice.  They perceived that patients were now being told the same message: 
Participant: I actually quite like the fact that we're all - and again, we're all trying 
to do the same thing together. That means if patients go and see [GP name] first of 
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all and then come to see me, they'll get the same treatment rather than us all trying 
to approach things from different angles and doing our own sort of thing. At least 
if you've got some sort of a protocol there, the patients get sort of standard care. 
(GP61 – female, 16 years experience) 
6.2.2 Contractual change: losses 
Many salaried participants felt that the overall structure and content of the new 
arrangements had been beneficial, but primarily for GP principals and in particular those 
that had been practising for some time prior to 2004 and now no longer had 24-hour 
responsibility for their patients. Many participants were largely positive about QOF as a 
concept as 1) they felt that it had improved patient care and 2) it was largely evidence-
based and therefore in line with the standards of care they ought to provide.  However, 
they also had some misgivings about the P4P system.  
 
6.2.2.1 Locked in? On the contractual treadmill  
Participants were aware that the contract was reviewed annually and that were working to 
an evolving agenda.  As discussed the evolving nature was perceived as being positive for 
patients as standards of care would continue to rise and improve. A small number, 
however were more cynical about the nature of the changes and like many of the 
principals, they perceived the continuous ‘goal creep’ as a way of clawing back monies 
from the profession.  They also felt that the government had under-estimated the amount 
and quality of work being provided by general practice and that ultimately many of the 
subsequent contractual changes were not for clinical but political purposes.   For example, 
on asking about their thoughts regarding the extended hours DES many perceived that 
these changes were unnecessary in terms of patient satisfaction with practice access.  
Many related however that despite the perceived lack of need for the DES, the decisions 
of whether or not to implement the DES actually came down to the perceived financial 
implications.  Some stated that their principals had ‘no choice’ but to implement the DES 
as it would represent a financial loss. Others said that their principals had decided against 
it (again due to financial factors) and they were prepared to ‘take the financial hit:’ 
 
Participant:  Cost was one of the main things. Especially going into our elderly 
population, we didn't see a particular demand. That was proven by our previous 
Saturday surgeries. There were people who could have come any time during the 
week. 
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SCS:  So for all the people who said "Oh, this isn't really a choice, it's being 
imposed on us," that doesn't really resonate? 
Participant:  We were prepared to take that small financial hit, because we would 
still lose money even if we did take it on and get the money, it would cost us more 
to implement it. (GP60 - male, 0.5 years experience) 
 
In terms of the direction of QOF changes, many felt that in contrast to the 2004 version, 
many of the ‘new’ (post-2004) changes were not evidence-based, highlighting for 
example the 2006 introduction of indicators requiring the use of depression tools. In 
addition, the patient surveyt and the new diabetes indicators introduced in 2009 were 
considered as very controversial targets, the latter was considered by many to be 
potentially dangerous to some patients: 
 
Participant: I mean I think, yeah really it always has to evolve because the 
evidence always changes anyway.  I think the HbA1c is a particularly difficult one 
I think because… there’s controversy about that because the studies are actually 
showing now that we try to progress in the controls are really very low on 
HbA1C’s, the mortality rates are actually higher....So, so I think that’s - that’s a 
particular one where erm it’s a very specific controversial one (GP31 – female, 3 
years experience) 
 
Approximately half of the salaried participants were interviewed around or after the time 
of the introduction of these new indicators.  I was keen to ascertain in later interviews 
whether or not these controversial targets were being pursued. It appeared that in most 
cases however they were not considered problematic enough not to pursue despite any 
reservations that they as individuals may hold: 
 
 SCS:  When new indicators came out in April, what happened? 
Participant:  We had a practice meeting. The details were gathered together… and 
we had a meeting with the doctors and the nurses, and went through everything 
that we needed to be doing essentially. To make sure we're up to date. 
SCS: What were people's views on these new indicators? 
Participant:  Fairly ambivalent, really.  No one had any particular concerns or 
problems. 
                                                 
t Some perceived that this was in fact a perverse incentive as practices may score well by patients valuing a 
‘nice’ but incompetent GP.  
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SCS: What about the value of them? Do you see any good clinical reasons for 
them being in there? 
Participant:  Some of them. I think, definitely most of them do seem to have a 
reasonable clinical benefit. I think some of the targets are too aggressive, I think. 
Diabetes would be a good example. HbA1c targets, they're going lower and lower, 
which I think a lot of people would disagree with. And certainly I think the 
evidence would disagree with. So that'd be one where I'd be worried about. (GP60 
– male, 0.5 years experience) 
 
Participants however, related that in order to avoid being too aggressive in the pursuit of 
targets and potentially pushing individual patients too far (or to dangerous levels), 
individual practitioners would need to continue to apply discretion and assess each case as 
they presented.  Participants highlighted the importance of exception reporting in allowing 
them to exert their professional judgement and thereby reduce the potential for 
inappropriate patients to be pushed too far.  When asked their views regarding a QOF 
without exception reporting, participants related that this would not only be unfair to 
patients who may be pushed into having unwanted treatments but also to 
practitioners/practice performance. Furthermore, some related that that local population 
factors would come into play and make it more difficult for those working in more 
deprived areas to hit targets. 
Participant: I mean…a small proportion will never have a smear no matter how 
many times you ask them.  There will be people who are asthmatic who will never 
stop smoking …so it’s not always about purely about the doctor activity, I think 
find out that they made the effort, but if we made the effort, and it is not beyond 
their ability and because the patient tries, or patient health or whatever, then there 
shouldn’t be penalized for that. (GP49 –male, 12 years experience)  
Participant: Obviously we're coming from a lot further back with our patients 
than some other people. Some other people have got patients who are your nice, 
wealthy patients that want to have all the screening done and want to have their 
cholesterol checked. Some of our have got much bigger issues, and cholesterol is 
not of any significance. They're trying to survive today, not get through 20 years to 
find out what their cholesterol is. (GP61 – female, 16 years experience) 
In addition to concerns over the pursuit of controversial targets, there was also a general 
perception amongst some participants that the perpetual and focused pursuit of targets in 
principle was problematic.  Some felt that their principals were too focused on the 
continual need to achieve against the targets in order to maintain practice income: 
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SCS:… what do you think, you know, are the main differences between before 
and … and now?  I mean do you think things are better, worse or a mixture … I 
mean…. 
 
Participant: for the patients or for the … 
 
SCS: For both.   
 
Participant:  I think it’s … well I think it has put a lot of strain on the partners and 
practice to get all QOF points. And the same as the contract, I mean when it came 
to get all these points just to get more money, I think ehm it’s put more strain on 
doctors and it has lost ehm the … just normal care for patients, taking them as a 
patient rather than as another points … object to get points. (GP62 – female, 10 
years experience) 
  
This perceived focus on achieving targets and the transformation of patients into as GP62 
puts it an ‘object to get points’ was echoed by some other participants. Even though GP10 
had only been working for a year, she also felt that this was the case: 
 
Participant: [QOF’s] all I've ever known, basically…it's making sure that you 
concentrate on specific things. So, it's at least monitoring that you achieve things, 
like blood pressure, for example, things like that. But, it does make you just kind 
of, in a way, go for points, if you see what I mean, rather than looking at patients 
as whole. Things you really just go 'oh, I've got to get that,' to get the points. You 
see what I mean?... It's not like it's something I really agree with, in a way, because 
I think it makes you focus on the wrong thing because you're not aiming for 
targets, you’re wanting to look after patients.  (GP10 – female, 1 years 
experience) 
 
Being an employee appeared to provoke different views with respect to their need to focus 
on QOF.  Whereas some participants felt that they were obliged to meet QOF targets 
(even though some disagreed with QOF or aspects of it e.g. GP62 saying ‘her heart wasn’t 
in it’), others felt that they were (or could be) less focused than their principal counterparts 
who they perceived had (or should have) the main responsibility and pressure of achieving 
QOF: 
 
Participant: This is one of the benefits of being in that under-tier of a salaried GP.  
It’s the partner’s job to sit all worrying about who that mail... send an email and 
say can you please keep an eye upon blah, blah, blah when they are coming in.  
It’s something that doesn’t have to make any difference to me (GP49 – male, 12 
years experience) 
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Others felt a strong sense of attachment to their practice and had seemingly been 
socialized into their practice’s way of doing things, including meeting QOF targets: 
 
Participant: I do my share of the game. I tend to... I trained here, so I've got a lot 
of attachment to this practice. And I tend to do things just like a partner. (GP59 – 
male, 2 years experience). 
 
6.2.2.2 QOF and quality of care? 
Whereas many considered that QOF was largely evidence-based and had led to 
improvements in care standards for the overall patient population, they were also aware 
that it was a limited measure and could have negative consequences.  There was a 
perception that a large proportion of practice time and effort was directed at achieving the 
targets. Whilst included areas were considered important, they related that they often took 
a large amount of time and attention away from other important areas of work, particularly 
in relation to their specific practice population or individual patients: 
 
Participant: I just feel as though we're spending a lot of time doing a few of these 
things. I think because of our population here, sometimes there are bigger issues 
than screening for depression, actually. They're being abused or something else is 
going on. You feel that you have to do those sorts of things and then try and cover 
the other things or try and help them with their social problems or whatever else as 
well. (GP61 – female, 16 years experience) 
  
In addition, some related that due to the focus on QOF there was a risk of other areas of 
work being somewhat sidelined, particularly towards QOF year end where the practice 
activity was particularly geared towards QOF targets: 
 
SCS:  So you think that the areas that aren't in QOF aren't necessarily done as well 
in general. I'm not saying here, as such. 
Participant:  I would say so. If you had just a short period of time, you're likely to 
stress more on areas that are likely to be economically yielding as opposed to areas 
which are not. You'll still do them at the end of the day, but when it comes around 
January of February, everybody is now busy and trying to look at the areas that 
they need to improve on. So I would not have any particular citing that this one 
probably has not been managed as well, but the presence of QOF I think is likely 
to improve the quality of service that patients get [in those areas]. (GP59 – male, 2 
years experience) 
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Finally, many related that although the achievement of high QOF scores may mean that on 
the surface good quality of care is being provided, it did not necessarily translate into high 
quality care actually being provided overall or to individual patients. Many perceived that 
it was possible to achieve well on QOF by simply being good at ticking boxes and in some 
cases by gaming the system: 
 
SCS: Is it equivalent to good care, do you think, a high QOF score? 
Participant:  I'm sure that isn't a direct correlation. I think it probably shows the 
vigilance and hard work, but not necessarily. If all you diabetics have got blood 
pressures under a certain level and they are all having their retinal screening every 
year, it tends to suggest that their diabetes is going to better controlled than people 
who aren't having those things done…Because a lot of what's good general 
practice, it's not ticking boxes really. (GP56 – female, 5 years experience) 
SCS: Do you think that if you get a good QOF score now that necessarily means 
that you're providing good quality care? 
Participant:  No, I don't think so, because there is evidence out that that surgeries, 
on the day before QOF is due everybody has had their blood pressure done an it's 
120/80. So there's real scope for falsifying. And unfortunately nobody is willing to 
address the surgeries that falsify, because the PCT has been approached and said 
that it's a police matter and the police say it's a PCT matter. So it doesn't happen. 
So, no. Good QOF numbers doesn't necessarily mean you've given good care. 
(GP53– female, 4 years experience) 
 
6.3 Practical responses to QOF 
6.3.1 Organisational change? 
Although salaried GPs were not in a position to actually decide to implement changes in 
response to the new contractual arrangements, I was keen to assess whether salaried GPs 
had experienced changes akin to those that principals described making in the previous 
chapter.  I was also interested in what their thoughts and experiences were as a result of 
such changes.  
 
6.3.2 Staffing capacity 
Some participants were not in post when the contract came into play in 2004 and therefore 
were unable to discuss whether or not changes to the staffing levels had occurred.  Of 
those that were in post a mixed picture emerged, with some stating that no changes had 
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occurred and others stating that additional staff members (both clinical and non-clinical) 
had been taken on.  Any participants who had joined their practice after 2004 were asked 
why they had been recruited. None related their appointment to QOF work, but cited other 
factors such as the practice was expanding or they were a replacement for outgoing 
partners: 
 
Participant: I think when I came in here, I think two of the partners were retiring 
and they were basically looking in for a salaried post because Dr. [principal] had 
turned from a part-time to a full-time, and I also was looking for a salaried post.  
(GP47 – female, 2 years experience) 
 
6.3.3 Skill-mix: altered roles and responsibilities  
Many participants were unable to answer questions regarding whether any changes in 
skill-mix had occurred specifically in relation to the 2004 changes. However most 
described that within their practices, PNs had a significant role in CDM, particularly in 
relation to areas that were included in QOF.  Some highlighted that their PNs had already 
been doing this type of work pre-QOF, but others stated that there had been an increased 
shift of work previously done by GPs to PNs since 2004: 
 
SCS: Yeah.  So just thinking about what happened to the nurses roles when … 
when this came in.  Did, did their [nurse’s] roles change? 
 
Participant:  They did … yeah more put in charge to do CDM. Because a lot of 
the points probably come in through keeping a tighter control on chronic illnesses. 
And because we don’t have the time to ask all the questions, they are doing our 
main monitoring of like asthma reviews and therefore yeah their involvement in 
chronic illness was increased a lot, which I think is a good (GP62 – female, 10 
years experience) 
 
Regardless of whether or not QOF had been responsible for PNs doing more CDM work, 
most perceived that PNs were the best or most appropriate people for the role. They 
reasoned that most of QOF related CDM work involved routine and/or template-driven 
work.  PNs were deemed as being ideal for this type of work as they were ‘good’/‘better’ 
than GPs at following protocols.   Whereas many perceived these arrangements meant an 
efficient and appropriate use of practice resources, it also meant that they were now more 
likely to see the more ‘complex’ patients and therefore the working day was now more 
intense with fewer breaks: 
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Participant: I do think sometimes... I think having more defined roles is a more 
efficient use of your time because me testing someone's urine or doing an ECG, 
you know, they're paying me a lot of money to do something that's so simplistic. 
So, I do think your skills would be better employed in dealing with more complex 
patients But, equally, you need a balance, because they're exhausting, the complex 
patients and it's nice to have a break in between doing bloods or doing a pill check 
or something. (GP41 – female, 5 years experience) 
6.3.4 Sub-specialisation 
In the previous chapter, some principals described a trend towards increased sub-
specialisation within their practices, primarily due to PNs receiving more specialised 
training and dealing more exclusively with chronic disease patients or with the 
development of PN-led, disease-specific QOF clinics.  Others stated that this situation had 
already been in place prior to QOF and some did not have such arrangements as they 
perceived that GPs were more able to deal with a variety of needs in one appointment.  
The accounts of salaried GPs also reflected this mixed picture.  Some related that the ‘sub-
specialist approach’ to care was a positive development for the specialist PNs who they 
perceived as now having increased job satisfaction by working autonomously in their 
clinics. Some also perceived that patients received ‘better’ care under these arrangements 
as PNs were trained and focused care on providing specialised care for the patient’s 
specific condition. As GP59 also highlights, this arrangement also meant that patients 
were now more likely to experience continuity of care with their ‘expert’ PNs: 
 
Participant: I think it's been a good development both for the nurses, for the 
doctors and for the patients. For the nurses, it's a new area. They can develop 
themselves and do the work. For the doctors, it's less work, work taken off your 
hands. And that gives real time to concentrate on other things. For the patients you 
get to know one person. You are being seen by one person all the way through. 
(GP59 – male, 2 years experience) 
Participant: I wouldn't know whether they had been doing it before, but they've 
certainly been doing it since and they're very effective. And it's my impression that 
they enjoy having an area of clinical responsibility, as well. One of the nurses is an 
expert on COPD... And the other nurse is a diabetic expert. (GP12 – female, 11 
years experience) 
 
A repercussion of this arrangement however, as highlighted in the quote below, is that 
some participants felt they were less familiar with certain areas of medicine than their 
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specialist PNs and in some cases felt de-skilled.  As GP12 stated, this meant that at times 
she may have to seek advice from her PN colleague, something that some of the more 
recent entrants also described doing. 
 
Participant: [nurse name] is probably now better -- the practice nurse who's the 
respiratory nurse -- was certainly better at spirometry than I am because I have to 
go back and look at the numbers and interpret the graphs again. But she does all 
the spirometry so she can easily say, "This means this." So she's certainly better at 
that and she's more on top of current prescribing recommendations. And the 
diabetic nurse is similarly good at that. I sometimes ask [nurse name’s] advice or 
send patients to see her for an opinion. (GP12 – female, 11 years experience) 
 
6.3.5 Internal QOF teams – QOF ‘leads’ and ‘non-leads’ 
All participants described the presence of an internal ‘QOF team/QOF leads’ within their 
practices.  Most participants however were not part of these teams and were ‘non-leads’ 
with no nominal responsibility for an area(s) of QOF. The quote below typified the type of 
arrangements that most participants were subject to i.e. being monitored and directed by 
their QOF lead(s). 
 
Participant: we have got a main partner, he looks at all QOF stuff for both 
surgeries, and like myself and the nurse practitioner here keep an eye on it here 
too.  But I mean, most of it, I don’t do that so much so [name of main partner] will 
tend to do that and he will let us know basically, whatever we are falling behind in, 
and what perhaps we need to look at…generally, the guidance comes from higher 
up, and it just gets filtered down, and say look…we need to catch up on some 
mental health reviews, and then we will implement that and do what we can. 
(GP48 – female, 2.5 years experience) 
 
Four salaried participants however, did hold a nominated responsibility for an area or in 
the case of GP41 all areas of QOF.u GP41 was the lead clinician but also shared the duties 
of an ‘overall QOF lead’ as identified in the previous chapter with her practice manager 
and described the tasks required by the lead role as needing a team effort. 
 
SCS:  So, in terms of such a progressing against QOF targets, is it you who 
monitors them, or is it [name] the practice manager? 
                                                 
u Whereas this was unusual for a salaried GPs to hold the ‘overall QOF lead role, her employment in a 
private practice meant that any GP who held the post would be salaried. 
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Participant:  It's a team effort, really. We all do. I will tend to keep quite a close 
eye on QOF, but then, so did [name’s practice manager]. We'll holler out things to 
each other. So, it's really a team effort, QOF, to be honest. Even our admin have 
helped, in terms of auditing patients. I've just made up spreadsheets for the 
information that I need and when they've sat in reception doing nothing, they've 
gone through the patients and collated the information for me, which highlights 
what's missing for which patients. (GP41 – female, 5 years experience) 
However, this GP was working in a newly opened practice (having only been open for 
three months prior to the interview), with few clinical staff and it was unclear whether this 
arrangement was of a temporary nature.  
 
The other three ‘leads’ could be classified as ‘partial leads’ in their practices.  GP61 said 
she had volunteered for the role, whereas GP10 and GP31 had each been delegated an 
area of QOF by their respective overall leads.  GP61 and her salaried GP colleague had 
been delegated the shared responsibility for two areas of QOF, mental health and 
depression.  She described how the depression indicators in particular required a 
substantial effort during the period of its introduction.  This included deciding which tool 
that practice staff would use, as well as doing the extra administrative work to collate and 
prepare the necessary patient record information:  
 
Participant: the first year we did it as neither of us knew what we were doing we 
used to get together and come in on our day off and look at our parameters and 
look at what we had and work out a plan of what we need to do, sometimes what 
we needed to do was go through all the patient records and check that they have 
got depression, and whether it was a new episode or whether they need a review or 
something like that. So usually we would meet together and from that meeting we 
would then say between now and when we meet again in 4 weeks time this is what 
we need to do, we’d split it up between the 2 of us and he’d do the first half and I 
would so the second half. (GP61 – female, 16 years experience) 
 
GP61 also described having to monitor and ‘chase’ other GPs (including her principals) in 
relation to her QOF areas and indicated that it was difficult for her to do so, particularly in 
the case of certain ‘repeat offenders’ who did not correctly comply with the (PHQ-9) tool: 
 
Participant: if we go back through them again and it hasn’t been done…and there 
were a couple and to be honest they tend to be the same Drs that don’t use them, so 
you chase them and say “well did you do a PHQ9?” and sometimes they give them 
the patient the PHQ9 and they document them given to patient but the patient 
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doesn’t bring them back and so they document PHQ9 given to patient but there is 
no score as the patient never brought the PHQ9 form back... (GP61 – female, 16 
years experience) 
 
GP61 appeared somewhat frustrated by her lack of ability to influence these ‘repeat 
offenders’ and seemed somewhat disillusioned by her efforts which had not resulted in the 
financial bonus she hoped for. However she appeared to find solace in the fact that she 
believed that the ‘extra’ QOF monies had been reinvested into the practice and had not 
gone to the principals.   
 
Participant: It is extra work and I volunteered to do it in the first instance, I think 
almost in the hope that we would get a bonus or something as in the first stages it 
was we would get extra money and you know it will be dished out between the 
people who do the work and this that and the other and it never was, it didn’t go to 
the partners, but was put back into the practice funds (GP61 – female, 16 years 
experience) 
 
It should be noted however, that (as highlighted earlier) this GP was looking for a 
partnership in the near future.  An unspoken future benefit for her volunteering to be a 
partial QOF lead may have been to gain kudos with her principals and enhance her 
chances of being offered a partnership should an opening become available. 
 
In contrast to GP61, the other two partial leads had substantially smaller areas of QOF 
(epilepsy) to deal with both in terms of the prevalence of the condition as well as the 
workload involved.  They also perceived their contributions as small, particularly in 
comparison to their GP principals:  
 
Participant: We each have... Well, mainly the partners have specified sort of QOF 
areas given to them.  I mean, I do epilepsy, but the salaried doctors don't do an 
awful lot of it. It's more the partners that do it. So, epilepsy's my thing. (GP31– 
female, 3 years experience) 
 
Participant: I mean, [the practice manager] obviously does all the organizational 
bits of it, but I think, [GP11] and [overall QOF lead GP2] probably take 
responsibility, if you like, for the rest of it. And I think [overall QOF lead GP2] 
basically was the one to allocate us all in the area, and then he would keep 
checking it. And then, we were supposed to do our own area, but he would check 
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on it. So, other than the organizational bit, I think [GP partner] and [overall QOF 
lead GP2] probably focus on it a bit more. (GP10– female, 1 year’s experience) 
 
Despite the smaller areas of QOF responsibility, both described having to do ‘extra’ work 
themselves in order to ensure that their areas were on track to achieve target levels.  In 
particular, GP10 said she was not happy about having to do such work which often 
required staying late beyond her usual hours.  Earlier in the interview, she had in fact 
described herself as being less QOF-oriented than her principals (GP2 and GP11) which 
concurred with a view in the  in the previous chapter that salaried staff needed 
‘encouraging to be a part of it’ (GP2).  It appeared however that GP2’s delegation of an 
area of QOF responsibility had increased not only her awareness of QOF requirements but 
also the likelihood of her doing QOF elements: 
 
Participant: it was at that time that I was given part of QOF to look at. So, I did 
spend a lot of extra time doing it, just going over things and checking with people 
and asking people to come in and things like that at that time. But, that's the only... 
and obviously, that was only a couple months ago. Since then, I've been a bit more 
aware of it than I was, because I haven't even been noticing these things before 
then. Since then, maybe if I see something I might think of it. If I do a medication 
review and they've got epilepsy, I might include more of QOF things than I had 
been doing before, if you see what I mean, because I'm more aware of what you 
need for that (GP10 – female, 1 years experience) 
 
6.4 The role and impact of ICT 
Of those that had been in practice prior to QOF, most stated that their practice that had 
already been ‘paperless’ for some time and were positive about the use of ICT (vs. paper 
notes) viewing QOF-related ICT as increased coding which was considered good practice.  
One GP who had recently moved over from Ireland (where they did not have QOF and in 
this GP’s case even use ICT) also spoke of the benefit of having these systems:  
 
Participant: most of it's paper, back at home, you'd have to trod through pages of 
notes, which is much more time consuming. So even though I think people go on 
about QOF in terms of time and workloads, I should think it simplifies things 
much more (GP57 – female, 3 years experience) 
 
Most participants felt that the systems had improved care due to the standardization of 
quality and improvements in patient record keeping and therefore an improved ability to 
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audit their work. Not all areas of QOF however were deemed important, indeed some 
thought certain areas were unnecessary e.g. CKD especially as they were not actually 
required to do anything with that data.  Such areas were therefore perceived as a 
distraction or time away from doing other more important work. GP61 described how 
much practice time was spent ‘de-bugging’ patient records, an activity that didn’t 
necessarily lead to improvements in care:   
 
Participant: But, you know, things have definitely changed since QOF came in. 
And a lot of it is time actually not spent with the patient; it's time spent going 
through the records and finding why does that code keep coming up, and why does 
it say we need to do this with the patient. Which actually isn't improving patient 
care. So that's the problem. I'm not sure if it's a good test of how well we care for 
our patients. (GP61 – female, 16 years experience) 
 
6.4.1 ICT as surveillance 
All participants were aware that the ICT systems were used within their practices to 
monitor QOF progress and identify areas that required increased efforts.  They were also 
aware that their work, at least in relation to QOF, was visible to others in their practice 
particularly at their practice meetings where QOF leads would present QOF data.  There 
again seemed to be a variety of approaches that their QOF leads took with respect to 
‘encouraging’ their practice staff and practitioners as the following quotes illustrate: 
 
Participant:  In the management meeting, they discuss... QOF plays a big part of 
it. So, it is the partners, but we are there as well as salaried GP's are around. And 
we are always asked for ideas. And it was found that some people were missing 
out, actually going through and getting those points, so that's brought up. And 
sometimes, name and shame is the only thing that works, unfortunately, but it 
does. (GP24 – female, 2.5 years experience) 
Participant:  It's on a rolling agenda item on the practice meetings. And it 
generally gets a nod in the direction of most of the time and perhaps just before the 
-- well, it has to go about March time, doesn't it? He [QOF lead] might say we are 
not up to our percentage of recording people who could, there's a highlight box, 
could everybody make sure that do it. So it's no more than that really. It's no 
wagging fingers. (GP12 – female, 11 years experience) 
The prospect of being named and shamed or standing out appeared to be an effective 
motivator for many, including compliance with areas that were not thought to be 
representing ‘good medical care’ (‘that other stuff’): 
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Participants: For QOF I think because I've got my own patient list and just I'm 
just quite aware that I don't want to be the one with really bad QOF results because 
every now and then we get sent round lists of our patients who need a bit of QOF 
catch up on X, Y and Z. As much as you can, I try to do bits and pieces as they go 
along for my patients. Some of it is general good medical care. And that other stuff 
as well. You have pride in your work. You don't want to be the one who is really 
got really low QOF points, compared to someone else in the practice. (GP55 – 
female, 1.5 years experience) 
 
Despite the surveillance, many participants did not feel that they were put under any 
particular pressure to meet QOF targets. Some reasoned that it was primarily their 
principals’ responsibility: 
 
Participant: I don't feel any pressure, right, partly because we've got 14 partners. 
So, you know…one of them does all the mental health QOFs, someone else does 
all the stroke QOFs…they've all got their own responsibilities. And because 
they're partners they do, do QOF, because it's their business. No, I never get leaned 
on. I mean, we get sheets sent around saying these last 10 patients all need their 
blood pressures. And I look through them and I'll see if they've had a blood 
pressure done at the hospital and it's just not made it on to a read code. I'll do it 
that way. (GP54 – female, 3 years experience) 
 
In contrast to most participants who did not feel closely scrutinised or under pressure to 
achieve QOF targets, two participants working in their former training practices appeared 
to undergo an unusually high level of scrutiny, despite now being fully qualified.  Rather 
than perceiving such scrutiny as negative they perceived it as being positive both for their 
own continuing development and for patient care.  In addition, both claimed to do more 
than the ‘average’ salaried GP which could be beneficial for moving onto a partnership: 
 
Participant: very often the principal doctors at some point will go through 
everybody that's been seen that day to see if there are any points left undone. And 
that's partially because of the teaching role being so big here. Because it is part of 
good care. It should have been in their own diary of notes anyway, that something 
needs updating. And so you do get pulled up if you miss some of the things. 
(GP53 – female, 4 years experience) 
Participant: It's just training really. Because it's only now two and a half years 
since I've completed my registrar. So, it's good. If I do get into a partnership later, 
which I would like to eventually I suppose, though we don't know the future of 
 195
General Practice at the moment, it'll help, because you know how things are done. 
(GP24 – female, 2.5 years experience) 
 
Finally, as described, GPs were aware and accustomed to being under regular surveillance 
within their own practices GP41, was subject to subject to daily surveillance from external 
sources, specifically the company holding the APMS contract:   
 
Participant: I can get a phone call from [Company] saying, "You've got some 
new blood tests that you've not looked at today." So, you know, it's something that 
I've got used to. It's not something that's nice because you do feel like people are 
invading your privacy at times. (GP41 – female, 5 years experience) 
 
6.4.2 ICT as communication from a distance 
Most of the salaried GPs only worked a limited number of sessions.  Some did not work 
on the days that QOF/practice meetings were held on.  As a result a small number of 
participants described the undesirable situation of being uniformed about changes to the 
targets.  As a result some were only informed of changes by the ICT of new work they 
were required to do for their practice: 
Participant: This is the problem with working part-time is that all QOF meetings 
happen on the day that I don't work…So I'm trying to find out about it. But at the 
moment, all these obesity things keep popping up. I don't actually know whether 
any QOF points are going with that or whether they're setting up some sort of 
obesity register. (GP56 – female, 5 years experience) 
 
 
6.5 QOF and the consultation: concerns, difficulties, consequences and solutions 
Despite most participants having only worked post-QOF, many of their views and 
experiences mirrored those of their more experienced counterparts as well as the principal 
GPs.  Many described how QOF had affected their consultations and for the most part not 
in a positive way. Participants were asked about non-QOF vs. QOF related work. Those in 
practice prior to 2004 were asked how their consultations compared pre- and post-QOF. 
The less experienced GPs (i.e. post-QOF only experience) were asked about non-QOF vs. 
QOF related consultations.  In either case, non-QOF related consultations were seen as 
comparatively less pressured with one main focus, the patient’s presenting issue: 
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SCS:  During that year when you were working without QOF, what would you say 
your consultations were like in comparison to now? 
Participant:  I would say that they were more relaxed. The concentration and 
attention was more on patients rather than on boxes. You would have more time 
for a patient to spend on say, examination rather than taking height, weight, and 
whatever [laughs] (GP58 – female, 6 years experience) 
Participants felt their ability to focus on the patient was somewhat compromised.  QOF 
was seen as ‘another agenda’ in the consultation and one which was not necessarily 
aligned with that of the patient. Given that participants’ appointments were limited to ten-
minutes this created extra pressure within the consultation: 
 
Participant:   I suppose it just puts more pressure on you time-wise. But I think 
you just have to manage it, you have no option. And you've got the proper 
examination done first. Then you have to try to quickly move through what you 
need to get done. …But, yes, time pressure is a little bit of an issue. (GP57 – 
female, 3 years experience) 
The GP above described how post-QOF she simply had ‘no option’ but to adapt to the 
new ways of working. Her view was echoed by many and was seemingly derived from the 
fact that there had been no additional time added on to the ten-minute consultation post-
QOF. They somehow therefore had to find ways of working in the new requirements.  
Where a patient attends for a ‘simple’ issue (that could be dealt with quickly) there 
appears to be little conflict as they described usually being able to attend to both agendas. 
However in ‘busy’ consultations where the patient for example brought multiple 
problems, they described dilemmas as to which agenda to attend to and that often 
something had to give.  In most cases they described that often this was time for things 
like communication regarding non-presenting or non-QOF related problems and/or 
interpersonal care. As these quotes highlight, ‘medical’ i.e. clinical care may be improving 
but at the cost of other types of care: 
Participant:  when patients come in you also, they’re looking at the contents of 
the screen and you’re looking at what the results are and where to put that and 
trying to fill up all the templates rather than, I think you hardly have your contact 
with the face contact really, or...Contact with the patients, so.  Erm yes I think you 
look, you sort of like you’re trying to fill up all the boxes, you’re trying to do 
everything for QOF rather than looking at the patient and taking time to talk to the 
patients.  (GP47 – female, 2 years experience) 
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Participant: …you lose all the time to chat and build up relationships with 
patients…that's a completely different part of general practice that the government 
just can't see and doesn't understand. And so you chat about…You know, 
everything else that's going on in their lives. You just don't have time for that 
because you're too busy going, "Do you smoke? I know I asked you that last time, 
but believe it or not that was 15 months ago and I've got to ask you again" and all 
that sort of business but I think it gives better medical care to patients. (GP56 – 
female, 5 years experience) 
Many expressed concerns that such consultations were not reflective of the type of 
approach that they had been trained to provide.  Some participants such as GP58 who 
expressed a dislike for the ‘QOF-focused’ approach felt that over time or at particularly 
busy periods (many referring to being pressured by busy waiting rooms) they were 
becoming more QOF-oriented in order to get through their workload: 
Participant: [QOF] changes the concept of consultation. For instance, when I 
started, I was trained to look at a patient. Look at the patient: did I have a good 
contact, and smile, and nod, or whatever? And then I went to see my GP, and I was 
shocked that my GP wasn't... I mean, I have changed my GP since then, but he 
wasn't interested in me, he was just looking at the screen. And I try not to do that 
with my patients, but then I'm running late everyday by half an hour, and then 
patients complain. It's a vicious circle. Or, they give you a comment, like a 
sarcastic comment: that every time you're here, their appointment was like 20 
minutes ago. So I'm finding myself more, now, turning to the computer. So, it's a 
big, big change for me. Although I hate it, I hate it. I changed my GP a long time 
ago because of that... [laughs] (GP58 – female, 6 years experience) 
A small number went on to express concerns regarding the future of their consultations as 
they felt that the consultation was already crowded and that new additions to QOF would 
simply reduce the non-clinical aspect of their role even more. Given that non-clinical 
aspects of care, e.g. continuity of care, was one of the main reasons cited for participants 
choosing general practice, the reduction of time with their patients may have negative 
future consequences for job satisfaction.  As GP54 puts it, such a situation would take the 
‘fun out of the job’: 
Participant: So we're always going to reach a limit where there's only so much 
you can do. And I guess they just keep creating more amendments that we have to 
get everything crossed off in. It just takes the fun out of the job, really… you 
haven't actually spent time getting to know the patient and what the patient 
actually wants. (GP54 – female, 3 years experience) 
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Whereas many identified with at least a significant proportion of their consultations being 
very template-oriented, others felt that overall they had a more ‘adaptive’ approach. They 
described this as consisting of 1) eliciting the patient’s needs and judging how much time 
this would take and 2) assessing how important any of the missing QOF elements were 
and 3) making a decision as to which agenda to deal with.  Many reasoned that often some 
or all of QOF elements were not that important and could be dealt with in a separate 
appointment.  If the missing QOF requirements for that particular patient were deemed to 
be of ‘urgent’ clinical importance then participants described taking the opportunity to 
attend to those whilst the patient was present. If they were not deemed important and 
could not be fit into the consultation then some participants stated that they simply asked 
the patient to book another appointment, thereby removing any pressures they may have 
felt in attempting to both agendas: 
Participant: I tend to wait and see what the patient is coming in with, because I 
think you know, some things are appropriate, some things aren’t appropriate.  You 
know, if somebody is coming in to tell me that they just found out they have been 
diagnosed with terminal cancer, it is not appropriate to start quizzing them about 
their smoking status and wanting to check blood pressure… So I think, I mean it 
can be difficult if you have got things flashing on the screen saying, please check 
this, please do that; but I think there are ways and means of doing it. (GP48 – 
female, 2.5 years experience)  
SCS:  Do you have a QOF routine?  
Participant: A lot of it depends on how much time we've got. If you don't have 
any time, then you just ignore it. You don't have time to do it every 
consultation…But, if you're running on time and someone just comes in with a 
sore throat or whatever - something that's quite quick to deal with - then you've got 
time to do it.  So, I don't think you do feel pressured because you don't have to do 
it there and then. It just completely depends on whether you're running on time or 
you've got time to do it. And like I say, when you're doing the searches anyway, 
they'll pick up the people who need reviewing. So, you can bring them back in for 
a specific appointment. (GP31 – female, 3 years experience) 
The term ‘appropriate,’ as used by GP48 was used by many participants in relation to how 
they individually judged each consultation with regards to the doing of QOF elements.  
Many however also described a sense of awkwardness when asking patients seeming 
‘inappropriate’ questions within their consultations: 
 199
Participant: So yeah, sometimes it can be a little bit hard. I think the whole 
smoking thing is just a bit of a nightmare because if we have to ask every six 
months if they were still smoking or something odd like that. So I kept on asking 
the same people again, and obviously they hadn't given up smoking yet. But you 
have to tick the box. And I think sometimes when you know the patient, that gets 
to be a bit awkward. Because you know they're not going to give up smoking. It's 
not really the time for them to give up smoking because they're going through 
various other stresses and things like that. (GP55 – female, 1.5 years experience) 
In order to deflect any discomfort that may arise from the need to ask ‘inappropriate’ 
questions to the patient, some participants described adopting a tactic of blaming the 
computer: 
Participant: I ask questions like, "What's your ethnic status?" And stuff like that. 
They're just like, "For goodness sake." You can wrangle a blood pressure into a 
conversation or into consultation OK, but how do you ask somebody where they're 
from? How are you going to get to that? But I blame the computer for that most of 
the time. (GP56 – female, 5 years experience) 
 
The preceding account suggests that the addition of QOF often made the consultation 
process more difficult due to the fact that they had dual and often competing agendas 
within time-limited consultations.  However, many also related that the addition of QOF 
templates was helpful as they now had tools which guided them to areas that were mostly 
regarded as being clinically important for the care of individual patients: 
SCS:  OK. What about working to the templates, protocols, and guidelines? 
Participant:  Yes. I like that. It is a good thing. 
SCS:  Do you think it makes your job easier that you have these things to follow? 
Participant:  It makes it easier, although the doctor should have what it is in his 
mind, but you know, you might forget things. If you have it in template - OK, I 
will ask her for this, I will ask for this, 1, 2, 3 - it is a good thing. (GP40 – male, 3 
years experience)  
Participant: It certainly, initially it does put a bit more pressure on you, because 
you're not used to them. In another sense it makes life much easier because instead 
of trolling through notes at home [Ireland], you have no pop ups or anything like 
that, and here you see it pop up. You know what to do, and it's easily done (GP57 
– female, 3 years experience) 
Not all ‘templates’ however were perceived as helpful. The depression tools were 
described by many as difficult to incorporate into their consultations and were not 
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perceived as being evidence-based or effective enough to replace their professional ability 
to assess their own patients.  As a result, many participants described using the tools in a 
cursory way and that the output did not really affect the way they chose to manage their 
patients. 
 
Participant: But I use them. I don't really see them as being that valuable. 
Although I did go to a talk by [name] saying that they did pick up, so they were 
slightly discriminating. But I don't monitor my treatment on them so I wouldn't do 
one at baseline and then, six months later, do a follow-up one, particularly. 
Because I've found there are other ways of monitoring the treatment, you know, 
talking to the patient and asking them how they're feeling. I've monitored the 
treatment that way more. So I suppose they're a little bit irksome. (GP12 – female, 
11 years experience) 
 
Participant: One that just springs to mind, just because I was doing it this 
morning, was speaking to someone who's horribly depressed. Then the idea of 
having to bring a questionnaire into -- I tend to ask them the questions and then fill 
out the questionnaire after. So I suppose a lot of it doesn't seem directly related to 
what we've seen, like your instinct that was important as a doctor. (GP51– female, 
2.5 years experience) 
Despite many disliking the tools they still felt that they had to use them (in some way) in 
order to fulfil QOF requirements.  One participant however bucked this trend and 
described herself as a ‘conscientious objector’ to their use and routinely refused to use 
them.  She reasoned however that she was only able to do this as she had previously been 
a partner in the practice and that her abstinence did not actually cost the practice overall a 
great deal financially. 
 
Participant:  Absolutely not under no circumstances will I ever use the screening 
tools. [laughs] 
SCS:  Does that cause any issues? 
Participant:  Yeah it does, particularly me being salaried. It's an instance where 
being salaried is more complicated because if I were a partner I would persuade 
my partners as a practice to have a policy that we wouldn't use them because I 
think they are positively detrimental. I think they can actually interfere with the 
way you manage patients with depression. Being salaried, I have to make my case 
and periodically say, "Well I'm not just doing it."  And at the end of the year 
luckily the amount of money attached to the screening questionnaires is not very 
big. (GP30 – female, 18 years experience) 
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6.6 Summary 
The views and experiences of this group of GPs largely reflected those of the GP 
principals, with regards to the perceived gains and losses resulting from QOF, particularly 
the impact on quality of patient care and the impact on the consultation.  This reflects the 
fact that regardless of status or clinical experience, GPs share a common professional 
ideology underpinned by their professional training as well as the fact that the common 
substantive aspect to their work is face-to-face patient care.  However, despite the broad 
congruence between the accounts of the two groups of GPs, this group reflected that really 
only GP principals were the immediate and direct beneficiaries of the new contract.  In 
particular, the perceived pay disparity created an impression of ‘two-tierism’ within the 
profession.  Furthermore, the contract had led to a situation where it was increasingly 
difficult for this group of GPs to move up a tier as their GP principal counterparts were 
not offering partnerships.  The level of resentment around this situation was somewhat 
contingent on the personal circumstances of the salaried GP, but in the long-term it 
appeared to create the potential for increased tensions between members of the profession. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Large scale quantitative studies constitute the majority of the empirical research regarding 
the nGMS contract and specifically the impact of QOF on general practice.  Studies have 
focused on associations between target achievement levels and, for example practice 
traits292-294 or individual diseases.295  Such studies however tell us little in relation to how 
achievement levels have been attained, why targets are pursued and any unintended 
consequences of the P4P scheme. Qualitative studies such as this allow us to examine and 
answer such questions by revealing some of the underlying complexities.  The findings 
outlined in the two previous chapters illustrate some of these complexities.  They suggest 
that the perceived impact of the nGMS contract, and in particular QOF, on the work of 
GPs was variable and complex.  Despite this, there were many common findings between 
the two groups of GPs particularly in relation to the perceived impact of QOF, and in 
many cases these reflect but also supplement the existing empirical literature.  There were 
some differences in views between the two groups regarding the broader contractual (i.e. 
non-QOF specific) benefits and losses. Such findings add to a small number of post-
contractual change studies which have placed a focus on the differences between GPs.   
 
In this chapter, I examine the available existing empirical literature on the impact of the 
nGMS contract in combination with my findings and in relation to my chosen theoretical 
framework.  For ease of presentation and understanding, I discuss the combined evidence 
within each individual aspect of Michael Lipsky’s SLB framework as outlined in chapter 
3.  I end the discussion by providing a judgement as to the continuing applicability and 
usefulness of Lipsky’s work to GPs, as well considering my study’s strengths and 
weaknesses before providing some overall concluding comments.  
 
7.2 Discretion and Policy Making 
In chapter 3, I described how discretion is at the heart of Lipsky’s work and as a result has 
received the most attention by analysts seeking to apply and test the framework in other 
UK professional contexts.  Accordingly, this sub-section forms the largest portion of my 
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discussion.   This reflects the fact that many of the nGMS and QOF associated changes 
reported in the existing empirical literature (outlined in chapters 2 and 3) suggested that 
discretion was an aspect of GP work that was subject to significant change.  In line with 
recent developments in SLB theory, I have moved away from the broad concept of 
‘professional discretion’ employed in the only study to have assessed the issue of post-
QOF GP discretion directly.146 Furthermore, I assess the issues and impact of both 
multiple accountability and ICT on GP discretion. Consequently I am able to provide a 
more nuanced view of GP discretion and illustrate how various post-QOF factors can act 
to constrain certain aspects of discretion whilst leaving others virtually intact.  The extent 
of QOF’s impact on GP discretion is somewhat contingent on the approaches taken by the 
individual GP and/or their practices.  This reflects the mixed evidence on GP discretion 
reported in the literature. I start with a re-cap of the factors cited by Lipsky as giving rise 
to the ‘substantial discretion’ SLBs are seen to have. 
 
Lipsky posits that SLB discretion arises as a result of: 1) the complex nature (and subject) 
of their work, which is too complicated to reduce to ‘programmatic formats’ and 2) a lack 
of capability to scrutinise SLB work which is normally conducted in private.  However, as 
I outlined in chapter 3, both of these conditions have somewhat changed over time within 
public services more widely as well as in general practice.  To briefly re-cap, the EBP 
approach to medical knowledge has become prevalent and this has seemingly led to 
changing views and attitudes within medicine more widely.  It seems to be accepted that a 
portion of medical professional knowledge can be reduced to various sets of accepted 
rules for the measurement and standardisation of professional practice.  General practice is 
no exception, as there has been an increasing acceptance that quality of care can be 
defined and measured.77 Ultimately this acceptance and drive to improve quality has led to 
the development of QOF.   Secondly, post-contractual research has identified convergent 
organisational changes within practices that would appear to make it easier to scrutinise 
and direct GP work, specifically the emergence and widespread presence of QOF leads or 
QOF teams.165;153  Although my findings and the existing empirical evidence indicate that 
the exact form of these ‘teams’ varies at the local level,52,153 they all have a common 
function.  QOF leads/teams are charged with supervising and directing QOF-related work 
of their practice colleagues.  They do so by utilising the new performance monitoring 
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capabilities provided by the ICT systems.153 This new level of scrutiny means that 
clinician-patient interactions, traditionally beyond the gaze of outsiders, have been opened 
up to scrutiny and to influence by others.296   I return to this development later in this sub-
section as it has significant implications and warrants a more detailed discussion.  For now 
the salient point is that aspects of GP work are now visible and open to scrutiny from 
others. Despite these changes, the only post-QOF study to assess the issue of GP 
discretion directly, found that GPs did not perceive the contract and associated changes as 
stifling their discretion.146  This conclusion is also reflected in my findings as many 
participants who had been in practice prior to 2004, claimed a scenario of ‘no change’ for 
a variety of reasons.  However, as I go on to outline, it is also clear that in comparison to 
working under the old GMS contract, GP discretion has been affected and continues to be 
so as the contract evolves.   
 
7.2.1 Post-QOF: A scenario of ‘no change’ 
Participants’ cited various reasons to support their claims of ‘no change.’ Firstly, many 
GPs reported that they had already been practising in an evidence-based manner i.e. they 
claimed to be providing the levels of care required by the initial version of QOF and that 
the main impact of QOF was simply the formalisation (recording) of this work.cf.157 Other 
empirical research also reported that GPs made similar claims,158 and is supported by 
quantitative evidence which suggest that the introduction of QOF only led to a short-term 
boost in the rate of quality improvement for some included conditions.167,212  The authors 
of these quantitative studies suggest that the limited impact of QOF on quality, may be 
due to various reasons including the fact the conditions assessed had all been subject to 
various pre-QOF quality of care improvement efforts (e.g. NSFs).167  Therefore even 
though the introduction of QOF represented another set of ‘rules’ to work within and 
towards, GPs already appeared to be aligned behind the goal of quality improvement.  
Indeed, early empirical research on QOF conducted in 2005-6 suggested that professional 
priorities were aligned with the clinical targets contained within in the 2004 version of 
QOF.153  Despite the passage of time, my findings also suggest that GPs are still aligned 
behind the majority of the clinical content of QOF and view it as leading to improved 
and/or standardised care for their patient populations.  The evidence would so far suggest 
therefore that value discretion has remained intact. 
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Secondly, GPs reported that it was practice nurses, not they, who were doing the majority 
of the determinate (or low discretion) QOF-related template work.  GPs perceived nurses 
as the most ‘appropriate’ practitioners for this.  This resonates with research which 
suggested that pre-QOF, general practice was undergoing a transformation due to a re-
distribution of work via a ‘hierarchy of appropriateness’156 in which, prior to 2004, those 
further down the clinical hierarchy were increasingly doing work previously considered to 
be medical.  Similarly, some of my participants reported that their PNs had (prior to 2004) 
already been doing the CDM work for many of the conditions included in QOF.  Other 
GPs however spoke of how the introduction of QOF had led to altered roles and 
responsibilities within their practices. They reported that post-2004 PNs were now doing 
work previously conducted by GPs.  In some cases, this also instigated a further shift, with 
former ‘nurse work’ being delegated downwards to HCAs, many of whom had been 
recruited specifically with this transfer in mind.  The newly widespread use of 
standardised electronic templates had seemingly aided this shift, as these templates 
provide a clear outline of the tasks required for chronic disease patients. PNs were 
perceived by GPs to be better suited or more ‘appropriate’ to the routine task work 
required by the templates and felt that PNs were less likely to deviate from them than 
GPs.v  As a result of these shifts, participants described that they were now free (or freer) 
to deal with the more complex/indeterminate work for which they perceived their GP 
training and skills (e.g. in diagnosis) more suited. Taken together, these findings support 
the existing empirical evidence which indicates that QOF has accelerated the trend for 
nurses to be the front-line providers of chronic disease care for the included 
conditions.52,153,157-159  As a result, it appears that the task discretion of PNs and not GPs 
has been most significantly impacted.  Research regarding the impact of QOF on nurses 
supports this, stating that templates were perceived to be ‘particularly constraining by 
PNs, who had less discretion than the doctors over their use.’153(p1358) 
 
Thirdly, various commentators raised concerns about QOF-approach, specifically  fearing 
that it would lead to the mechanisation of care provision.297,298 Early empirical work 
                                                 
v An added benefit of this arrangement for GP principals, (one which largely unspoken, but alluded to) was 
that this increased the likelihood of meeting their QOF targets.   
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reported that whilst these concerns may exist, GPs felt that their own personal practices 
were not reflective of a ‘Fordist’ or production line approach.153  This view was also 
prominent in my findings.  GPs reported that QOF rules were not simply mechanistically 
applied to all patients, but that there was a continued need to interpret the guidelines for 
each individual patient.  They described discretion in choosing which set of guidelines to 
follow, as well as the fact that not all patients were eligible for certain QOF targets.  
Furthermore, the inclusion of the exception reporting facility exemplifies that QOF ‘rules’ 
are not intended to be applied in such a way and its inclusion was to allow professional 
judgement to continue to be excerised.299  Indeed, GPs in my sample viewed exception 
reporting as an important mechanism to ensure that the rules set out on QOF were not 
strictly followed in all cases.  They also perceived that exception reporting served to 
decrease the likelihood of the over-medicalisation of certain patients or patient groups 
(e.g. the elderly).w  Therefore, GPs perceived that there was still space within the rules for 
discretion to operate in.  This reflects the idea that discretion is a relative concept, and 
highlights that post-QOF both ‘weak discretion’ or ‘rule discretion’ remains in 
operation.236  
 
Fourthly, it appears that GPs still feel that they have wide task discretion within their 
consultations.  Prior empirical research described how on accessing a patient’s record, the 
ICT systems generate pop-up boxes to attract the attention of the clinician to highlight any 
missing QOF data.150  Clinicians are however, able to dismiss these pop-up boxes and do 
not have to enter the information.150  Therefore the system is built to allow user discretion. 
As existing evidence suggests, GPs utilise this capability and their discretion to respond 
‘flexibly’ to the needs of QOF within the consultations.146  This was also reflected in my 
findings, as all participants described being able to choose when and if to attend to QOF 
in their consultations. As a result, GPs in my study and elsewhere158 felt that they were 
able maintain claims to a holistic approach to care.  Furthermore, even though QOF 
templates are designed to be used in a uniform way, participants described various 
approaches to their use, particularly in relation to areas they personally disliked e.g. many 
found their own ways of using the templates.   
                                                 
w Specifically, it has been suggested that the failure to make an allowance for age in QOF means that 
doctors are ‘encouraged to over-treat hypertension’ in elderly patients who are then at increased risk of 
fractures arising from falls.297 
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Lastly, my findings support existing empirical evidence which suggests that some GPs 
perceived the templates as helpful aide-memoires which facilitate the completion of 
required tasks.296   
 
7.2.2 Post QOF: ‘no change’ but… 
Thus far the evidence presented would suggest that GP discretion has been largely 
unaffected by the contractual change in 2004.  However, it was also clear from the 
empirical evidence and my data that GP discretion had been affected in comparison to 
working under the old GMS contract.x  Furthermore, GPs are over-time increasingly 
doing work that is not in line with their personal and/or professional opinions.158  
Specifically, it appears that both task and value discretion have been somewhat affected 
by the introduction of QOF. 
 
7.2.2.1 Post-QOF: ‘no change’ but extra work required 
Given my participants’ own claims of ‘no change,’ any quality improvements were 
suggested to have occurred as a result of ‘other’ practices/practitioners now being 
motivated (by the financial incentives) to work in a ‘quality’ manner.   However, during 
their accounts GPs often made reference to areas where changes had occurred in their own 
practices, both at a practice and consultation level.  For example at the practice level, GPs 
spoke of how the new ICT systems meant that they were increasingly re-calling patients.  
As GP6 put it, prior to QOF “if people had diabetes and they didn't turn up, we often 
didn't chase them.” Furthermore, both the existing evidence147,157 and my findings suggest 
that overall, they and their practices were now doing more clinical work in terms of 
monitoring which in some cases resulted in the recruitment of additional clinical staff.  
 
7.2.2.2 Post-QOF: the impact on discretion within the consultation 
The evidence presented earlier indicated that many GPs felt that the impact on the 
consultation was minimal (limited to simply recording QOF data).  However, both prior 
                                                 
x A few of the most experienced GPs noted a particularly difference under QOF, however some also felt 
freer from the pursuit of QOF targets as they were nearing retirement and were financially secure. All in all 
there was no apparent relationship between experience and discretion for those who had pre-2004 
experience. 
 
 208
evidence and my findings suggest that this was not necessarily the case.  The introduction 
of QOF appears to have influenced the GP agenda within the consultation.158  As I show 
this has impacted on both task and value discretion.  
 
In order to provide some context for the impact of QOF on their consultations, I asked 
GPs about their pre-QOF and/or non-QOF consultations.  Participants suggested that by 
comparison, these consultations were less pressured and more holistic than their current 
‘typical’ QOF related consultations.  The major reason for this perception was the fact that 
the vast majority of participants reported that they still had their pre-2004 appointment 
lengths of ten-minutes and as GP57 put it, the majority had ‘no option’ but to somehow 
‘fit’ QOF in.  A small number (n=3, practice ID13) did report lengthening their 
consultations (by 2-3 minutes), partly to accommodate the new work.  Although much of 
this new work may have been restricted to recording existing activities, GPs are now also 
regularly conducting ‘new work’ within their consultations e.g. routine use of depression 
tools.  Therefore, ultimately GP task discretion has been somewhat reduced within 
consultations.  The underlying and common factor of limited time appears to be central to 
the ability of GPs to exercise task discretion and as I now illustrate, can also impact on a 
GP’s ability to exert value discretion. 
 
GPs in my sample felt that QOF represented ‘another agenda’ in the consultation and one 
which seeks to prioritise the agenda of the practice.y  Some felt that the presence of this 
other ‘agenda’ in the consultation created tensions or as one GP put it, ‘discomfort’ for 
them.  This appeared to arise from the differing priorities that professional training and 
QOF represented.  Participants described how their professional training required them to 
elicit and concentrate on the patient’s agenda i.e. to primarily establish and address the 
presenting patient and their needs holistically.   However, as noted above  and  reported in 
previous research, concerns surround QOF’s ability to undermine holistic care.158,298  Not 
only does the mere presence of QOF make providing holistic care more difficult in 
principle, but the ICT systems are designed to attract,150 (or as GPs perceive, 
distract)157,158 their attention to strictly biomedical tasks.  Regardless of the fact that QOF 
was now perceived to be a routine feature of  daily work, many GPs still described the 
                                                 
y The notion of ‘agendas’ was spontaneously used by GPs in my sample and elsewhere.158 
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occurrence of these tensions due to the unpredictable nature of consultations, i.e. what will 
the patient present with and will it be ‘appropriate’ to introduce QOF.  In particular, when 
patient and QOF agendas were not aligned and/or conflicting,158 it caused a new source of 
dilemma i.e. when or if to address QOF. Participants appeared to adopt various strategies 
(some reserved for specific times) in order to deal with these tensions. Whereas some 
strategies (e.g. responding flexibly or asking the patient to re-attend if they could not fulfil 
all QOF requirements in one visit) allow GPs to continue to exert their value discretion, 
other responses acted to reduce it.  An example of this was that some GPs reported being 
or becoming ‘QOF-focused’ over time, whilst others spoke of their own experiences as a 
post-QOF patient i.e. they had received this type of care.  Although this was not the way 
that they wished to practice, it appeared to be a practical solution i.e. it was seemingly the 
only way they could process all the required work on a daily basis.  Others reported that 
this form of practice was limited to certain pressurised time-points (e.g. QOF year-end).   
 
The combination of the factors discussed thus far i.e. limited time, competing agendas and 
a distracting ICT system meant that participants felt that, post-2004, time for other aspects 
of care was reduced, specifically non-clinical aspects of care such as interpersonal care.  
In other words it seems that something has had to give, and as my findings and both prior- 
and post-contractual research suggests,157,300 it appears to be the ‘softer,’ non-clinical 
aspects.  However, these form a central aspect of the espoused GP role and were valued as 
enjoyable by my participants and a major reason for choosing their career in general 
practice.  Furthermore, these softer and largely non-incentivisedz aspects of care are 
important for several reasons.  First, interpersonal care is consistently reported by patients 
as a key skill for physicians to hold and they place a high priority (alongside technical 
competence) on it.301-305  Secondly, most patient complaints centre around issues with 
doctors’ manner, attitude and/or communication skills.306-308 Thirdly, communication 
skills are central to elements of effective clinical practice such as diagnosis,309 and have 
been shown to impact on certain health outcomes.310  Finally, interpersonal care forms a 
key part of an accepted definition of quality of care in primary care224 but as many of my 
                                                 
z The patient survey which is now incentivised, does include assessments relating to interpersonal care, 
however participants did not appear to place much importance on the results of these surveys.  
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participants and the literature highlight, QOF is unable to measure the quality of this 
important aspect of their work. 
 
7.2.2.3 Why are GPs doing work not in line with their values? 
Even though many GPs in my sample broadly supported the overall goals and content of 
QOF, there were certain areas that were disliked or not considered legitimate for their 
role.  Nonetheless, participants reported that these areas were being pursued and targets 
were seemingly being met. This resonates with earlier research which also identified that 
GPs questioned the relevance of the indicators introduced in 2006, stating that they were 
‘not a family [general practice] practice way of doing things.’158(p232) Regardless of this 
view, the GPs in this study were apparently intent on meeting the targets anyway.158  I 
now outline various reasons for this behaviour, some of which are specifically related to 
GP status. 
 
First, some research suggests that QOF is becoming ‘synonymous with quality.’164 Such a 
statement is supported by those GPs in my sample who felt that QOF and the availability 
of QOF scores allowed their practice (and more widely their profession) to demonstrate 
that they were providing a good service.  Therefore despite any personal reservations 
individual GPs may hold, they may feel a pressure to maintain high QOF scores in order 
to be seen as providing ‘quality’ care.  Secondly, and on a related theme, my findings in 
line with other research,158 highlight the competitive nature of GPs.  Practice-level QOF 
scores are publicly available, and allow GPs to compare and contrast their practice 
performance with neighbouring practices.  Many had become accustomed to achieving 
full QOF points and it is possible that they wanted to maintain these high standards.  
Furthermore, it is possible that this competitive edge also led some GPs to criticise other 
GP(s) practices who they suspected had achieved high scores by at best, tick box medicine 
and at worst fraud.    
 
Thirdly, for some GPs their personal experience of working with QOF appears to have 
influenced their attitudes and behaviours towards aspects of QOF.  For instance, although 
many GPs in my sample disliked the requirement to routinely use depression severity 
measurement tools, a small number found that their patients actually liked the tools. 
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Consequently, the attitudes of these GPs towards the use of these tools appeared to 
change, seeing them in a more favourable light. Therefore they accepted a reduction in 
their personal discretion, as it appeared to benefit their patients. Prior research also 
indicated that professional and patient views on the use of such tools were divergent.311  
As in my sample, the GPs in this study felt that a focus on depression was required, 
however they did not agree with the method they were being asked to use or even that it 
was necessary.  Many felt that they possessed the necessary knowledge to manage and 
diagnose depression and therefore did not require any external aids.  In contrast to GPs, 
patient views on the tools were mostly positive with many reporting that the tool offered 
opportunity for self-reflection and/or a way to monitor their progress.311   
 
Finally, participants cited various ‘pressures’ which influenced their behaviour and 
discretion with regards to complying with QOF targets, particularly those they considered 
controversial or disliked.  The source of pressure to comply was however not the same for 
all GPs and many appear to be related to their status.  One common source of pressure for 
all GPs however arose from the widespread presence of QOF teams/surveillance. I now 
provide a more extended discussion of the form and functions of these teams and thereby 
support and extend the evidence beyond that currently available. 
 
7.2.2.4 QOF teams and surveillance: reduced discretion is the new norm  
As highlighted previously, early research identified the formation and presence of QOF 
teams and/or leads.153  All participants in my sample also reported the post-2004 formation 
and continued presence of QOF teams and/or QOF leads in their practices. Participants 
described how, prior to or early on in the implementation period of the contract, 
discussions had taken place in order to ascertain how best to organise their efforts towards 
meeting QOF targets.   In each case, the outcome of these discussions appeared to result in 
a division of responsibility amongst practice staff, with participants now occupying one of 
three informal ‘positions’ within a new form of hierarchy 1) overall QOF lead, 2) partial 
QOF lead and 3) ‘non-lead’. As reported elsewhere,52 there was little competition between 
GPs for lead roles, especially overall lead roles, despite (in some cases) the provision of 
some additional protected time.  This echoes research which also suggests that GPs were 
content to let other colleagues take responsibility for the delivery of the targets.296 GP 
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reluctance to take up these roles appears to relate to the perceived time and administrative 
intensive nature of the roleaa and supports findings which suggest that voluntarism (by 
those possessing certain suitable managerial skills or traits) is a key factor in their 
‘appointment.’52  
 
Reflecting the findings of prior research,52,165 GP principals in my study were the most 
likely to hold a lead rolebb and/or form part of a QOF team with salaried GPs primarily 
designated as non-leads. The empirical evidence also indicated that some salaried GPs 
held partial lead responsibilities,164 and this was also the case in my sample (n=3).  
However, one salaried GP in the APMS practice (where everyone is salaried) held overall 
lead responsibilities.cc  In addition, some participants also reported that practice nurses 
held partial lead roles in their practice and supports prior findings that QOF leads may be 
drawn from and ‘cut across traditional clinical and administrative hierarchies.’52(p243) 
Regardless of the form that QOF ‘team’ may take, their common purpose and focus is to 
ensure that the practice meets its QOF targets. Members of these teams possessed the most 
knowledge and control regarding QOF content and ICT systems, confirming the 
suggestion that decision-making and managerial power within practices has become more 
concentrated.52,165   In particular, overall leads appeared to hold the greatest decision 
making capacity by managing the activity of other practitioners within their practice.  Due 
to their role as information/data leads they are directly able to control the ICT systems, 
changes they instigate are filtered down to all other practitioners whom are expected to 
adapt their practices accordingly.  The relative power of those who control the ICT 
systems was also reported in a small ethnographic study (n=2 practices) conducted early 
in the lifetime of the contract.166  My findings highlight that this phenomenon is 
widespread and illustrates that those who control the content of the ICT systems are in 
control of the ‘information process’ surrounding QOF.   
 
In addition to varying ‘levels’ of leads (e.g. overall and partial), there were also 
differences amongst apparently ‘equivalent’ leads, in particular those holding partial lead 
                                                 
aa The burden of the role was becoming more apparent over time, hence the designation of QOF deputies 
identified in R2 interviews. 
bb In a small number of cases, practice managers acted as overall QOF leads on behalf of their GPs. 
cc Thus far I have seen no evidence regarding the internal organisation of APMS practices in relation to QOF 
and there I an unaware of whether this is usual or not.   
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roles.  Whereas, some partial leads simply oversaw the work of their salaried staff 
working in their area of QOF (directing nurses activity towards targets), others conducted 
the bulk of the target work within their area(s) themselves.  This was particularly the case 
for the three salaried partial leads.  Whereas one had volunteered for the role (in the initial 
hope of monetary gains), the other two had been delegated their areas of responsibility by 
their overall QOF lead. For example in the case of GP10 her overall lead (GP2) 
designated her partial lead responsibilities to ‘encourage’ her to focus on QOF targets.  
Regardless of how these salaried GPs came to hold their area of QOF responsibility, they 
all appear to have been co-opted, by their GP principals, into the pursuit of the 
organisational targets without receiving any immediate or direct benefits (e.g. a financial 
bonus).   
 
Regardless of a GP’s position in the hierarchy (principal, salaried, lead, non-lead etc), all 
participants were aware of the possibility of scrutinydd and reported how their lead(s) 
adopted various tactics or ‘control strategies’ in order to enhance the likelihood of the 
practice meeting QOF targets. For the vast majority, these largely consisted of 
comparisons of individual practitioner performance at practice meetings, with some leads 
adopting more punitive strategies (e.g. ‘name and shame’) than others.  Many participants 
regarded the achievement of QOF as requiring a team activity and recognised that their 
individual actions (or rather lack of), increasingly impacted directly upon their practice’s 
income and for GP principals their personal income.  In other words, post-QOF they are 
now experiencing a greater level of ‘horizontal accountability’ with their practice 
colleagues and peers.238  This development appears to contribute to a willingness by 
individual GPs to accept scrutiny by other practice members and even the shame of being 
‘publicly’ chastised for being the one seen as letting the side down by ‘not pulling their 
weight.’  In other words, many wished to avoid being seen as the deviant case or 
‘outsider’ within their organisations.312  In addition to these ‘soft’ or social sanctions, a 
small number of GP principals (n=8) within one practice (ID22) were liable to ‘harder’ 
financial sanctions as a result of their new partnership agreement. Whilst the presence of 
soft sanctions has already been reported in the empirical literature,146,153 the development 
of such ‘hard’ sanctions has not.  In this case, the GPs reported that the suggestion of 
                                                 
dd Which as my findings indicate may be overt or covert. 
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clearly defining responsibilities and liability for under-performing originated from their 
lawyers.  The decision to turn this suggestion into an actual feature of their partnership 
agreement indicates a move away from trust to the formalisation of accountability, 
specifically horizontal accountability, at least for this practice. 
 
For the majority of GPs, the post-QOF formation of internal surveillance mechanisms 
appeared to enhance the likelihood of the majority of practitioners complying with QOF 
targets, including ‘controversial’ targets such as the depression indicators.  In line with 
previous evidence derived from a small number of case studies, the level of surveillance  
appears to vary more widely and impact upon the level of GP discretion.296 Most 
participants spoke of weekly performance assessments, held in practice meetings.  For a 
small number of GPs in my sample, the level of surveillance was particularly high and left 
little room to avoid the targets.  For instance, the two salaried GPs who had also been 
trainees within their current practice had particularly high levels of (daily) scrutiny.  
However, rather than perceiving this as controlling, they both felt that it was legitimate 
and beneficial both to patient care and to their continued learning.  In contrast, the GP in 
the APMS practice regarded the level of surveillance she was under as extremely close 
and that it invaded her ‘privacy.’  In addition, this scrutiny differed as it was external to 
the practice and outside the profession (the scrutinizers were non-clinicians from head-
office interested in managing her tasks).   This type of surveillance may be perceived as 
less valid than the primarily peer led type seen in traditional partner-run practices.  Indeed 
when I asked salaried GPs about the notion of working for a private provider, many 
highlighted the issue of scrutiny by non-professional managers as being problematic.  
They perceived that non-clinicians priorities would differ as well as questioning their 
ability to judge ‘professional’ decisions and therefore scrutiny by non-professionals was 
not considered desirable or legitimate. 
 
The preceding evidence illustrates that internal surveillance and critical appraisal in 
relation to QOF performance by QOF leads/teams appears is a widespread phenomenon.  
In addition, GPs appear to consider these developments as legitimate and necessary to 
ensure that practices meet their QOF targets.  My findings therefore lend weight to the 
suggestion that new professional norms may be emerging in general practice.164  Such 
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claims have been supported by contrasting how traditional professional norms act not only 
to promote the notion/image of collegiality and equality amongst the medical profession 
but also to restrict the propensity for peer criticism.  Furthermore, the new informal 
hierarchies, and the creation of QOF teams has been suggested to represent a new stratum 
within the profession, leading to a type of professional ‘re-stratification.’164   The 
emergence of new professional norms was not anticipated by Freidson313, who predicted 
that re-stratification within the medical profession would lead to ‘cleavage and friction.’ 
The collective evidence suggests that has not occurred in general practice due to the 
development of ‘new norms’ which have ameliorated the occurrence of a consequential 
split within the profession.164  My findings suggest however that the nGMS has created a 
situation whereby cleavage and friction are more likely to occur in the future between 
those GPs who are employers and those who are employees.  Furthermore, this section 
also highlights some of the status specific sources of pressure that act to constrain an 
individual GP’s discretion. 
 
7.2.2.5 Status specific pressures: leading to the control of, and increasing divisions 
within the profession 
Prior to the introduction of nGMS, non-principal, ‘early-career’ GPs were reported as 
having high job satisfaction and discretion in terms of the type of work they did.  
Specifically these GPs felt they were doing what they considered to be ‘nice-work’ in 
contrast to their GP principals who conducted the ‘unrewarding’ or ‘burdensome’ work.232  
In contrast, recent post-nGMS research indicates a very different situation.230,231 The 
findings of these later studies reports salaried GPs as doing the unrewarding work and 
being treated as second-class citizens within what they now regarded as a two-tier 
profession.230,231  It appears therefore that there may also a second form of stratification 
occurring within the profession, with the nGMS creating a reversal of the situation 
between the two groups of GPs, i.e. new ‘winners and losers.’  However, as I show, even 
the winners have new difficulties to deal with. 
 
Participants in my sample agreed that the 2004 version of nGMS was overall a good 
package deal, offering the profession increased monies and flexibility to have a better 
work/life balance.  However, it seems that GP principals have primarily been the direct 
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beneficiaries.  First, they had on average been in practice much longer than the salaried 
GPs and had worked under a variety of older out-of-hours schemes, which some described 
as ‘unsustainable.’  Secondly, the area that caused most consternation was the issue of 
pay. Equity theory suggests that individuals will compare their inputs or efforts and 
associated rewards with others around them, perceiving themselves as being treated fairly 
if the ratio of inputs to rewards is equivalent to those around them.314  GP principals had, 
as a result of QOF monies, received large pay rises, creating an acknowledged large pay 
differential between the two groups of GPs.  In accordance with equity theory, this led to a 
perception of inequality.  This subsequently led some to perceive that general practice was 
now a hierarchical profession, with salaried GPs forming the ‘under-tier.’ Some salaried 
GPs were resentful of the situation, reasoning that the substantive portion of their daily 
work (i.e. conducting patient consultations) was largely comparable to GP principals.  
Others however, felt that they were fairly rewarded, reasoning that GP principals were 
under greater pressures and/or had greater responsibilities.  Finally, of those that had 
actively chosen a salaried role, some were pragmatic, stating that they knew the 
implications of their choice and for others these implications were worth less than the 
ability to have a ‘portfolio career.’232  
 
Despite the differences in pay, salaried GPs felt that they were fairly treated by their 
employers and were not merely left doing their GP principals ‘dirty work.’cf.230 They also 
reported an environment of equality within their practice, citing inclusive practice 
meetings.ee However, it was clear that some saw their current salaried post as temporary 
or as an apprenticeship, and that eventually the desire to gain increased control would 
mean that they would seek a partnership.  However, the future outlook appeared to 
suggest that this was becoming increasingly unlikely as the market demands have 
changed.  
 
Whereas prior to 2004, the employment market meant that salaried GPs could pick and 
choose the kind of work they wished to undertake,232 post-2004 it seems that this is less 
likely.  Salaried GPs hoped the current situation of limited opportunities for partnership 
                                                 
ee In a small number of cases salaried GPs did not work on the days when practice meetings were held and 
felt more excluded.  This is akin to reported feelings of exclusion/isolation reported elsewhere.231 
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was temporary. However, it was clear that many were working in the prospect of gaining 
an opportunity in their current practice and includes the pursuit of areas they personally 
disliked.  In other words, by complying with all of QOF (even disliked areas) these GPs 
were subordinating their personal preferences for their career aspirations. Such factors 
illustrate Lipsky’s view of how the behaviour of SLBs and conforming to goals, reflects 
the available sanctions and incentives, as for some salaried GPs the prospect of gaining a 
partnership was the ultimate incentive.  This is not to say that only those salaried GPs who 
wished to become a partner complied with all of the targets.  Some appeared to do so as 
they perceived that as employees of their organisations, they were obliged to comply with 
all of the organisation’s QOF targets.  Others appeared to do so out of a sense of 
organisational loyalty arising from the fact that they had been trained and socialised in 
their current practices, which led some to say they did things ‘just like a partner.’  Only a 
small number of salaried GPs suggested that they did not routinely attend to QOF and 
reasoned that this was acceptable as their GP principals were primarily responsible for 
delivering QOF.  Only one GP (GP30) stated that she overtly did not comply with some of 
QOF, specifically the depression indicators.  However, this case was unusual, as she had a 
long established personal friendship with the practice owner as well as previously being a 
partner in the practice.     
 
The relative dearth of available partnerships appears unlikely to change. The accounts of 
GP principals were peppered with discussions of financial pressures and combined with a 
perception of uncertainty regarding the future outlook of funding, seemingly means that 
GP principals are closing ranks.  The available data shows that they are increasingly 
choosing to employ fellow GPs as opposed to making them an equitable partner.315  GPs 
principals cited various sources of financial pressures which led to such decisions.  In 
order to meet QOF targets, participants here as in the practices included in the early 
ethnographic studies,147 reported additional investments in their practices in terms of 
staffing numbers, training or increased hours.  Even for those who had not made such 
investments, there is the issue of rising expenses (e.g. cost of living increases for staff 
wages) year on year or simply the desire to maintain their personal income levels.  Recent 
evidence in fact highlights that income levels are falling as the proportion of practice 
income GPs had to re-invest in their practices reached a recent record of over 62%.316   In 
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addition, they were in effect being asked to achieve more over time (targets tightening, 
extended access DES etc) but with fewer financial resources being made available due to 
a lack of increase in the global sum.   
 
All in all, the preceding discussion highlights that GP principals are foregoing a degree of 
discretion in order to make financial gains or at least to maintain their financial status quo.  
They appear to be on a ‘contractual treadmill’ or as has been described elsewhere, they 
had limited opportunities to resist or disengage from the contractff due to their 
responsibility to maintain practice income (and their profit shares).213  The post-QOF 
perceived pressures and responses of GP principals reflect the limitations outlined at the 
end of chapter 3 in applying the SLB framework to GP principals.  To re-cap it was 
suggested that they should be seen as an SLB/manager ‘hybrid’ due to their dual status as 
workers in, and owners of the business. The presence of QOF appears to have magnified 
the managerial and the entrepreneurial aspect of their roles.  In addition, their personal 
(income) objectives and organisational objectives are strongly aligned and they are 
therefore increasingly ‘results oriented.’  However, as I now highlight, even this picture is 
too simplistic as it appears that even amongst GP principals, there are some that are more 
results oriented and concerned with performance than others, specifically QOF leads. 
   
As described earlier, these arrangements varied within practices, in terms of the structure 
and types of practitioners holding the lead roles, with overall leads holding the most 
influence over other practitioners and most closely resembling managers in Lipskian 
terms. This complexity lends weight to the suggestion for a more nuanced approach to the 
issue of management in modern public services versus the simple distinction Lipsky 
makes between managers and SLBs.234  However, the difficulty in general practice 
remains the fact that GP principals are owners of their organisations.  This is exemplified 
by the fact that as I identified in some cases, GP principals are ‘allowed’ to be somewhat 
disengaged from the pursuit of QOF targets and that salaried leads are not necessarily able 
to affect the activity of their GP principals.  Both occurrences are related to the position of 
                                                 
ff Only 2 GPs from one practice (ID12) reported that they were not pursuing all of QOF targets as they did 
not consider some of them to be evidence-based.  They were prepared to sacrifice income to work in a 
manner aligned with their professional views.  In addition, they were financially secure as they both also 
held other income-providing roles. 
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authority inherent to a GP principal.  In other words, the informal and formal hierarchies 
can conflict, and in some cases the formal hierarchy wins out. Furthermore, it seems that 
although tensions between practitioners can exist,146 (due to QOF non-compliance/’free-
riding’) it appears to be limited in its extent.296  Where tensions do exist, there appear to 
be various factors that can prevent them from surfacing and spoiling otherwise established 
and successful working relationships/partnerships.  For example, as one GP principal 
(GP14) put it when discussing the relative under-performance of some colleagues, ‘people 
pull their weight in different ways.’   
 
7.2.2.6 Multiple accountability: in name only? 
I have already described how QOF has increased the horizontal accountability of GPs 
within their practices and impacted upon the discretion of individual GPs.  In addition to 
this, recent theoretical work also highlighted that ‘bottom-up’ pressures are more 
prominent due to a governmental drive to promote the client’s role in the evaluation of 
service delivery.317  In general practice, the primary source of such pressures within QOF 
arises from the incentivisation of the patient-survey. It has however seemingly not been 
powerful enough to affect any significant bottom-up pressures. Prior research reported 
that the incentivisation of the patient survey was not a ‘driving force’ on practice 
services.157 My findings echo this, as GPs from only one practice (ID11) reported making 
a change in their service in relation to feedback from their patient survey, which resulted 
in longer appointments.  Most GPs were fairly apathetic to the patient survey as their 
survey results had always indicated high patient satisfaction.  This ceiling effect (i.e. a 
lack of variation in responses) is a commonly known issue with regard to patient 
satisfaction measures and therefore any further attempts to increase bottom-up pressures 
may require new levers.   
 
Finally, there is the issue of top-down accountability.  As highlighted in chapter 2, 
although QOF is voluntary, PCTs are mandated to inspect practices and assess their QOF 
data.  Despite this external scrutiny, QOF inspection visits were not considered overly 
intrusive by my participants.  This may reflect that fact GPs are routinely achieving their 
QOF targets, that the visits were not perceived as punitive in nature and/or that the 
systems were not perceived as very effective, particularly in regards to detecting 
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fraudulent activities.  In addition, other pressures stemming from the PCT in terms of 
reducing prescribing costs for example, were often not considered as a priority in 
comparison to meeting the immediate needs of their patients.  
 
Finally, Lipsky posits that enacted policy frequently does not reflect official policy.  The 
evidence presented suggests that on the surface, enacted policy does reflect official policy.  
QOF provides clear rules, GPs have developed systems in order to police themselves and 
their efforts towards the official policy rules and QOF achievement levels remain high 
across general practice.318  However, it is not GPs, but PNs who are delivering the bulk of 
the policy goals.  Furthermore there have been unintended losses in other dimensions of 
quality and presumably the government did not intend for targets to be achieved via a 
‘tick-box’ approach.  Aside from this, it is clear that within the remit of QOF, the policy 
making aspect of the GP role has been largely reduced but it is important to note that 
significant space does remain outside of QOF, not only for policy making but also the 
exercise of discretion.  This reflects the views of many GPs within my sample who saw 
QOF as representative of only a small aspect of their role. 
 
7.3 Conditions of work  
7.3.1 Scarce resources? 
The scarcity of resources perpetuated by high demand is argued as being a key factor in 
SLBs being unable to realise their high ideals within their daily work.   Lipsky argued, the 
availability of additional monies to organisations does not necessarily lead to alleviation 
or improvement in service levels as funds may be directed to the salaries of SLBs.  
Similarly, QOF was a financial boost for general practice, but according to national data, 
many GP principals awarded themselves large pay rises,169 rather than investing in their 
practices and improving/expanding services etc.  However, at a local level the degree of 
investment can vary. Empirical studies indicated that although GP principals may have 
had pay rises, some also invested in their services and staffing levels.52  My findings also 
illustrate that many GPs principals described enlarging (headcount and/or hours) or 
enhancing (via training) their staffing capacity.  Expansions to the staff complement were 
primarily at the level of administrative staff and/or the lower end of their clinical 
hierarchy and seemingly led to some alleviation of the overall burden of QOF work on 
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GPs.  Such factors may explain why surveys illustrate that the proportion of practice 
income GPs have to re-invest in their practices is increasing over time.316 
 
In terms of actual GP numbers, few reported recruiting additional GPs, only replacing 
outgoing members.  Given that the newly developed bureaucratic systems within practices 
had resulted in increased patient contacts,gg the demand for the static base number of GPs 
is in fact growing.  In addition, modelling projections in 2007 indicate a growing gap 
between demand growth and GP supply in England,319 perpetuating the issue of high 
patient demand and low GP supply. In summary, the evidence suggests that the issue of 
the relative ratio of high client numbers to GPs will be maintained for the foreseeable 
future.  
 
Another key resource is the time allowed for client-interactions.  The vast majority of 
participants (n=59)hh, still had the common pre-2004 consultation lengths of 10 minutes. 
The scarcity of time appeared to become more apparent for GPs post-QOF.  They 
described increased pressures (relative to pre-QOF or non-QOF consultations) as a result 
of attempting to accommodate the two often conflicting agendas (patient vs. QOF), which 
at times resulted in one or the other of the agendas not being attended to. In addition, even 
where GPs felt they were already doing the clinical work in QOF targets, they still related 
that time was scarcer for the other aspects of their role (e.g. interpersonal care) simply as a 
result of recording QOF data or in Lipskian terms, the ‘form-filling’ aspect of a SLBs role.  
In other words, the bureaucratic role of GPs had increased post-QOF.  However, as many 
patients now visit the practice nurse who conducts much of the form-filling for GPs, some 
GPs felt this was a better system as they actually have more time to reflect upon the PN 
collated information.  This may therefore allow GPs to make ‘better’ or less pressured 
decisions.     
 
The final resource relates to an SLB’s personal experience for the role, particularly that 
inexperience was disadvantageous.   The issue of personal experience in relation to QOF 
                                                 
gg Either as patients had multiple conditions, because appointment length are insufficient to deal with all 
requirements (patient and QOF) in one go and/or because patient attended at the ‘wrong time’ for the system 
and so they had to call them in again. 
hh The 3 missing are those in practice 13 who lengthened their consultations. 
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has not been addressed within the literature and therefore the evidence here is limited to 
my findings.  They appear to suggest that in contrast to inexperience making QOF work 
more difficult, some of the less experienced GPs suspected that ‘older’ GPs found the 
2004 transition difficult, as they would have had prior ways of working, conducting their 
consultations etc. whereas many of those in practice since 2004 had simply not known 
their work any other way. QOF templates appeared to provide a level playing field 
because experience did not come into one’s ability to follow the templates.  Furthermore, 
it may have been expected a priori, for clinical experience to be a factor in whether or not 
GPs would have a greater propensity to become QOF-focused or not.  For instance, one 
could hypothesise that GPs with the greatest pre-QOF experience would be the best placed 
to resist becoming QOF-focused or that new entrants may be socialised by their practice 
colleagues into becoming QOF-focused.  My findings suggest that experience does not 
appear to be a major factor, as GPs with varying levels spoke of resorting to being QOF 
focused either in response to busy or pressurised periods (e.g. QOF year-end) or that they 
were becoming more QOF-focused overall.   
 
7.3.2 Goal conflict? 
As highlighted in chapter 3, the introduction of QOF has the potential to create many of 
the types of goal conflict raised by Lipsky.  The first source of goal conflict stems from 
social engineering goals vs. client-centred goals. In GP terms, this can be translated into 
the population or public health approach to care embodied in QOF vs. their espoused 
focus on the individual and holistic care.  Although many GPs suggested that QOF 
represented as one GP put it ‘herd medicine’ they also related that for the most part this 
did not conflict with their focus the individual patient.  They reasoned that all guidelines 
and targets had to be adapted to the individual and (for the most part) were also to an 
individual patient’s benefit.  In other words, the two goals were not necessarily in conflict 
if one applied discretion. The only area that GPs appeared to highlight as representing 
primarily a public health or epidemiological interest, was the collection of what they 
deemed as ‘unnecessary’ population-level data (e.g. on smoking).  Of course the current 
plans to place GPs at the heart of commissioning,320 will necessitate a change to a more 
population-focused approach to care, at least for the sub-set of GPs who will be making 
the decisions on the local commissioning boards.  It will be interesting to see if any 
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conflicts arise within this sub-set or whether they filter down and feature more 
prominently in the everyday decision-making of the rank and file GP. 
  
A second and new source of goal conflict specifically associated with the introduction of 
QOF concerns the dilemmas now posed by the obvious presence of dual-agenda 
consultations, particularly when the agendas are in conflict.158  In Lipskian terms, this is 
an example of client-centred goals vs. organisational goal conflict or in this case patient-
centred goals vs. organisational goals. For some GPs this type of conflict only arose 
sporadically as they had either relatively little exposure to QOF or their QOF exposure 
was primarily limited to doing medication reviews where patients were attending 
specifically for a medication review and therefore the two agendas were aligned.  Other 
GPs however appeared to relate that this type of conflict occurred in a significant 
proportion of their consultations which were increasingly complex.ii   As I highlighted 
earlier, GPs are seemingly adopting various strategies to deal with this source of conflict, 
one of which resulted in them being/becoming QOF-focused due to the perceived 
pressures of time and workload.  In such cases, GPs are choosing the most efficient way 
for them to attend to the organisation’s goals of meeting QOF targets and process their 
patients quickly, over being patient-centred.jj  A small number appeared to resolve this 
source of conflict by reasoning that it was of clinical importance that individual patients 
had their particular QOF elements up to date i.e. that they were in fact being patient-
centred.  Such views appeared to alleviate any tensions they may have had in 
being/becoming QOF-focused.  Other GPs however, reported maintaining an approach 
reflective of their professional training by attending to QOF opportunistically i.e. when 
and/if appropriate etc, thereby also lessening this source of goal conflict.  In summary 
therefore, whereas this may be a source of tension in theory or at specific times, GPs for 
the most part are finding ways of resolving this source of conflict or do not see it as a 
conflict in the first place.   
                                                 
ii This was a major reason why the GPs in practice 13 had lengthened their appointments i.e. to be able to 
deal with both agendas more effectively. 
 
jj This is an example of ‘goal displacement’ i.e. the norm of individual patient orientation has become 
subordinate to the needs of the organisation.  This may also explain why the over-medicalisation of patients 
is reportedly occurring.   
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The final issue relates to role expectations, specifically the contradictory expectations that 
shape the SLB role from various reference groups.  GPs reported that they were in effect, 
attempting to meet the demands of three very different reference groups: the government, 
their patients and their local PCTs.  Evidence collected earlier in the lifetime of the nGMS 
contract (Nov 2005 – May 2006) also highlighted this by suggesting that GPs may be 
experiencing tensions between the dual requirements of implicit rationing (e.g. prescribing 
budgets) and the adherence to explicit rules within QOF.146  Since this period, one would 
assume that tensions may have increased as the government has chosen to tighten QOF 
targets.  My data suggests that GP principals are still feeling this tension but not to an 
extent that it affects their service. GPs related that they were striving to meet these new 
stricter targets for the benefit of their patients, whilst at the same time receiving pressure 
from their PCTs to reduce their prescribing costs.  Despite this, GPs spoke of a need to do 
their best for their patients, and effectively disregarded the PCT priorities.  It will however 
be interesting to see how this type of conflict plays out once the other reference group is a 
sub-section of their own peers under the new commissioning arrangements effective from 
2013.320  
 
Lastly, in terms of the supposition that clients are not a significant determinant of the 
nature of the SLB role and practice, QOF appears to have done little to raise the profile of 
patients.  In some ways QOF can be seen to have downgraded the espoused focus of GP 
work, the individual; as a consequence of practices increasingly becoming structured and 
systematised around the most efficient ways of dealing with their patient population and 
collecting points.  This was exemplified by the combination of two new QOF induced 
factors: the fragmentation of care (patients being required to see a PN then a GP etc), and 
the strict call/re-call systems.  This has led to patients with multiple QOF conditions being 
required to attend their practice on several separate visits.150  This downgrades the value 
of a patient’s time in relation to the needs of organisational efficiency.  Furthermore, 
patients were seemingly regarded less as unique individuals and more as an ‘object to get 
points.’ GPs also placed little importance on or made few changes in response to the direct 
mechanism of patient feedback, the incentivised patient survey.157 This may reflect one or 
more of several issues: 1) any income-loss related to the survey is small,321 2) patient 
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satisfaction is usually high 3) patients are not in a position to assess technical competence 
and/or that their patients are essentially ‘non-voluntary’ as alternatives to traditional 
partner-run arrangements remain small.227  If the trend for the marketisation of general 
practice continues to a stage where real competition/choice occurs, the role of patients in 
influencing GP services may increase in the future.  Recent work however highlights 
various factors (e.g. patients loyalty to GPs/practices) which suggests that patient choice 
will not necessarily be a powerful lever for service changes and/or quality 
improvement.322 
 
7.3.3 Performance measures and predicted consequences 
Lipsky described how during the period of his writing, measuring the performance of 
SLBs was crude and problematic.  However, as I also discussed the ‘technology’ of 
performance measurement has moved on somewhat since the 1970s.  Medicine represents 
a good example of the improved technology with the EBP movement demonstrating that it 
is possible to define and measure complex work. In general practice, QOF and its 
associated ICT systems represent the latest attempt to measure performance.  In addition, 
to the acceptance that complex work can be reduced to a series of performance markers, 
the traditional professional norms which prevent the scrutiny and criticism of other 
GPs/professionals seem to be changing. Rather than resist these measures, GPs have for 
the various outlined reasons not only accepted the performance measures but embraced 
them. 
 
In chapter 3 section 3.6 I outlined the three predictions Lipsky made that would result 
from the introduction of performance measures to SLB work.  I now discuss each one in 
turn.  First, does the introduction of QOF provide goal clarity and allow GPs to direct their 
energies with less ambivalence than prior to QOF?  The answer appears to be yes and no. 
The combined evidence suggests that some GPs view QOF templates as aide-memoires, 
i.e. they provide clarity in terms of what they are required to do and facilitate the 
processing of their work.  As GP57 put it, as a result of QOF ‘You know what to do, and 
it's easily done.’  In particular, this is the case when the patient and QOF agendas are 
aligned. However, as outlined earlier, the introduction of QOF also served to increase the 
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ambivalence in judging when and if to complete QOF in certain consultations where it 
seemed inappropriate.  
 
Lipsky’s second prediction is that SLBs will concentrate on the measured activities.  This 
reflects concerns raised by research conducted just prior to the introduction of QOF.300 
This study reported that GPs felt linking money to clinical activity may mean that ‘tunnel-
vision’ could occur i.e. a focus on incentivised activities at the expense of non-
incentivised work.300 Again the post-QOF evidence for this actually occurring is mixed 
and limited.  At the individual level, some GPs reported to be more QOF-focused than 
others.  Some appear to resort to this more biomedical approach at particularly busy time 
points but otherwise claim to maintain a holistic approach to care.  What is clear is that 
practice resources are increasingly organised around the needs of meeting QOF targets.  
As I highlighted in chapters 5 and 6, GP principals appear to have made similar internal 
changes to their practice organisation in an effort to maximise their ability to meet QOF 
targets. These converging lines of change resulted in: altered roles and responsibilities for 
practitioners; increasing sub-specialisation; new informal QOF related hierarchies and 
increasing bureaucratisation.  Such findings support the existing empirical literature 
suggests that post-2004, individual practices responded to the needs of QOF in a similar 
manner, resulting in the emergence of converging organisational forms.165  This new 
‘singular,’ organisational form has it seems arisen in a quest for efficiency as many of the 
changes were accompanied by a rhetoric of efficiency, with respect to organisational and 
financial efficiency.  Overall such changes reflect Lipsky’s point regarding how behaviour 
in organisations becomes compatible with how the organisations are evaluated and may 
provide an explanation for the differing fortunes of incentivised and un-incentivised areas.  
My findings and the qualitative literature provide no consensus as to whether or not non-
incentivised care has suffered since 2004.  Quantitative evidence on this is limited, but 
supports the view that non-incentivised areas of clinical work are suffering in comparison 
to those incentivised.222 Furthermore a study conducted in the US investigated the effects 
of removing incentives for certain screening activities over a period of four years (vs. the 
five years where the activities were incentivised) and found declines in performance levels 
for those newly non-incentivised activities.323   
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Thirdly, has fraud and deception intruded into performance measurement? My findings 
reflect those in the exiting literature,157;151,223 and indicate that whilst some GPs admit to 
data manipulation (e.g. changing readings on the cusp of target levels), it is not 
widespread.   
  
Finally, although the technology of performance measurement has improved to measure 
aspects of clinical care, it is not capable of measuring the quality of care provision overall.  
As highlighted in the literature, QOF only measures the measurable297 and thereby 
neglects complex areas of a GP’s role that patients consider to be important.298  This was 
reflected in my findings as GPs felt QOF could not capture important aspects of their 
work (e.g. IP care) and that QOF scores do not indicate the quality of patient interactions.  
Furthermore, many were critical as there was no way to tell how the scores were achieved 
i.e. high QOF scores did not necessarily translate into high quality care provision as they 
can be achieved by ‘unprofessional’ (tick-box) means. 
 
7.3.4 Client relations 
As highlighted in chapter 3, the APMS contract option offers the potential to dramatically 
change the non-voluntary nature of patient relationships with traditional partner-run 
practice arrangements. Actual alternatives to traditional general practice provision have 
however remained low throughout the study period227 and may explain why GPs only 
viewed APMS as a potential and not an actual threat.  As a result, the non-voluntary 
nature of patients who seek GP services currently remains intact.  Existing empirical 
evidence highlights that patient choice has reduced post-QOF.150  This reflects my 
findings which highlight patients reduced choice terms of choosing when to attend and 
who they see on attending. The structured call/re-call systems treat chronic disease 
patients in Lipskian terms as ‘bundles of bureaucratically relevant attributes’ and act to 
summon patients to regularly attend their GP practices.  An example of the inflexibility 
and bureaucracy of the system was highlighted by one GP who described the awkward 
situation of patients being recalled to the practice just after they have attended, as it was 
‘the wrong time’ for the practice and its QOF targets.  Furthermore, patients can be 
required to attend specific QOF clinics, where they may not see the provider of their 
choice and as reported elsewhere are limited in their access to skilled medical care.150  
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Lastly, where patients do not attend (perhaps as they feel capable of effectively self-
managing their conditions) they may still be pursued simply as part of QOF-point 
gathering exercise.  In my sample, this was limited to telephoning patients at home, but 
other evidence suggests that some practitioners actually visit patient homes to chase QOF 
points.150  Such actions highlight the tension between patient autonomy and professional 
responsibility for the delivery of EBP. 
 
In my sample, some GPs acknowledged the post-QOF reduction in patient choice, stating 
for example that they would not previously have ‘chased’ patients who regularly did not 
attend their practice.  Others however, felt QOF provided them with a mandate to ‘chase' 
patients, that they had essentially been given greater responsibility for ensuring their 
patients received the necessary care.  Finally, it appears that where GPs are 
being/becoming QOF focused, they are using QOF templates (e.g. by blaming the 
computer prompts) to control the structure of the consultation process by prioritising their 
agenda over the patient’s. In turn, this reduces the opportunity for patients to introduce 
‘non-relevant,’ potentially distracting and/or time-consuming elements to the consultation. 
Furthermore, adopting a QOF-focused approach maximises the likelihood of individual 
GPs meeting their organisational targets and reduces the potential of experiencing 
sanctions from under-performance. These findings may provide a supplementary 
explanation for recent evidence which also suggests that GPs utilised QOF templates in 
order to limit the opportunities for patients to introduce their own topics.228   
 
7.4 Advocacy and alienation 
7.4.1 Advocacy 
If as Lipsky described, the ability of SLBs to advocate for patients (in terms of securing 
the best outcome and devoting dedicated time/effort to the individual) is undermined by 
the organisational need for mass processing, it could be argued that the implementation of 
QOF has reduced the capacity for GP advocacy.  Post-QOF, practices have undergone a 
process of QOF-induced internal re-organisation, driven by a need to meet QOF targets 
(not the needs of individual patients) in the most efficient manner.  However, the evidence 
shows GPs perceive that QOF has produced improved or standardised levels of care.  GPs 
appear to extend this logic and perceive that all registered patients now have the same 
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chance of receiving high ‘quality’ care and that the system reduces the likelihood of 
inequalities of service/bias.  This is because non-attending patients are no longer ignored 
once they fail to attend, but are actively reminded about the care available to them.  In 
addition, some patients appear to like the use of depression tools which they see as 
providing an important ‘objective adjunct’ to their GPs personal judgement.311  However, 
as I discuss in section 7.5, my data illustrates that these tools are not being used in a 
uniform manner and that GPs are developing new shortcuts. 
 
Finally, GPs also placed importance on the ability to exception report certain patients, 
which effectively allows them to continue to advocate for individual patients whose 
interests would not be served by the pursuit of targets.  
 
7.4.2 Alienation 
The combined evidence suggests that clinicians perceive much of QOF template-work as 
routine, mechanistic and largely undesirable work to conduct.  Template work therefore 
can be characterised, and was also perceived by GPs as alienating, hence many were 
happy to ‘offload’ as GP14 put it, such work to their nurses.  Such sentiments resonate 
with research conducted on the 1990 ‘GP’ contract which indicated that GPs used their 
practice nurses as ‘absorbing mechanisms’324 for their ‘dirty work.’325 This may provide 
an explanation as to why many GPs seemed as Lipsky states are ‘willing to accept 
organisational re-structuring’ and ‘less concerned with protecting their own connection 
with clients.’  QOF-induced organisational changes within practices and the reported 
reduction in GPs’ personal continuity168 with their chronic disease patients would reflect 
this statement because many GPs are increasingly only working on part of the ‘product’ 
and process.  Rather than perceiving this as alienating, many GPs in my sample were 
satisfied with the new arrangements.   They perceived their work post-QOF to be more 
satisfying as they were now seeing more diverse and complex cases which required the 
creative use of their knowledge and decision-making.  Others cited various factors which 
meant their work was less favourable i.e. they had less job satisfaction post-QOF.  For 
example, internal re-organisations (in the quest for organisational efficiency) meant that 
some were increasingly ‘pushed’ into being sub-specialised, resulting in a loss of variety 
in their work. Others concerns reflected those reported in the existing literature and 
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include the loss of continuity with patients157 (as GPs are increasingly the second point of 
contact for chronic-disease patients)kk and feeling ‘de-skilled.’161  Such findings illustrate 
that GPs (or at least a sub-set) are increasingly becoming ‘partial’ practitioners.133 
 
As the preceding paragraph highlights, GP principals are able to make decisions which 
can subsequently lead to an increase or decrease in feelings of alienation towards their 
work.  As my findings illustrate this includes the ability to decide to: give staff a ‘QOF 
holiday;’ to re-structure their surgeries in order to limit the amount of routine/repetitive 
QOF-related appointments e.g. medication reviews and/or award (and also remove) 
financial bonuses for QOF achievement to salaried staff.  This resonates with Lipsky’s 
suggestion for ways that managers may exert their discretion to reduce worker alienation 
and again points to the limitations of viewing GP principals as SLBs.  By comparison, it is 
clear that salaried GPs are not able to exert the same level of control over the type of work 
they do.  The available empirical evidence suggests that salaried GPs are experiencing 
feelings of alienation as they have little control over the type of work they do and perceive 
that they have been delegated undesirable work, specifically, the‘ left-over or discarded 
jobs…the less complex and perhaps less professionally satisfying or challenging 
work.’230(ibid p914)  As highlighted previously however, although salaried GPs in my sample 
acknowledged that they did work designated to them by their employers, they mostly felt 
that they were not simply left doing a principals ‘dirty work,’325 but were engaged in 
varied work and felt fairly treated by their employers.  However, my findings and a recent 
report do suggest that the views and experiences of salaried GPs are somewhat context 
dependent.231  Many salaried GPs in my sample compared and contrasted their 
experiences within their current practice with where they trained or the experiences of 
other salaried GPs they knew of elsewhere.  What is clear from my findings is that whilst 
many salaried GPs are content to remain salaried (as this allows them to pursue other 
areas of work etc) some eventually wish to become GP principals in the future and this is 
driven by a need to have more control.   
 
                                                 
kk Variety of work and personal continuity were the main reasons that many cited for choosing a career in 
general practice, therefore over time should the trend continue, both job satisfaction and recruitment may 
suffer. 
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There is also the issue of whether QOF has impacted upon the ability of GPs to control the 
input (i.e. patients) and outcomes of their work.  It would be appropriate to remind the 
reader at this point that QOF contains features which would appear to reduce the potential 
for GP alienation in relation to this point. Specifically, the decision to pay for progress 
towards targets (as opposed to an all or nothing approach) and the ability to exception 
report. I was curious as to what GPs felt about a version of QOF without exception 
reporting. When asked, many GPs felt that this would lead to negative results for patients 
(who may be inappropriately treated) and for themselves, as they would be penalized for 
patient actions (e.g. non-attendance, non-compliance) that were beyond their control.  
Furthermore, many perceived it would create an unequal playing field with those practices 
in affluent areas having an advantage.ll  Under the current system (and despite my sample 
containing GPs working in slightly more deprived areas than the national average) few 
GPs reported any difficulties in meeting the targets.  This supports evidence which 
indicates that although deprived practices may have initially been at a disadvantage to 
more affluent practices, the gap in QOF achievement had closed between 2004-7.221  In 
other words, the views of my GPs working in more deprived areas may reflect the later 
time point that I collected my data.  The preceding highlights the importance of exception 
reporting to feelings of alienation.  Whereas my questions regarding the removal of 
exception reporting were hypothetical in nature, there are now reports that proposals are 
afoot to remove the exception reporting facility.326  In addition to my findings, lessons on 
the effect this have can be drawn from the US, where some health plans utilize P4P 
systems, but do not have the exception reporting facility.327  The lack of an exception 
reporting facility led to physicians feeling unfairly penalized and accountable for their 
patients’ actions as well as a ‘subtle pressure to get rid of non-compliant patients.’(ibid 
p756).  
 
Finally, it appear that GPs are feeling increasingly alienated from QOF over time as they 
doubt their ability to affect the outcome of their QOF-related work, specifically the overall 
QOF score.  For example, many felt that the incentivisation of the patient survey 
                                                 
ll GPs in the most deprived areas related that their patient’s had ‘bigger issues’ to deal with (e.g. housing 
issues) than their often symptomless chronic diseases and often did not attend or comply with advice, 
medications etc. 
 232
undermined their ability to achieve full QOF points.mm  However, many still perceive that 
the majority of targets are largely within practitioner control and that points awarded 
reflect the effort invested.77  Furthermore, it seems that GPs feel that QOF has enabled 
them to increase control over the outcomes of their work, as they feel that the current 
focus on process measures has produced better quality of care.  This appears to convey to 
GPs that they can control or at least influence (proxy) outcomes and sometimes even 
‘significant outcomes’ such as a reduction in the incidence of heart attack.nn However, 
when asked about proposals to an outcome-focused QOF,329 payment by outcome-results 
was not favoured.  The negative views reflected the issues that arose for the removal of 
exception reporting i.e. that they would be unfairly penalised for factors beyond their 
control.  In other words, should the proposals come to fruition we may see GPs 
increasingly alienated from their work and this may have negative implications for the 
future of recruitment and retention within the profession. 
 
7.5 Consequences and coping mechanisms 
My findings illustrate that prior to the introduction of QOF, GPs felt more able to work in 
an atomistic manner.  As GP50 put ‘it we were operating much more individually before.’  
Post-QOF however, I have shown that GPs are experiencing greater horizontal 
accountability.  Furthermore, the use of uniform standardised templates would appear to 
restrict the scope for them to deviate and/or continue in their prior ways of working.  In 
some cases this was welcomed i.e. where patient needs were aligned with QOF, they were 
actually perceived as helpful to them completing the necessary QOF work.  In addition, 
many perceived that QOF had improved care as GPs were no longer left to their own 
devices and that they were now all singing from the same hymn sheet i.e. standardised 
working practices and having less discretion to ‘do your own thing’ was somewhat 
welcomed.   However, some GPs did appear to form new routines and short-cuts, 
primarily for areas that they did not like.  For example, many disliked the depression tools 
and found ways around it or as one GP put it he ‘intelligently bypassed it (GP37).’   
 
                                                 
mm Recent negotiations mean that the 2011/12 QOF will no longer pay according to patient survey results. 
nn Recent evidence however suggests that QOF had no discernible effects on processes of care or on 
hypertension related clinical outcomes.328 
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In terms of GPs showing example of modifying the concept of their job, most appeared 
not to have done so.  Prior to QOF it appeared that GPs were modifying the concept of 
their job in response to a re-distribution of work, specifically GPs appeared to be 
reconfiguring their identities as ‘biomedical specialists.’156  My evidence suggests that 
post-QOF, GPs are maintaining (or returning to) their claims to a holistic approach and 
describe the changes as marginal to their personal practice.   This echoes research which 
identified a post-QOF trend towards increasing biomedicalisation, despite GPs claims to 
continue to practice ‘holistically.’43  As the authors put it however, even if GPs have never 
been truly holistic, QOF has produced changes that ‘go further in the direction of a 
biomedical, disease-oriented model of care than has been seen before.’43  As I illustrated 
in section 7.2.1.2 there has been an impact on value discretion and there is increasingly 
evidence to suggest that the focus of general practice has ‘shifted from patients and the 
diseases that make them suffer, to the diseases themselves and their measurement within 
the patient.’298(p436)  Some salaried GPs in my study certainly felt that their practices and 
principals were so focused on achieving QOF that patients are now seen as an ‘object to 
get points.’  Finally, it is also clear that some GPs were becoming more specialised as a 
result of QOF, by for example being the diabetes lead in their practice.  This caused 
tensions for some who identified themselves primarily as generalists and were unwilling 
to modify the concept of their job to one resembling a consultant or ‘biomedical 
specialist.’     
 
7.6 Future outlook 
Lipsky made various suggestions to improve the future of street-level practice and the 
service received by its clients.  The first of Lipsky’s suggestions surrounds the need to 
enhance client involvement and empower them so that they become powerful figures in 
the determination of the services they need to access.  There has been a significant build-
up of government rhetoric regarding increased patient involvement in service design but 
until recently few actual mechanisms within the focus of this work general practice.  
Within QOF, the recent move to incentivise the results of the patient survey within QOF 
reflects this rhetoric.  However, in reality it appears to be an ineffective means for 
enhancing the likelihood of patient power.  Furthermore, despite the fact that general 
practice has move towards Lipsky’ suggested model of street-level units/practice rather 
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than individuals being responsible for patients, I would say that QOF has done little to 
improve patient empowerment or involvement and if anything, it appears to have 
downgraded it.  However, the recent coalition White Paper Equity and Excellence: 
Liberating the NHS 320 states that  patients will be at the ‘heart of the NHS’ system, one 
that offers ‘personalised care that reflects individuals’ health and care needs.’(ibid p3)  
This government aims to achieve this by placing GPs at the centre of commissioning; and 
ensuring that the voice of patients is ‘strengthened’ through various means including a 
patient commission operating at a national and local level known as Healthwatch. 
Furthermore the recent health select committee report extend the initial proposals in the 
White Paper320 by recommending that local commissioning bodies have a duty to consult 
Healthwatch when making decisions about service provision.330  As well as any national 
mandates to engage with patients, further motivations to satisfy client demands arises 
from the fact as of April 2013 GPs will be directly accountable to their patients for their 
commissioning decisions.  Whereas currently GPs are able to deflect any patient anger 
arising from commissioning decisions (e.g. lack of services) onto their PCTs, from 2013 
many will have to sit face to face with their patients and presumably have to explain the 
decisions of their own profession.     
 
The second major area surrounds the concept of the ‘professional fix.’ Lipsky discussed 
how the espoused service orientation of the professional has often been shown to fail.  For 
example rather than placing primacy on the needs of the client, professionals have been 
shown to favour their own preferences, leading for instance to the neglect of more 
challenging cases in favour of those easier to process.  In addition, he argues that such 
failures are allowed to perpetuate by the fact the professions, are by definition, only 
accountable to their peers who are traditionally reluctant to criticise each other and 
scrutiny is difficult as they work in isolation.  
 
These improvements as well as the fact that high QOF scores have been achieved across 
the profession, appear to strengthen the position of the profession who can now 
demonstrate their service levels. However, in terms of the issue of the professionals 
placing their clients’ needs over the needs or preferences of the professional, the 
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introduction of QOF has somewhat reduced the available time and ability to focus on the 
individual patient.  
 
Regarding the second issue of scrutiny and accountability, QOF has introduced new levels 
of scrutiny and accountability (primarily at the horizontal level and only within the remit 
of QOF) but these remain under the control of the profession i.e. GPs remain accountable 
to each other. However, new norms appear to be emerging which means that it is now 
more commonplace for GPs to criticise the performance of each other.  The emergence of 
new norms is also supported by:1)  evidence that other reforms such as Practice-Based 
Commissioning (PBC) exposed GPs within their practices to peer review (e.g. in terms of 
referral rates) from GPs outside their practices (i.e. the PBC consortia leads),164,331 2) 
recent calls by the RCGP chair for a ‘clampdown’ on poorly performing GPs and 2) a 
recent survey found that one in five GPs had reported a GP colleague for incompetence or 
impaired practice during their time in practice.332  Whereas this is commendable, the real 
test will come with the new commissioning arrangements as GPs will be responsible for 
rooting out ‘unfit’ GPs.  
 
7.7 Summary  
It appears that the introduction of the nGMS contract and QOF in 2004 has instituted 
changes within general practice that fundamentally change the way that GPs work and 
relate to one another.  QOF has been implemented within practices by a series of common 
changes which have increased the level of bureaucracy within practices as well as the 
bureaucratic aspect of the GP role.  GPs appear to have removed much of the impact on 
their own work by delegating much of the determinate template related work lower down 
the clinical hierarchy to their PNs.  It is also clear however that the actual degree of 
impact of the contractual changes on individual GPs is context specific.  For example, 
local decisions regarding the degree of delegation of template work to nurses and/or the 
level of investment into practices can vary.  Such variations have implications for feelings 
of alienation or the level of discretion individuals feel.  In order however to answer the 
call for ‘in-depth’ studies of the SLB framework within specific professions,237 and to 
answer my research question of whether the conceptualisation of GPs as SLBs is still 
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appropriate post-QOF, I focus my analytical summary on the key common changes that 
have occurred within general practice. 
 
The introduction of the nGMS and QOF has done little to change the fact that GPs are 
public service workers who directly interact with citizens in the course of their jobs.  
However it has impacted to varying degrees on many of the aspects of the framework and 
as Lipsky highlighted, the analysis is less likely to be appropriate if the key characteristics 
of ‘relatively high’ discretion were reduced and the conditions of work changed.  Post-
QOF it appears that overall levels of discretion, (although reduced vs. pre-QOF) still 
remain high within the remit of QOF and by the fact that much of QOF work has been 
delegated to staff lower down the clinical hierarchy. In addition, conditions of work 
remain inadequate relative to the tasks required of GPs, and some e.g. time have become 
even more scarce; demand continues to be high and has increased in due to the increased 
patient attendance required by QOF and is projected to continue to increase; goal conflict 
still exists for many GPs and patients remain (and as a result of QOF are in some respects 
even more) non-voluntary.  In these respects, GPs can still be seen to fit the SLB 
framework.  However, QOF has changed a central condition in relation to performance 
measurement, namely that performance measurement oriented towards goal achievement 
is now possible, at least for a sub-section of GP work.  The fact that performance is not 
only visible, measurable but also incentivised leads me to the conclusion that post-QOF 
the conceptualisation of GPs, and in particular GP principals, as SLBs appears less useful 
in understanding the responses of GPs in relation to QOF.   I argue that the post-QOF 
responses of this sub-group of GPs (and overall leads in particular) are more akin to 
Lipsky’s description of managers, rather than the SLBs they oversee.  The comparison of 
responses of practising GPs to prescriptive policies pre- and post-QOF exemplifies this 
and to finish the summary I now compare the findings from the last study to use the SLB 
framework pre-QOF (data collection March 2002-March 2003)132 to my post-QOF 
findings. 
 
Both studies set out to investigate the attitudes and experiences of GPs to non-compulsory 
prescriptive policies and in both cases GP attitudes were positive as they perceived that 
both could lead to improved patient care (e.g. via standardisation).  Despite this the GPs in 
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the pre-QOF study did not have a strategy to ensure implementation.132  No individual GP 
took responsibility for the implementation of the NSFs within their practice and 
consequently there was no systematic way of implementing the policy i.e. no ‘information 
process.’  As a result individual GPs interpreted the complex policy as they wished and 
only used aspects that made the practicalities of doing their job easier. In other words GPs 
(regardless of status) reacted as SLBs and their actions meant that enacted policy did not 
reflect official policy. However, there were also instances of behaviour that did not 
conform to expected SLB behaviour but instead resembled behaviour that would be 
expected of managers who are ‘results oriented.’132   
 
We now move forward a year to 2004 and the introduction of by far the most prescriptive 
policy in the history of general practice, QOF.  We now see that there are clear figures and 
lines of responsibility for implementing policy, resulting in a strong information process. 
In other words, GPs are policing themselves and their colleagues to ensure that for the 
most part enacted policy reflects official policy.  In addition, individual practices have 
been internally re-configured along similar lines to maximise the likelihood of meeting 
targets.  Such ‘managerial’ responses were also noted the last time that the direct link 
between finances and clinical work was made under the 1990 contract.333  However, GP 
principals have gone a step further to anything seen before and have also implemented 
internal surveillance mechanisms within their organisations.   Although such responses 
can be seen in part as a result of the development of new professional norms, these not 
offer the full explanation. Presumably the formation of these new norms has occurred over 
a longer period than the few intervening years between the two studies.  The key 
difference appears to lie in the fact that QOF is a P4P scheme and that the monies earned 
through QOF represent a significant portion of practice income which has made GP 
principals increasingly results oriented. In other words the overall responses of GP 
principals reflect their priorities as owners of, rather than workers in their organisations.  
It also provides an explanation as to why 1) the majority of GP principals continue to 
ensure their practices pursue the whole of QOF irrespective of whether or not aspects of it 
are aligned with their professional views and 2) some of QOF-related changes meant that 
GPs felt their work was now ‘harder’ and/or more alienating.   Future changes to QOF 
will test the priorities of GP principals as there are plans to remove two indicators (worth 
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approximately £1800 per practice) which incentivise practices to measure blood pressure 
in patients with hypertension and chronic kidney disease.334   These plans reflect the fact 
that NICE view these indicators as being sufficiently embedded in practiceoo and that their 
removal will allow room for new indicators.  The combined evidence would suggest that 
QOF has become ‘normalized’ within general practice,336 however the removal of direct 
incentivisation may mean that this process is reversed or at least somewhat reduced in 
limited areas.  Such changes will rely solely on GP principals’ professionalism and 
commitment to providing the necessary levels of clinical care for their practice population. 
However, the limited evidence on the removal of incentives in the United States indicates 
that activity will drop.323   
 
Finally, in regard to salaried GPs, Lipsky argues that SLBs have different priorities to 
their managers and that the relationship is ‘intrinsically conflictual.’  Although some 
professed to be less QOF-focused than their GP principals, for the most part salaried GPs 
did not appear to have differing priorities as they were aligned behind the concept of EBP 
(to the point where one could say it had become naturalized) and as a result, most of QOF.  
Only areas not perceived as evidence-based were questioned and from the accounts of 
overall QOF leads these were less well attended to by all practitioners but these are 
seemingly nonetheless ‘mopped-up’ by some means in time for the practice to meet its 
targets.  Furthermore, it appears that for those salaried GPs who aspire to become GP 
principals, it would appear counter-productive to the realisation of these aspirations to 
display ‘conflictual’ behaviour.  In this case, Lipsky’s framework fails to acknowledge 
that SLBs may themselves have aspirations to one day become the managers of their 
organisations. 
 
The conclusion that Lipsky’s framework is less appropriate to understanding the impact of 
QOF, begs the question as to what other theoretical positions may be of continued use to 
studying the profession.  I suggest that my findings in combination with those from the 
literature suggest that notion of re-stratification may be of continuing value.  Support for 
this suggestion arises from the identified changes at the micro-level of the profession 
                                                 
oo NICE cite evidence for this as being stable high achievement and low exception reporting.  The 
combination of these factors make it possible to draw up lists of suitable candidate indicators  for removal 
and is in line with the advice from their professional advisors.335 
 239
where multiple vertical strata are developing.  Firstly, within practices, there exists a 
division between those GPs holding QOF lead role responsibilities and those that do not, 
the latter individuals experiencing and accepting scrutiny by their colleagues.  
Additionally, between practices via PBC, there are those GPs occupying positions on the 
boards of consortia that not only set the goals and priorities for other practices within the 
consortia but also scrutinise the performance of practices within their consortia.  The 
forthcoming changes as proposed in the recent White Paper320 however appears to provide 
the greatest possibilities thus far for a clear demarcation within the profession, with those 
occupying the lead commissioning roles having the greatest influence over their rank-and-
file colleagues. Further research is required to explore the impact and consequences of 
these changes for the profession. 
 
7.8 Strengths and limitations 
This study benefited by using qualitative methods in order to explore in-depth the effects 
of a central policy within localised contexts. Much of the empirical literature derives from 
a small convenience sample of four practices conducted early in the life of the 
contract153,165 and although important, the generalisability of these findings was not well-
established. My findings add weight to the relevance and consensus of the concepts 
arising from early research as many of them continue to be identifiable some years on. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the small ethnographic studies which form the evidence-base 
for much of the post-QOF qualitative literature, my findings are derived from a large and 
diverse sample of GPs.  In addition, although the sample was not ‘representative,’ the final 
sample did closely approximate national statistics for many of the key characteristics.  
Furthermore, QOF is an evolving policy and most studies provided a ‘snapshot’ of the 
policy and views in time.  I was however able to assess views over time as I collected data 
over a period of almost 2 years.  My study was also able to explore the stability of GP 
views and experiences by conducting follow-up interviews with over a third of the first 
round interviewees. However, in practice, little difference was found between the first and 
second round interviews, except for views on further changes to QOF. 
 
Finally, although the interviews provided much rich data and insight into the perceived 
impact of the new contractual arrangements, one limitation is that no direct observation 
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was undertaken.  This was due to a change in the original design of the overall project that 
I was employed by.  Many of the topics raised by my analysis could benefit from 
supplementary observational work, particularly regarding the impact of QOF on the 
consultation.  In addition, the perceived impacts on the consultation could be enhanced by 
including a patient perspective.  
 
7.9 Conclusion 
This study was devised to investigate the perceived impact of a significant policy change 
in UK general practice.  The findings from this thesis support much of the existing 
empirical literature and taken together indicate that the profession is undergoing a period 
of significant change.  Furthermore, these changes have been driven primarily by GP 
themselves, starting with in Freidsonian terms the ‘knowledge elites’ (involved in 
contract/QOF negotiations) down to the GP principals who have chosen to implement and 
police their practice responses.  The results of such changes include a highly 
bureaucratised ‘GP service’ not only for practitioners to work within but also for patients 
to be processed through.  In addition, QOF has created a situation where the profession is 
undergoing a process of re-stratification which has contributed to a ‘collapse’ in 
traditional professional norms and the development of new norms including the 
‘normalisation’ of EBP.  As a result, GPs are now simultaneously able to strengthen their 
claims to the provision of a high quality service as well as to reduce the ground for some 
of the criticisms usually levelled at them.  However, under the new commissioning 
arrangements announced in the White Paper320 and due to come into full effect from 2013, 
the profession will undoubtedly be exposed to new criticisms due to the unprecedented 
level of responsibilities they will have for the health system.  Given such changes, one can 
foresee a further layer strata, with those holding the lead commissioning roles and 
‘managing’ the resources that rank-and-file colleagues require access to.  In addition, it 
seems that the future of a significant portion of the GP workforce appears to rest in the 
hands of their GP principal colleagues.  This may create cleavage and mean that any 
underlying frictions may surface.  In other words, further re-stratification may occur with 
a split between those who are employers and those who are employees.  This suggestion 
has some credence as recent reports illustrate momentum for the creation of a rival union 
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to the BMA, one which would specifically cater to and protect the needs of salaried 
GPs.337  
  
Finally, although as I discussed earlier, the presence of QOF makes the GP/SLB analogy 
less useful to studying GP responses to QOF, and in particular GP principals, this is not to 
say that the framework is not helpful beyond the remit of QOF and/or GP responses to 
future policies.  For example, should the proliferation of private sector APMS practices 
occur and/or the enforced ‘proletarianisation’ of new recruits into the profession continue, 
a significant number of GPs may find themselves working in the type of tall hierarchies 
described by Lipsky in the 1970s.   
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Appendix 1 
 
Background to Study 
The research process began when I took up a post as research associate in October 2007 
on a three-year, longitudinal NHS Service and Delivery Organisation (SDO) funded 
project. The project aimed to investigate the impact of incentives (financial and otherwise) 
contained within the recent contractual reforms on the motivations, behaviours and 
performance of primary care professionals (PCPs) across three areas of primary care 
namely; general practice, pharmacy and dentistry.  As contracts can change and in the 
case of GPs, one key aspect i.e. QOF is specifically designed to do just that, it also aimed 
to analyse how these changes would affect the motivations, behaviours and performance 
of those affected. In order to achieve its aims the project utilised a multi-method, multi-
stage design, linking analyses of national routinely collected quantitative data 
supplemented with further empirical data collection in the form of qualitative interviews.   
My role within the project was to manage the data to day requirements of the qualitative 
arm of the project as well as to undertake the data collection and take part in the analysis 
of the collected data across all sectors of interest (see338 for the project report).  In 
summary therefore, my task was to identify and formulate an area suitable for doctoral 
research within the scope of the data I was to collect. 
 
Given the breadth of the project aims, there was a lot of scope to choose a topic within any 
of the individual professions/areas or indeed to look at the impact of the new contracts 
across the various professions.  After discussions with my supervisory team, I made the 
decision to focus on general medical practice for reasons which were largely pragmatic 
i.e. it was an area I was somewhat familiar with as 1) I had previously worked as a 
research associate on a two-year project that aimed to elicit patient preferences for various 
aspects of general practice. 2) my MRes dissertation focused on assessing the 
effectiveness of interventions designed to improve the interpersonal care of primary care 
physicians.  Given that undertaking doctoral research is widely known to be a long and at 
times difficult journey, it seemed to make sense to minimise any other difficulties that I 
may have incurred during the process by attempting to undertake research outside an area 
I at least had some familiarity with.  In addition, and in relation to the first point, I was 
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also influenced by the fact that I work in a research group that produces research in 
relation to general practice and indeed produced research that directly fed into the focus of 
this research (i.e. QOF) such as the General Practice Assessment Questionnaire (GPAQ).   
Finally, the QOF has been described by some as ‘the boldest such proposal on this scale 
ever attempted anywhere in the world.’241(p457)  The opportunity to conduct research on an 
area regarded in this way and attracting international interest also proved too much of a 
temptation to resist.  
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Study of New Contracts (Incentives) in Primary Care  
    Participant Information Sheet  
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years new contracts have been introduced for some groups of Primary Care 
Professionals (PCPs). Our study is concerned with GPs, primary care dentists and 
community pharmacists.  The new contracts mean that there have been changes to the 
rules under which these groups of staff provide services to the NHS. In particular, the new 
contracts emphasise targets and payments to be made for meeting those targets. This 
means that new financial incentives have been introduced to encourage PCPs to meet 
specific targets. In addition some PCPs are becoming more involved in local 
commissioning processes.  
 
We are interested in findings out about the effect of incentives on PCPs. The research is 
aimed at providing some understanding of the ways in which incentives impact on 
patterns of working within PCP organisations, rather than looking at whether they meet 
targets. In order to do this we want to interview staff who work in PCP organisations as 
well as staff working in the PCT whose duties are connected with the new PCP contracts 
and other relevant stakeholders. We will, for example, also interview patient group 
representatives and private sector provider representatives. 
 
This research will help us learn from what works well and may suggest some areas where 
the contracts’ effects are not in line with those intended by policy makers and we will feed 
these findings into policy makers with the aim of promoting the delivery of high quality 
care in PCP organisations.  
 
We would like to invite you to help us assess what happens in PCP organisations as part 
of this process. 
 
What will I have to do if I take part? 
NPCRDC
5th Floor 
Williamson Building 
The University of Manchester 
Oxford Road 
Manchester 
M13 9PL 
 
       TELEPHONE 
0161-275 7601 
   
 FACSIMILE 
0161-275 7600 
   
DIRECT LINE 
             0161-275-7654 
Appendix 2 
 269
 
If you agree to take part a researcher will interview you. The interview will be audiotaped.  
 
What are the possible risks of taking part? 
 
There are no risks in taking part in the study. 
 
Are there any possible benefits? 
 
It is hoped that we can use what we learn to inform policy making in this area in the 
future.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No, taking part is voluntary.  If you would prefer not to take part you do not have to give a 
reason.  If you take part but later change your mind you can withdraw at any time from the 
study. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Any information you provide will be kept confidential. The information we collect will be 
stored in a locked cabinet and will be destroyed five years after the end of the study.   
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
We will produce a final report of the results for the people who funded the study. All data 
will be anonymised i.e. no personal details of any kind will be made public. We will also 
publish articles and papers about the study and produce a report for the PCP organisations 
and the various stakeholders who participated in the research. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
The research is organised by a team from the Universities of Manchester and York. It is 
funded by the NHS Service Delivery and Organisation Research & Development 
Programme. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
The study has been reviewed by funder’s reviewer process and an NHS Research Ethics 
Committee. 
 
What do I do now? 
 
If you consent to the request to be interviewed then we would like you to sign a consent 
form. If you do not consent, then please tell the researcher. 
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to read this.   
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If you wish to obtain any more information or ask any questions about this research you 
may contact: 
 
Dr Ruth McDonald, Research Fellow, University of Manchester 
National Primary Care Research and Development Centre 
Williamson Building 
University of Manchester 
0161 275 7601 
ruth.mcdonald@manchester.ac.uk  (email) 
 
Sudeh Cheraghi-Sohi, Research Associate, University of Manchester 
National Primary Care Research and Development Centre 
Williamson Building 
University of Manchester 
0161 275 7654 
Sudeh.cheraghi-sohi@manchester.ac.uk  (email) 
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NPCRDC
5th Floor 
Williamson Building 
The University of Manchester 
Oxford Road 
Manchester 
M13 9PL 
 
       TELEPHONE 
0161-275 7601 
   
 FACSIMILE 
0161-275 7600 
   
DIRECT LINE 
             0161-275-3535 
CONSENT FORM 
(Version 1, 01/12/06) 
 
 
Title of Project:  NEW 
CONTRACTS (INCENTIVES) IN 
PRIMARY CARE 
Principal investigator: Dr Ruth 
McDonald 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above 
study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving any reason, and without any detriment to myself and 
my organisation.   
  
I understand that the interview will be audio-taped  
I agree to take part in the above study.  
I understand that only the members of the research team have access to the 
information collected during the study. 
 
I am aware that the information collected during the interview will be used to 
write up a report on the project, as well as journal articles and books. 
 
I understand that information collected during the course of the research project 
will be treated as confidential. This means that my name, or any other 
information that could identify me, will not be included in anything written as a 
result of the research. 
 
 
I understand that when this research is completed the information obtained will 
be retained in locked filing cabinets in a storeroom in the National Primary 
Care R&D Centre, University of Manchester for 5 years and then will be 
destroyed. 
 
 
 
Name of Participant 
 
 
 
 
Date Signature 
Name or Person 
Taking Consent  
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Appendix 4 - Topic Guide  
 
 
How long have you been a fully qualified GP for? 
 
What made you go into general practice?  
 
What do you like about it? 
 
What do you dislike about it? 
 
 
Describe the primary health care team here and your position in it 
 
(NEED TO ASCERTAIN STATUS – SALARIED, OWNER, LOCUM ETC***) – IF 
SALARIED THEN ALSO ASK SPECIFIC UNDERLINED QUESTIONS. 
 
How long have you been at this practice? 
Did you train here? 
If no, ask how their old practice was in comparison to this. 
 
Did you actively seek a salaried role or did you want a partnership after training? 
What do you like about being salaried? 
Are there any negatives to being salaried? 
Do you want to be a partner in the future? 
 
 
Is there anything unusual about this practice? 
Staff skill mix? 
Services offered? 
What type of contract do you hold (GMS, PMS etc)? 
 
How has the new GP contract had an impact on you? 
Prompt: 
Ability to opt out of out-of-hours care? – for those who just entered prior to and after 
2004, ask if it affected their decision to choose general practice 
Changes in volume of work? More paperwork? 
Changes in nature of work?/ working patterns 
Changes in relationships with patients? 
Changes in relationships with PCT – support from PCT? 
PCT Inspection process? 
Prompt – targets/ incentives/ bonus 
 
What do you like about it? 
Prompt – impact on quality? 
 
What do you dislike about it? 
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Seeing fewer patients?  
Seeing different patients?  
Should it take into account local population factors?  
Impact on non-incentivised areas? 
 
 
What were your consultations like pre-QOF in comparison to now? (if appropriate – if not 
ask about non-QOF consultations in comparison) 
 
What % of your daily consultations would you say involve QOF? 
 
Has the contract changed the nature of the consultation? 
Prompt – routines – when do you address QOF in the consultation? 
Prompt – use of templates, views on templates, loss of eye contact?, box ticking 
Prompt – patients’ agenda lost? 
 
 
Do you think that the QOF (or aspects of it) impacts on your role as a GP?  
Prompt - advocacy 
 
Are there any indicators that you find problematic? 
Prompt depression screening, CKD 
Are all indicators pursued by the practice? 
 
 
What (if any) changes were made in your practice in order to meet the QOF targets? 
Prompt – some practices formed QOF teams – have you? If so: 
Prompt – who takes responsibility for monitoring in the practice? 
Prompt – how was it decided who would take responsibility? 
Prompt – do you chase people up / get chased up etc?  
Prompt – do you check progress on the computer? 
 
 
Has it had an impact on the other people who work here? 
Changes in skill mix, hours etc  
 
How have nurses roles changed since the introduction of the new contract? Becoming 
more specialised? 
Seeing different patients? 
Type of care? 
Prompt – some evidence to say GPs feeling de-skilled? Do you? If so, how? 
 
 
More practices are making statements about high QOF scores in their ads for staff – how 
would you interpret this? 
 
How do you feel about public/peer access to your practice’s performance? 
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What are you views about money and QOF –what other factors are there that influence 
GPs in responding to QOF? 
Prompt – health improvement 
Prompt – practice reputation 
 
 
Do you think that it has had an impact on the profession of general medical practice? 
Prompt – morale 
Prompt – public perception- media stories of money etc for GPs 
 
What are your views on the negotiations with government over the contract 2007/8?  
Prompt extended hours DES - clarify if and why they are or are not offering it. 
 
What do you think about private companies e.g. Care UK coming in to run practices & 
employing all the staff?  
If salaried, ask about their views on what they think that would be like working for a 
private company in comparison to a traditional GP run practice  
 
What do think the impact of an increasingly salaried GP workforce will have on general 
practice?  
 
How do you think GPs’ and nurses roles will change in the future?  
 
Exception reporting facility 
Can you give me an example of when you have done this? 
How would you feel if this was removed? 
 
Evolving QOF: What are your views on: 
The patient survey? 
Prompt – incentivisation 
 
New Indicators? 
Prompt –2009 HbA1c targets 
 
An outcome-based QOF? 
 
 
Final thoughts about the future of the contract/QOF 
Prompt – tension between tighter targets and PCT budget constraints? 
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Appendix 5: A diagrammatic representation of QOF team 
arrangements for selected practices 
GP34 
GP32 GP33 GP35 GP36 GP37 GP38 GP39 
Now 
QOF 
deputy 
GP47 
GP43 
GP42 GP44 GP45 GP46 
GP49 
GP2 
GP11 
GP10 
GP23 
GP17 GP18 
GP28 
GP16 
GP41 
GP40 
Overall GP QOF leads represented in dark shaded boxes  
Medium shade boxes represent partners interviewed in the practice 
Lightest boxes represent salaried GPs interviewed in the practice 
 
Practice 23 Practice 17 
GP22 
GP24 
Practice 12 
Practice 13 
Practice 2 
Practice 24 
Practice 22 
 
